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Abstract
This thesis contains three essays on delegated portfolio management and deals with
issues such as impact of regulations on mutual fund performance, impact of competition
on transparency in financial markets and strategic trading behaviour of agents in illiquid
markets.
Chapter 1 analyses the impact of more frequent portfolio disclosure on mutual funds
performance. Since 2004, SEC requires all U.S. mutual funds to disclose their portfolio
holdings on a quarterly basis from semi-annual previously. This change in regulation provides
a natural setting to study the impact of disclosure frequency on the performance of mutual
funds. Prior to the policy change, it finds that the semi-annual funds with high abnormal
returns in the past year outperform the corresponding quarterly funds by 17-20 basis points a
month. This difference in performance disappears after 2004. The reduction in performance
is higher for semi-annual funds holding illiquid assets than those holding liquid assets. These
results support the hypothesis that performance of funds with more disclosure suffers more
from activities such as front running.
Chapter 2 analyses the impact of competition in financial markets on incentives to re-
veal information. It finds that discretionary portfolio disclosure and advertising expenses of
mutual funds decrease with competition. This supports the theory that mutual funds use
portfolio disclosure and advertising as marketing tools to attract new investments in a fi-
nancial market, where superior relative performance and greater visibility are rewarded with
convex payoffs. With higher competition, the likelihood of landing new investments goes
down for each fund while the cost of disclosure goes up. Funds respond by cutting down on
costly disclosures and advertising activities. Thus competition seems to have adverse impact
on market transparency and search cost.
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Chapter 3 develops a model of strategic trading to study forced liquidation. Traders who
hold an illiquid risky security have to satisfy minimum capital requirements, or liquidate their
position. Therefore, traders with price impact can induce the fire sale of others to benefit
from future low prices. It shows that if traders have similar proportions of wealth invested
in the risky security, or the market is sufficiently liquid, they behave cooperatively and
smooth their orders over several trading periods. However, if the proportions are significantly
different across agents, and market liquidity is low, the strong agent, who is less exposed to
the risky asset, predates on the weak agent, and forces her to exit the market.
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Chapter 1
The Impact of More Frequent
Portfolio Disclosure on Mutual Fund
Performance
1.1 Introduction
In 2004 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) amended the Investment Company
Act of 1940 and required mutual funds to file its complete portfolio holdings schedule with the
Commission on a quarterly basis 1. There were several arguments in support of the increase in
the disclosure frequency. First, more frequent disclosure would allow shareholders to observe
the securities held by various funds more accurately. This in turn would help them with the
asset allocation and diversification choice of their overall portfolios. Second, share holders
would be able to better monitor whether, and how, a fund is complying with its stated
investment objective. Third, quarterly disclosure would make it easier to track whether
1within 60 days of the end of the fiscal quarter.
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funds are engaging in various forms of portfolio manipulation such as window dressing.2
However, a section of mutual fund industry and academia 3 were also concerned about
the repercussions of more frequent disclosures on fund performance. In a comment letter to
the SEC in 2003, Fidelity Investments wrote - “Mutual funds success has its costs, however,
in the form of copycats, free-riders and front-runners who can profit from knowledge of fund
shareholders holdings. As mutual funds assets have grown, the potential profits to be made
by trading against mutual funds at the expense of fund shareholders have grown as well.”
4 5
Interestingly, it appears that the concerns about holdings disclosure are not new. Way
back in 1929, when there were only a few funds around, an author had noted the following6-
“...The principal objection voiced by investment trusts to the periodical publication of
their investments is that the facts thus broadcasted often subject them to gratuitous criticism
on the part of ill-informed investors, while practical use is made of these facts mainly by
brokers on behalf of their clients, or by competitive trusts not so well equipped to ferret out
investment opportunities for themselves. Moreover, it is felt by many trusts that they would
be handicapped in realizing the best price on their holdings if the knowledge of the extent
of these holdings were public property...”
With the increase in the disclosure frequency, it was feared that funds would be forced to
incur higher cost. Apart from the increase in direct expenses associated with producing and
2See 17 CFR Parts 210, 239, et al. Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure of Registered
Management Investment Companies; Final Rule, March 9 2004
3See Wermers(2001)
4See -RE: Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure of Registered Management Investment
Companies, Release No. 33-8164; File No. S7-51-02 by Fidelity Investments, 2003
5Also in a letter to SEC, ICI (Investment Company Institute) general counsel Craig Tyler wrote “ it
would be a grave error for the commission to mandate more frequent portfolio holdings disclosure by all
funds ”
6Leland Rex Robinson, Investment Trust Organization and Management. New York: The Ronald Press
Company, 1926: 87-89.
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distributing holding related information, there would be costs coming from higher exposure
to activities such as front running and free riding.
Front running refers to the scenario where other traders buy (sell) securities in antic-
ipation of buy (sell) trades by the fund. The fund may therefore be forced to trade at
unfavorable prices. Periodic releases of fund holdings data, together with daily releases of
the funds net asset values (NAV) and returns, allow other market participants to anticipate
the funds trades in real time using computer programs that specialize in estimating portfo-
lio changes. Increasing the frequency of disclosure will improve the precision of such front
running models, yielding higher returns at the cost of the mutual funds.
There are previous empirical studies that provide evidence on the front-running activities
in the market. Cai (2003) uses a unique data set to examine the behavior of the market
makers in the Treasury bond futures market when LTCM faced difficulties in 1998. He
finds that market makers engaged in front running against customer orders coming from
a particular clearing firm- orders that closely matched various features of LTCMs trades
through Bear Stearns. Coval and Stafford (2007) show that mutual funds that experience
large outflows (inflows), tend to decrease (increase) existing positions. This creates opportu-
nities for outsiders to front run the anticipated forced trades by mutual funds experiencing
extreme fund flows. Their hypothetical front running strategy earns between 0.35% to 1.07%
a month. Chen, Hanson, Hong and Stein (2008) find indirect evidence that hedge funds do
pursue front running strategies of the kind mentioned in Coval and Stafford (2007) and profit
during periods of mutual fund distress.
Free riding refers to the situation where some funds mimic the holdings of an actively
managed fund. They rebalance their holdings based on periodic portfolio disclosure of the
actively managed funds. Frank, Poterba, Shackelford and Shoven (2004) use mutual fund
holdings data and construct hypothetical copycat funds that mimic actively managed fund
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portfolios. They provide evidence that after expenses, copycat funds earn statistically indis-
tinguishable and possibly higher returns. They argue that copycat funds could potentially
erode the market share of actively managed funds (with high expense ratios) by offering
comparable returns net of expenses. In a bigger sample Wang and Verbeek (2010) find that
copycat funds on average marginally outperform their actively managed counterparts net of
trading costs and expenses. The average relative performance of the copycat funds increases
significantly (by 5 basis points a month) after the increase in disclosure frequency in 2004.
Copycats may adversely affect fund performance if they can cause the price to move
before the fund could fully benefit from its research/ investment strategy. Some argue that
most positions could be bought or sold in a short span of time without incurring much
trading cost. However, others do not agree and argue that more frequent disclosure might
expose funds to substantial market impact costs. 7
There is also an indirect channel in which free riding activities can reduce the fund
returns. If copycat funds can generate comparable net returns (they have zero research
expenses) as the original actively managed funds, they will attract new investments. The
resulting competition will lead to lower or slowly increasing assets for the original active
funds. This implies that the existing shareholders of the active funds will have to bear a
larger chunk of the research related expenses.
However, in some situations fund returns may be enhanced by copycat activities if their
trades increase the price of the stocks held by the original active funds. In those cases
portfolio disclosure in fact enables the fund managers to realize favorable return on their
security positions in a shorter time frame.
In this paper we study the impact of more frequent portfolio disclosure on mutual fund
7For example see Craig S. Tyle, Comment Letter Re: Shareholder Reports and Quarterly portfolio
Disclosure of Regulated Investment Companies (Investment Company Inst, 2003)
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performance.
We compare the performance of the semi-annual funds with that of the quarterly funds
between 1990 and 2003 and between 2005 and 2008. If a fund discloses less often, it is likely
that it will be less exposed to activities such as front running. However, fund shareholders
may incur higher agency costs as they won’t be able to monitor fund activities more fre-
quently. To identify the impact of lower disclosure frequency on performance, we focus on
the successful (skilled funds). It is more probable that in successful funds, agency effects
will not outweigh the benefits from lower exposure to activities such as front running. Thus
our hypothesis is - successful semi-annual funds will be less exposed to activities such as
front running compared to successful quarterly funds and hence will perform better. The
same may not be true for the poorly performing semi-annual funds. Less monitoring by the
investors owing to less frequent disclosure might lead the managers in poorly managed funds
to indulge in value destroying activities and this agency cost might outweigh some or all of
the benefits accrued from less exposure to activities such as front running activities.
Between 1990 and 2003 we find that the successful semi-annual funds outperform the
successful quarterly funds by 17 to 20 basis points a month. Then we compare the per-
formance of the successful semi-qtly funds (funds that were semi-annual before and have
become quarterly after 2004) and the successful qtly- qtly (funds that were quarterly even
before 2004) funds between 2005 and 2008. Unlike before 2004, we do not find any signifi-
cant difference in their performance. We do a difference-in-difference test with semi-annual
funds which were forced to disclose quarterly after 2004 as the treatment group and funds
which have been quarterly throughout as the control group. We find that the performance
of successful previously semiannual funds have come down by about 22 basis point a month
after 2004. That is the performance of the previously semi-annual successful funds has come
down after 2004 to the extent that they are no longer different from the quarterly successful
funds after 2004. This suggests that the previously semi-annual funds are now more exposed
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to activities such as front running and this is affecting their performance adversely.
Then we turn our attention to the illiquid and liquid funds (funds who invests in illiquid
and liquid assets respectively). Trades by illiquid funds will incur larger price impacts and
will attract more front runners. It is likely that illiquid funds will benefit more by disclosing
less frequently compared to other funds and particularly compared to liquid funds.
Between 1990 and 2003 we find that successful illiquid semi-annual funds outperform the
successful quarterly funds by 32 basis points a month. At the same time we don’t find any
significant difference between the performance of successful liquid semi-annual and quarterly
funds. In a difference in difference test we find that the performance of successful previously
semiannual illiquid funds have come down by about 34 basis points a month after 2004. We
do not see any such reduction in performance for the liquid semiannual funds. We repeat
this exercise for the small cap and large cap funds. By their investment styles, small cap
funds invest in small cap stocks which are relatively illiquid and large cap funds in large cap
stocks which are relatively liquid. We find similar results as in our earlier illiquid and liquid
fund tests.
We then look at the total assets under management of the funds. Semi-annual funds
seem to be bigger in size compared to quarterly funds. Ge and Zheng (2006) find that large
funds are more likely to disclose less frequently. Funds with large assets under management
are more likely to trade in bigger sizes with larger price impact. This will attract more
front-runners. Hence if these large funds disclose less often they will save more on trading
costs. We find that the outperformance of successful semi-annual funds over the successful
quarterly funds increases with the size of the funds. We don’t find any such relationship
after 2004.
Between 1990 and 2003 we do not find any significant difference between the performance
of poorly performing semi-annual and quarterly funds. It appears that any gain on less front
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running for the semi-annual fund is negated by larger agency cost incurred by the fund
managers as a result of less monitoring. The increase of disclosure frequency after 2004 was
expected to reduce the agency cost in the previously semi-annual poorly performing funds
and hence to improve their performance after 2004. However this would also expose the
funds to activities such as front-running and it is not obvious which effect would dominate.
We compare the performance of poorly performing semi-qtly funds and poorly performing
qtly- qtly funds between 2005 and 2008. We do not find any significant difference in their
performance (as was the case prior to 2004). This suggests that any improvement in the
agency cost of the poorly performing previously semi-annual funds after 2004 has been
negated by the increase in the trading costs owing to activities such as front running.
As a robustness check we examine the impact of disclosure frequency on the unobserved
action of the mutual funds captured by return gap (the difference between the reported fund
return and the return on a portfolio that invests in the previously disclosed fund holdings).
During 1990-2003 period, we find that the return gap of the successful semi annual funds
to be higher than that of successful quarterly funds by about 12 basis points a month.
This difference in return gap between semi-annual successful and quarterly successful funds
persists over time and predicts the difference in their future performance. This implies that
unobserved actions of the successful semi-annual funds create more value compared to their
quarterly counterparts. However, after 2004 we do not see any such difference in return gap
between previously semi-annual funds and funds who have been quarterly throughout.
Our paper is related to Ge and Zheng (2006). Using data between 1985 and 1999, they
find that past winners (losers) who disclose less frequently outperform (underperform) past
winners (losers) who disclose more frequently. We take the change in mandatory disclosure
policy as an exogenous event to examine the impact of disclosure frequency on the perfor-
mance of mutual funds. Ours is a cleaner test because prior to 2004 the funds could choose
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between quarterly and semi-annual frequency (for that matter any frequency higher than
semi-annual).
Rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 1.2 discusses the hypotheses, Section
1.3 discusses the methodology, Section 1.4 describes the data , Section 1.5 presents the results
and Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Hypotheses
We would like to test the impact of frequency of mandatory disclosure on mutual fund
performance. We conjecture that if a fund discloses less often, it will be less exposed to
activities such as front running. This will lead to superior performance compared to a fund
which discloses more often. On the other hand there are concerns that agency costs may go
up in the funds with less frequent disclosure as fund shareholders will not be able to monitor
fund activities more frequently.
The net result of these two opposing effects - lower trading cost (owing to less front
running) and higher agency cost (owing to less monitoring) is not obvious in funds which
discloses less often. Hence, to examine the effects of lower disclosure frequency on perfor-
mance, we focus on the successful ( skilled funds). It is more likely that in successful funds,
agency effects will not outweigh the benefits from lower trading cost. Thus, we should expect
successful semi-annual finds to outperform successful quarterly funds.
Prior to 2004 (1985-2004), mandatory frequency of disclosure was semi-annual. However
some 60% of the funds opted to disclose quarterly. So one could possibly compare the
performance of the successful semi-annual and quarterly funds during this period to examine
the effects of disclosure frequency on fund performance. However, this test will not give us
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the correct picture as disclosure frequency is not determined exogenously.8 Still we should
expect a statistical association between the two, particularly if there is a cost to switch from
one disclosure frequency to the other.
We look at the performance of semi-annual and quarterly funds before 2004, however,
we address the problem arising from endogenous choice of disclosure frequency by using the
change in mandatory disclosure frequency in 2004 as a natural experiment. After 2004, all
the funds had to disclose their holdings every quarter. We consider the funds which disclosed
semi-annually before 2004 as our treatment group and the funds which disclosed quarterly
even before 2004 as our control group and test the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: The change in mandatory disclosure frequency in 2004 will have a detri-
mental effect on the performance of successful previously semi-annual funds compared to
successful funds which have been quarterly throughout.
Free riding and front running could be two channels by which portfolio disclosure can
affect the fund performance. Free riding will be costly for the funds if it can cause the
price to move before the fund could fully benefit from its research and investment strategies.
There is also an indirect channel through which free riding activities can reduce the net
fund returns. There is evidence that copycat funds can generate comparable net returns as
the original active funds. This implies that both the original active and copycat funds will
compete for investments in the market. This will lead to lower assets for the active funds or
slower growth of their assets and its existing shareholders will have to bear a larger part of
the research expenses. Also, as we have discussed already, there are scenarios where original
active fund returns may be enhanced by free riding activities. Thus the impact of free riding
activities on the fund returns is not obvious.
However, front running activities are always costly for the funds and it will be severe
8Funds could chose any frequency higher than semi-annual during this period.
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for funds holding illiquid assets. Trades by illiquid funds will incur larger price impact and
will appear as lucrative profit making opportunities to the front runners. By the same logic,
funds holding relatively liquid assets will attract less front runners and its performance will
suffer less from these activities. We formulate the following hypothesis to test this.
Hypothesis 2: The effect predicted in Hypothesis 1 will be stronger for semi-annual funds
holding illiquid assets than those holding liquid assets.
1.3 The Difference-in-Difference test
A clean way to examine the impact of change in the disclosure frequency on mutual fund
performance will be to implement a difference-in-difference test. This is possible, because
in our sample, we have funds which disclosed semi-annually before 2004 and which were
subsequently forced to disclose quarterly after 2004. This group of funds (semi-qtly funds)
will be our treatment group. There are also funds who had been voluntarily disclosing
quarterly before 2004. Hence, the change in the policy will not affect the performance of
this group of funds (qtly-qtly). We treat them as our control group.
As discussed before, to identify the effect of change of disclosure frequency better, we
focus on the successful semi-annual and quarterly funds only. That is, we restrict our sample
to the top ranking funds based on their past 12-month four factor abnormal return. Our
econometric specification is the following.
Alphai,t = Constant+β1∗Semii+β2∗POST2004+β3∗Semii∗POST2004+β4∗Xi,t+i,t
Where Alphai,t is fund i’s four factor abnormal return in month t . Semii is an indicator
variable and takes a value of one if fund i is semi-annual between 1990 and 2003 and zero if it
is quarterly. POST2004 is an indicator value and takes a value of one if t is later than 2004.
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Xi,t is a set of control variables such as Total net asset, Expense ratio etc. All the control
variables are lagged by a month. We include year dummies in the regression and use panel
corrected standard errors. Here the coefficient of interest is β3, which captures the impact
of change in disclosure frequency on the performance of successful previously semi-annual
funds. We expect it to be negative.
We repeat the above test by restricting our sample to poorly performing funds (bottom
ranking funds, based on their past 12-month four factor abnormal return) only. In this case
β3 will capture the impact of change in disclosure frequency on the performance of poorly
performing previously semi-annual funds.
If we do not restrict our sample to successful or poorly performing funds only, the econo-
metric specification corresponds to that of a Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference (triple
difference) test as specified below.
Alphai,t = Constant+β1∗Semii +β2∗POST2004 +β3∗Rank4i,t−1 +γ1∗Rank4i,t−1 ∗
Semii + γ2 ∗Rank4i,t−1 ∗POST2004 + γ3 ∗Semii ∗POST2004 + δ1 ∗Semii ∗POST2004 ∗
Rank4i,t−1 + δ2 ∗Xi,t + i,t
Where the new independent variable Rank4i,t−1 is an indicator variable and takes a value
of one if fund i belongs to the top quintile based on the past 12 months four factor abnormal
return. Otherwise, it takes a value of zero. Here the coefficient of interest is δ1 which is
equivalent to β3 in the previous equation and captures the same effect (the impact of change
in disclosure frequency on the performance of successful previously semi-annual funds). As
before we expect it to be negative.
Also, we test the impact of change in disclosure frequency on the performance of poorly
performing previously semi-annual funds by the following specification.
Alphai,t = Constant+β1∗Semii +β2∗POST2004 +β3∗Rank0i,t−1 +γ1∗Rank0i,t−1 ∗
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Semii + γ2 ∗Rank0i,t−1 ∗POST2004 + γ3 ∗Semii ∗POST2004 + δ1 ∗Semii ∗POST2004 ∗
Rank0i,t−1 + δ2 ∗Xi,t + i,t
Here the new independent variable Rank0i,t−1 is an indicator variable and takes a value
of one if fund i belongs to the bottom quintile based on the past 12 months four factor
abnormal return. Otherwise it takes a value of zero. Here the coefficient of interest is again
δ1.
1.4 Data and Summary Statistics
Our sample covers the time period between 1990 and 2008. The mandatory portfolio disclo-
sure frequency for the mutual funds was semi annual until 2004. So we divide our sample
into two - 1990 and 2003 and 2005-2008. We follow Kacperczyk , Sialm and Zheng (2007)
and merge the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Survivorship Bias Free Mu-
tual Fund Database with the Thompson Financial CDA/Spectrum holdings database and
the CRSP stock price data. The CRSP mutual fund database includes information on fund
returns, total net assets (TNA), different types of fees, investment objectives, and other fund
characteristics. The CDA/Spectrum database provides stock holdings of mutual funds. The
data are collected both from reports filed by mutual funds with the SEC and from voluntary
reports generated by the funds.
We focus on open-end US domestic equity mutual funds. We eliminate balanced, bond,
money market, international, and sector funds, as well as funds not invested primarily in
equity securities. To be more precise we base our selection criteria on the objective codes
and on the disclosed asset compositions. We select funds with the following ICDI objectives:
AG, GI, LG, or IN. If a fund does not have any of the above ICDI objectives, we select
funds with the following Strategic Insight objectives: AGG, GMC, GRI, GRO, ING, or
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SCG. If a fund has neither the Strategic Insight nor the ICDI objective, then we go to the
Wiesenberger Fund Type Code and pick funds with the following objectives: G, G-I, AGG,
GCI, GRI, GRO, LTG, MCG, and SCG. If none of these objectives is available and the fund
has a CS policy (Common Stocks are the securities mainly held by the fund), then the fund
is included.
We exclude funds that have the following Investment Objective Codes in the Spectrum
Database: International, Municipal Bonds, Bond and Preferred, and Balanced. The reported
objectives do not always indicate whether a fund portfolio is balanced or not, and hence we
exclude funds that, on an average, hold less than 80% or more than 105% in stocks. We
also exclude funds that hold fewer than 10 stocks and those which in the previous month
managed less than $5 million.
If a fund has multiple share classes, we eliminate the duplicate funds and compute the
fund-level variables by aggregating across the different share classes - for the TNA under
management, we sum the TNAs of the different share classes. For the other quantitative
attributes of funds (e.g., returns, expenses etc), we take the weighted average of the attributes
of the individual share classes, where the weights are the lagged TNAs of the individual share
classes.
To identify illiquid and liquid funds, we adopt the following two approaches. First, we
retrieve from the Thompson database the detailed holding data for each fund in the sample
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and obtain the Gibb’s estimate9 for each of the stocks held by funds.10 The liquidity measure
of the fund is then calculated as the value weighted average liquidity measure of the funds’
underlying securities. Every month we divide the funds into tertiles based on their liquidity
measure and call the top tertile funds as illiquid funds and the bottom tertile funds as liquid
funds.
Second, we identify the small cap and large cap funds from the sample by Strategic
Insight objective code and Lipper class code from the CRSP Mutual Fund Data Base. We
also check the names of the funds and Morningstar investment style data to confirm their
investment styles. We find 77 semi-annual and 215 quarterly small cap funds. Similarly we
find 87 semi-annual and 206 quarterly large cap funds. We consider funds which invest in
small cap stocks as illiquid funds and which invest in large cap stocks as liquid funds.
1.4.1 Summary Statistics
Table 1.1 reports summary statistics of the main fund attributes.There are 2901 unique funds
in our sample. We call a fund semi-annual (or quarterly) if it discloses every six months (or
every three months) at least 75% of the time during its whole life span. Changing this
threshold to say 70% or 80% does not qualitatively change our results. Hence, for the
most part of the analysis we stick to the 75% threshold.11 At this level we have around
9We download the estimates from Joel Hasbrouck’s website at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/ jhasbrou/.
The Gibbs estimator is a Bayesian version of Rolls (1984) transactions cost measure
c =
{ √−cov(rt, rt−1) if cov(rt, rt−1) < 0
0 otherwise
This measure derives from a model in which rt = c ∗ δq+ut where qt is a trade direction indicator (buyer or
seller initiated), c the parameter to be estimated, δqt the change in the indicator from period t− 1 to t, and
ut an error term. A couple of algebraic steps leads to the previous expression under the assumption that
buyer and seller initiated trades are equally likely.
10We also use the Amihud liquidity measure instead of Gibbs estimate and find similar results
11Owing to missing data and other reasons such as change in the fiscal year, we do not see a fund disclosing
at the same frequency throughout its existence. So we allow for some of the disclosures to be at different
frequencies and still call a fund semi-annual / quarterly as the case may be. When we increase the threshold
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1200 quarterly funds and 600 semi-annual funds in Thompson Financial CDA/Spectrum
database. However, after merging with CRSP database and screening the sample following
the procedure mentioned above, we have 777 quarterly and 392 semi-annual domestic equity
funds. This number goes up when we define semi-annual and quarterly funds at a lower
threshold - say at 70%.
Panel A of this table displays the mean, the median, the standard deviation, the 25th
and the 75th percentile of the TNA (Total Net Assets), number of stock holdings, expense
ratio, new money flow, annual turnover and age of all the funds in the sample. Panel B,
reports the same details for the the quarterly funds and Panel C for the the semi-annual
funds. We calculate new money flow as follows: flowi,t =
(
TNAi,t−TNAi,t−1∗(1+reti,t)
TNAi,t−1
)
.
Table 1.2 compares the characteristics of all the funds in the sample with that of the quar-
terly and semi-annual funds and reports p value of the difference in the means of quarterly
and semi-annual funds.
We see that the semi funds are considerably bigger in size(TNA) compared to the quar-
terly funds. This may be because big funds are more exposed to activities such as front
running and they prefer to disclose less often to minimize their trading cost.
The expense ratio of the semi-annual funds seems to be higher than that of the quarterly
funds. If we can take expense ratio to be a proxy for agency cost, we probably can infer
that funds which are more likely to incur agency cost are the ones more likely to disclose
less frequently. However, expense ratio includes marketing and distribution cost, and higher
marketing expenses may not necessarily lead to poor performance.
The annual turnover ratio of semi-annual funds seem to be higher than that of the
quarterly funds. If we can consider turnover ratio to be a proxy for information related
beyond 80% we have fewer funds and our statistical tests lack power.
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trades, we probably can infer that funds engaged in more information based trades prefer to
be semi-annual.12
We see that flows to the semi-annual funds are more volatile. It may be because funds
experiencing volatile flow strategically disclose less frequently to counter flow based front
running.
Lastly semi-annual funds appear to be holding more number of stocks and are younger
compared to their quarterly counterparts.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Frequency of Disclosure and Mutual Fund Performance
We divide our sample into two periods - between 1990 and 2003 and between 2005 and 2008
- and compare the performance of semi-annual and quarterly funds in each of these periods.
Before 2004
First, we identify the semi-annual and quarterly funds during 1990-2003. Every month we
rank the funds into quintiles based on their past 12 month abnormal returns using the
Carhart (1997)four factor model.It has the following general specification:
Ri,t −RF,t = αi + βi,M(RM,t −RF,t) + βi,SMBSMBt + βi,HMLHMLt + βi,MOMMOMt + i,t
where the dependent variable is the return of fund i in month t minus the risk-free rate,
and the independent variables are given by the returns of the following four zero-investment
factor portfolios. The term RM,t − RF,t denotes the excess return of the market portfolio
12see Ge & Zheng (2006) for a discussion on expense ratio, turnover ratio etc.
30
over the risk-free rate, SMB is the return difference between small and large capitalization
stocks, HML is the return difference between high and low book-to-market stocks, and MOM
is the return difference between stocks with high and low past returns.13 The intercept of
the model, αi, is Carhart’s measure of abnormal performance. The CAPM uses only the
market factor, while the Fama and French model uses the first three factors.
We hold an equally weighted portfolio of the funds in a quintile for the next one month.
Then we regress these monthly portfolio returns on the market factor (CAPM), three factors
(Fama and French) and four factors (Carhart). The results are reported in Table 1.3.
At the bottom of the table we see that there is no unconditional difference between
the performance of semi-annual and quarterly funds. However, top quintile semi-annual
funds outperform top quintile quarterly funds by 17-20 basis points a month. This supports
our conjecture that top quintile quarterly funds suffer more from activities such as front
running. We report results for mean raw returns, mean excess returns in the first two
columns. However we concentrate on the CAPM alpha, three factor alpha and four factor
alpha in the last three columns.
We do not find any significant difference between the performance of poorly performing
semi-annual and quarterly funds. This probably implies that any gain on less front running
for the semi-annual fund is negated by larger agency cost incurred by the fund managers
owing to less monitoring.
For robustness check we repeat the portfolio analysis for semi-annual and quarterly funds
who disclose semi-annually or quarterly for more than 80% of the time during their existence.
We find similar results as reported in table 1.4. The top quintile semi funds outperform top
quintile quarterly funds by 16-19 basis points a month. And there is no significant difference
13The factor returns are taken from Kenneth French’s Web site:
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data Library.
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in performance between the bottom quintile semi-annual and quarterly funds. In unreported
results we repeat this analysis for frequency thresholds starting from 70% and increasing by
steps of 1% and get similar findings. As a further step to check robustness of our results,
we repeat the above analysis by ranking the funds based on their past 12-month four factor
abnormal returns into deciles and compare the performance of the top and bottom decile
semi-annual funds with that of top and bottom deciles quarterly funds. We do not report
the results. However, the top decile semi-annual fund outperforms the top decile quarterly
fund by even a larger margin(by 24-28 basis point a month compared to 17-20 basis points
a month earlier). There is no statistically significant difference in performance between the
bottom decile semi-annual and quarterly funds.
The results we obtain for the successful funds here is similar to Ge and Zheng(2006),
but we do not find their results for poorly performing funds. They examine the relationship
between disclosure frequency and future fund performance conditioned upon fund investment
skills. They take past performance as a proxy for fund investment skills and show that past
winners who disclose less frequently outperform past winners who disclose more frequently
and past losers who disclose less frequently under perform past losers who disclose more
frequently. The difference in result for the poorly performing funds could be attributed to
the more recent data (our sample spans from 1990-2003 and theirs from 1985-1999) and the
different methodology we use in this study.
After 2004
Between 1990 and 2003 we see that semi-annual successful funds outperform quarterly suc-
cessful funds by 17-20 basis points a month. This may be because semi-annual successful
funds were less exposed to activities such as front running. If this is true we should expect
the difference in performance (between semi-annual successful funds and quarterly success-
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ful funds) to be reduced or become insignificant after 2004, as all the funds are required to
disclose quarterly since then.
We compare the performance of previously (prior to 2004) semi-annual successful funds
with quarterly successful funds between 2005 and 2008. We rank the semi-annual and quar-
terly funds into quintiles based on their four factor abnormal return during the previous 12
months.We hold an equally weighted portfolio of the funds in a quintile for the next one
month. Then we regress these monthly portfolio returns on the market factor (CAPM),
three factors (Fama and French) and four factors (Carhart).
We see in Table 1.5 that there is no statistical or economic significant difference in
performance between the semi-annual successful funds and quarterly successful funds any
more. The difference in abnormal returns has reduced from 17-20 basis points a month prior
to 2004 to 2-4 (none of which is statistically significant) basis points a month after 2004.
In unreported analysis, we divide the sample period from 1990 to 2008 into three – 1990-
1997, 1998-2003 and 2005-2008. We find that the semi-annual successful funds outperform
the quarterly successful funds during the first two sub periods. However, between 2005 and
2008, there is no significant difference in their (previously semi-annual and quarterly funds)
performances.
The increase of disclosure frequency after 2004 was expected to reduce the agency cost in
the previously semi-annual poorly performing funds and hence to improve their performance.
However this would also expose the funds to activities such as front running and it is not
obvious which effect would dominate.We compare the performances of poorly performing
semi-quarterly funds and poorly performing qtly-qtly funds between 2005 and 2008. In Table
1.5 we do not find any significant difference in their performance (as was the case prior to
2004). This suggests that any improvement in the agency cost of the poorly performing
previously semi-annual funds after 2004 has probably been negated by the increase in the
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trading costs owing to activities such as front running.
For robustness purposes we repeat the analysis for semi-annual and quarterly funds,
defined with a threshold of 80% and obtain similar results.There is no significant difference
in performance between the semi-annual successful funds and quarterly successful funds any
more. We rank the funds into deciles based on their past 12-month four factor abnormal
return and repeat the analysis. We again obtain similar results.
The Difference-in-Difference Estimator
So far we have learned that successful semi-annual funds have a performance advantage
over successful quarterly funds prior to 2004. We also saw that this performance advantage
goes away after 2004. Now we need to establish that this is indeed caused by the change
in disclosure policy in 2004. In this sub-section we try to show that through difference-
in-difference and triple difference tests. We are able to implement these tests because the
change in the policy is an exogenous event, which affects only the semi-annual funds (our
treatment group) and not the quarterly funds (our control group). As discussed before, for
better identification of the impact of higher disclosure frequency on performance, we focus
on the successful semi-annual and quarterly funds.
Table 1.6 shows results for the difference-in-difference test. Here our main variable of
interest is the double interaction term(Semii ∗ POST2004). In panel A, we have restricted
our sample to the successful funds only and in Panel B, to poorly performing funds only. We
can see that the above coefficient is negative and significant in Panel A and not significant
in Panel B. This implies an performance drop of around 22 bps a month after 2004 for the
successful funds who were semi-annual before 2004. In Panel B we do not see any such
change in the performance of the poorly performing funds which were semi-annual before
2004.
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Table 1.7 shows results for the difference-in-difference-in-difference test. For this test we
use the whole sample of semi-annual and quarterly funds. Here our main variables of interest
are the triple interaction terms( Semii ∗ POST2004 ∗Rank4i,t−1 and Semii ∗ POST2004 ∗
Rank0i,t−1 ). These are similar to the double interaction term in Table 1.6. As we can
see, the coefficient on Semii ∗ POST2004 ∗ Rank4i,t−1 is negative and significant in all the
specifications. This implies that successful funds which were semi-annual before 2004 appear
to have lost around 22-23 bps a month after 2004. The coefficient on Semii ∗ POST2004 ∗
Rank0i,t−1 is not significant. And this implies that the change in the regulation did not have
any impact on the poorly performing funds which were semi-annual before 2004.
These evidence support the hypothesis that successful previously semi-annual funds are
more exposed to activities such as front running after 2004 and this is adversely affecting
their performance. In the next section we will look at the cross-section of semi-annual and
quarterly funds and will give further evidence in support of this argument.
1.5.2 Frequency of Disclosure, Mutual Fund Performance and Illiq-
uid Fund Holdings
In this section we test our second hypothesis which says that the change in the disclosure
policy will affect the funds holding illiquid assets (Illiquid Funds) more than funds holding
liquid assets(Liquid Funds).
First, we examine if there is any difference in the performance between the illiquid semi-
annual and illiquid quarterly funds prior to the policy change. We then go on to implement a
difference-in-difference test to see if the performance of the successful previously semi-annual
illiquid funds has come down after the policy change in 2004. We repeat the above exercise
for liquid semi-annual and quarterly funds. At the end we implement difference-in-difference
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tests for small cap and large cap funds.
Relative performance of Illiquid and Liquid semi-annual and quarterly Funds
before 2004
We identify the illiquid and liquid semi-annual and quarterly funds following the methods
explained in sections 1.4. Every month we rank these funds into tertiles based on their past
12 month abnormal returns using the Carhart (1997)four factor model. We hold an equally
weighted portfolio of the funds in a tertile for the next one month. We regress these monthly
portfolio returns on the market factor (CAPM), three factors (Fama and French) and four
factors (Carhart).
Table 1.8 shows the results for the performance difference between illiquid semi-annual
and illiquid quarterly funds in Panel A and between liquid semi-annual and liquid quarterly
funds in Panel B. We can see that the successful semi-annual illiquid funds have significant
3-factor and 4-factor performance advantage (of around 33 basis points) over their quarterly
counter parts. We do not see any such difference for the liquid successful funds. This lend
credence to the hypothesis that illiquid quarterly funds attract more front runners and hence
suffer more compared to the illiquid semi-annual funds.
The Difference-in-Difference Test for the Illiquid Funds
We just learned that successful illiquid semi-annual funds have a performance advantage over
successful illiquid quarterly funds prior to 2004. In this section we will examine the impact
of the change in disclosure policy in 2004 on the performance of illiquid semi-annual funds
through difference-in-difference and triple difference tests. We are able to implement these
tests because the change in the policy is an exogenous event, which affects only the semi-
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annual illiquid funds (our treatment group) and not the quarterly illiquid funds (our control
group). As discussed before, for better identification of the impact of higher disclosure
frequency on performance, we focus on the successful semi-annual and quarterly illiquid
funds.
Table 1.9 shows results for difference-in-difference estimation for the successful illiquid
funds in Panel A and poorly performing illiquid funds in Panel B (the sample has been
restricted to the successful illiquid funds for Panel A and poorly performing illiquid funds
for Panel B). As discussed earlier the coefficient of interest is that of the double interaction
term(Semii ∗ POST2004). We can see that it is negative and significant for the successful
illiquid semi-annual funds (Panel A) and insignificant for the poorly performing illiquid
semi-annual funds(in Panel B). This result (about -34 bps a month) is similar but stronger
than the results we had obtained for the whole sample of successful semi-annul funds(about
-22 bps a month). This further supports the hypothesis that successful semi-annual funds,
particularly illiquid funds suffer more from activities such as front running after the policy
change in 2004.
Table 1.10 shows results for the triple difference test for the illiquid funds. For this
test we use the whole sample of semi-annual and quarterly illiquid funds. Here our main
variables of interest are the triple interaction terms( Semii ∗ POST2004 ∗ Rank2i,t−1 and
Semii ∗ POST2004 ∗Rank0i,t−1 ).These are similar to the double interaction term in Table
1.9. As we can see, the coefficient on Semii ∗ POST2004 ∗ Rank2i,t−1 is negative and
significant in all the specifications. This implies that successful illiquid funds who were semi-
annual before 2004 appear to have lost around 36 bps a month after 2004. The coefficient
on Semii ∗ POST2004 ∗ Rank0i,t−1 is not significant. And this implies that the change in
the regulation did not have any net impact on the poorly performing illiquid funds who were
semi-annual before 2004.
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The Difference-in-Difference Test for the Liquid Funds
We repeat the tests for the liquid funds. The results are reported in the tables 1.11 and
1.12. We do not find the results we find for the illiquid funds. In fact in Table 1.12 we
find some improvement in performance for the successful previously semi-annual funds and
deterioration in performance for the poorly performing previously semi-annual funds.
The Difference-in-Difference Test for Small Cap and Large Cap Funds
In this subsection we use illiquid and liquid funds identified based on their investment styles.
Small cap funds primarily invest in small cap stocks which are relatively illiquid and large
cap funds primarily invest in large cap stocks which are relatively liquid. Our hypothesis
would predict that the change in frequency will have a higher impact on the small cap funds
compared to the large cap funds.
We conduct similar tests on these funds as we did in the previous section. Table 1.13
shows the results. We see that the results for the small cap fund is similar to what we had
previously obtained for illiquid funds. The performance of successful previously semi-annual
small cap fund has gone down by around 36 bps a month after 2004. And there appears to be
no impact of the change in disclosure frequency on the performance of successful previously
semi-annual large cap funds. Similarly we do not find any net impact on the performance of
poorly performing previously semi-annual small cap and large cap funds.
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1.5.3 Frequency of Disclosure, Mutual Fund Performance and Size
of the Funds
In this subsection, we turn our attention to asset under management. From the descriptive
statistics of the funds, we see that the semi-annual funds are significantly larger than the
quarterly funds. Ge and Zheng (2006) show that large funds are more likely to disclose
less frequently . So it is likely that prior to 2004 successful large funds which disclose less
frequently will outperform successful large funds which discloses more frequently by a bigger
margin. That is the relative performance between semi-annual and quarterly funds will
increase with asset under management.
To test this we rank both the semi-annual and quarterly funds based on their past 12
months (four factor) abnormal return. We choose only the top quintile semi-annual and
quarterly funds from the sample. We again rank these top quintile funds based on their
total net assets. As we are doing a double sort, we consider funds between 1998-2003 to
have more number of funds in each size groups. In all, we have 33011 observations for
quarterly funds (693 unique funds) and 15220 observations for the semi-annual funds(339
unique funds). We compare the performance of successful semi-annual funds with that of
successful quarterly funds in the same size(TNA) group.
In panel A of the Table 1.14, we divide the successful semi-annual and quarterly funds
into three groups based on their recent size(TNA) and hold an equally weighted portfolio
of funds in each group for the next month. We report the mean raw return, mean excess
return, CAPM alpha, three factor alpha and four factor alpha.
We see that the magnitude of the outperformance of successful semi-annual funds over
successful quarterly funds increases almost monotonically over the size of the funds. For
example for the 3 factor regression it is 7 basis points a month for the lowest size group and
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37 basis points for the highest size group.
In panel B we divide the successful funds into two groups based on their recent size(TNA)
and repeat the same exercise. We find similar results. The out performance of the semi-
annual funds in the bigger size group is more than double that of the smaller size group.
The results support our conjecture that successful large funds are more exposed to ac-
tivities such as front running and incur more on trading costs compared to successful small
funds. The results are economically significant and of mixed statistical significance.
After 2004, we do not find any difference in performance between the semi-annual and
quarterly successful funds and also, we do not find any relationship between their size and
relative performance.
1.5.4 Frequency of Disclosure and Return Gap
As a robustness check, we study if semi-annual and quarterly funds differ in creating or
destroying value relative to the previously disclosed holdings.
Kacperczyk, Sialm & Zheng(2007) estimate the impact of unobserved actions on fund
returns using a measure they call return gap. It is the difference between the reported fund
return and the return on a portfolio that invests in the previously disclosed fund holdings.
They document that unobserved actions of some funds persistently create value, while such
actions of other funds destroy value. Their main result shows that return gap is persistent
and it predicts future fund performance.
We conjecture that activities such as front running and in certain circumstances free riding
will affect firms’ abilities to create value relative to the previously disclosed holdings. Copycat
and front running strategies are less effective against the semi-annual funds compared to the
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quarterly funds and to the extent these strategies affect only the fund returns and not the
holding period returns, we will see return gaps of the semi-annual successful funds to be
persistently higher than that of quarterly successful funds.
For the poorly performing semi-annual funds, the advantage of less front running may
be negated by more value destroying activities by the fund manager (as a result of less
monitoring by the investors ) and it is not obvious if the return gap of the semi-annual poor
funds will be different from that of the quarterly poor funds.
Persistence of difference in Return Gap between the semi-annual and quarterly
funds
In this section we examine if there is any difference in the monthly return gap between the
successful14 semi-annual funds and successful quarterly funds and if this difference persist
over time. If there is a systematic difference between both the groups then we would expect
the relative return gap to persist over time.
We rank the funds based on their lagged 12-month average return gap and report equally
weighted return gap for each quintile group in the Table 1.15.We find that the return gaps
of the top quintile semi-annual funds are more than double that of the top quintile quarterly
funds. This difference persists over a period of 24 months. This suggests a systematic
difference in the abilities of these two groups of funds in creating value relative to the last
disclosed holdings and we attribute this to the less exposure of semi-annual funds to activities
such as front running.
We do not find any such difference between the poorly performing funds in both the
14In this section a successful fund means a fund who belongs to the top quintile / decile of the funds sorted
on past 12-month average return gap.Similarly a poorly performing fund belongs to the bottom quintile /
decile.
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groups. This supports our conjecture that for semi-annual poor funds the positive effect
on the return gap owing to less effective front running is negated by the value destroying
activities by the managers.
To confirm that this persistent difference in the return gap captures a systematic dif-
ference in both the groups of funds, we test if this difference in return gap between the
successful semi-annual and successful quarterly funds predict any difference in their future
performance.
Predictability based on difference in Return Gap
We examine the performance of a trading strategy based on the past return gap difference
between the successful semi-annual funds and successful quarterly funds. We sort semi-
annual and quarterly funds in our sample into deciles according to their average monthly
return gap during the previous 12 months (with a lag of 2 month to allow for the 60 days lag
in the reporting requirements). We then compute for each month the average subsequent
monthly return by weighting all the funds in a decile equally. Table 1.16 show that one can
earn between 24 to 34 basis points a month by going long on the top decile semi-annual
funds and short on the top decile quarterly funds.
This tables establish that value creation by the successful funds relative to the previous
disclosed holdings is hampered by activities such as front running by other agents in the
market.We do not find any statistically and economically significant difference in the per-
formance between poorly performing semi-annual and quarterly funds. It suggests that any
gain for the poorly performing semi-annual funds from activities such as front running is
negated by more agency cost / value destruction.
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This difference in return gap between semi-annual and quarterly funds disappear after
2004.
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1.6 Conclusion
To our knowledge this is the first paper that examines the performance of mutual funds
before and after the regulatory change in the disclosure frequency in 2004. We show that
successful semi-annual funds had a distinct performance advantage over successful quarterly
funds prior to the policy change. This advantage disappears after 2004. The reduction in
performance is higher for semi-annual funds holding illiquid assets than those holding liquid
assets. This suggests that semi-annual funds are more exposed to activities such as front
running after 2004.
One would have expected the change in policy to help reduce the agency cost of poorly
managed semi-annual funds. However, we do not find any improvement in the performance
of the previously semi-annual poorly performing funds (funds, in which the agency problem
should have been be higher). This suggests that any improvement in the agency cost of the
poorly performing previously semi-annual funds after 2004 has been negated by the increase
in the trading costs owing to activities such as front running.
Our results have implications for any change in the disclosure frequency in the future,
for example from quarterly to monthly. Policy makers will have to strike a balance between
potential advantages of more frequent portfolio disclosure and the possible harmful side-
effects coming from activities such as front-running.
Lastly, our results could also be interpreted as indirect evidence in support of activities
such as front running taking place in the market. Prior works in front-running literature
have so far focused on the the agents who front run or profit accruing from hypothetical
front-running strategies. In this paper we complement those by showing the impact of these
sorts of activities on the performance of the mutual funds.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
This table displays the mean, median, standard deviation, the 25th and the 75th percentile of total
net assets, number of stock holding, expense ratio, new money flow, annual turnover and age of the
funds for the whole sample in panel A, and for the quarterly and the semi-annual funds in panel B
and C respectively. We call a fund semi-annual (or quarterly) if it discloses every six months (or
every three months) at least 75% of the time during its existence. We calculate new money flow as
follows: flowi,t =
(
TNAi,t−TNAi,t−1∗(1+reti,t)
TNAi,t−1
)
Panel A: All mean median Std Dev 25% 75%
TNA in million 905 918 381 522 1227
No of stocks 114 117 21 102 129
Expense ratio 1.30% 1.30% 0.07% 1.28% 1.34%
Flow 3.98% 2.29% 8.15% 1.34% 3.52%
Turn over 91% 88.50% 13.70% 80.50% 101%
Age 15.4 9.58 15.3 4.58 21.5
Panel B: Qtly mean median Std Dev 25% 75%
TNA in million 948 988 382 633 1252
No of stocks 90 86 16 81 107
Expense ratio 1.30% 1.30% 0.08% 1.27% 1.34%
Flow 2.77% 1.55% 14.55% 0.75% 2.19%
Turn over 82% 78.00% 16.50% 68.00% 95%
Age 17 16.2 3.63 12.74 20.27
Panel C: Semi mean median Std Dev 25% 75%
TNA in million 1248 1239 559 741 1686
No of stocks 114 113 31 90.5 135
Expense ratio 1.41% 1.38% 0.15% 1.30% 1.42%
Flow 7.33% 2.55% 23.16% 1.12% 4.63%
Turn over 117% 116.00% 12.00% 111.00% 121%
Age 12.52 12.62 0.868 12.27 13.12
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics: Semi-annual Vs. Quarterly Funds
This table compares the average total net asset(TNA), number of stock holdings, expense ratio,
number of unique funds, new money flow, annual turn over and age of all the funds in the sample
with that of the quarterly and semi-annual funds. We call a fund semi-annual (or quarterly) if it
discloses every six months (or every three months) at least 75% of the time during its existence.
We calculate new money flow as follows:flowi,t =
(
TNAi,t−TNAi,t−1∗(1+reti,t)
TNAi,t−1
)
All Qtly Semi Qtly-Semi p value
No of funds 2901 777 392
TNA in million 905 948 1248 -338 < 0.0001
No of stocks 114 90 114 -24 < 0.0001
Expense ratio 1.30% 1.30% 1.41% -0.11% < 0.0001
Flow 3.98% 2.77% 7.33% -4.43% 0.046
Turn over 91% 82% 117% -35% < 0.0001
Age 15.4 17 12.518 4.48 < 0.0001
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Table 1.3: Disclosure Frequency and Fund Performance (1990-2003)
This table reports mean monthly returns for quintile portfolio of mutual funds sorted on their past
12 month abnormal return during the period 1990-2003. We use the four factor model of Carhart
(1997) to determine past 12-month abnormal return. The table reports results for all the funds in
the sample and for semi-annual and quarterly funds separately. At the end it reports the difference
in performance between semi-annual funds and quarterly funds. We call a fund semi-annual (or
quarterly) if it discloses every six months (or every three months) at least 75% of the time during
its whole life span. In the second column we show the mean raw return, in the third, the mean
excess return. Fourth, fifth and the last columns show the CAPM alpha, three factor alpha of
Fama and French and four factor alpha of Carhart (1997) respectively. The significance levels are
denoted by *, **, *** and indicate whether the results ate statistically different from zero at the
10-, 5- and 1-percent significance level.
past perf rank Raw Ret Ex Ret CAPM 3F 4F
All the Funds 0 0.73** -0.21** -0.21* -0.31*** -0.26**
1 0.84** -0.11* -0.08 -0.15** -0.12**
2 0.9** -0.05 -0.01 -0.08* -0.06
3 0.96** 0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.03
4 1.2** 0.27* 0.23 0.23** 0.13
past perf rank Raw Ret Ex Ret CAPM 3F 4F
Qtly Funds 0 0.74** -0.2* -0.19* -0.28** -0.23**
1 0.83** -0.12* -0.08 -0.16** -0.12**
2 0.88** -0.07 -0.03 -0.1** -0.07
3 0.95** 0 0.04 -0.02 -0.04
4 1.2** 0.25* 0.21 0.19** 0.11
Semi Funds 0 0.71* -0.24* -0.25* -0.37*** -0.32**
1 0.87** -0.08 -0.06 -0.14* -0.12
2 0.89** -0.06 -0.03 -0.1 -0.1
3 1** 0.09 0.09 0.03 -0.01
4 1.4*** 0.46** 0.4** 0.39** 0.28**
Semi-Qtly s-q (0) -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.09 -0.09
s-q (1) 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0
s-q (2) 0.01 0.01 0 0 -0.03
s-q (3) 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.03
s-q (4) 0.2** 0.21** 0.19** 0.2** 0.17**
s-q 0.054 0.062 0.04 0.036 0.016
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Table 1.4: Disclosure Frequency and Fund Performance (1990-2003) Contd.
This table reports mean monthly returns for quintile portfolio of mutual funds sorted on their past
12 month abnormal return during the period 1990-2003. We use the four factor model of Carhart
(1997) to determine past 12-month abnormal return. The table reports results for all the funds in
the sample and for semi-annual and quarterly funds separately. At the end it reports the difference
in performance between semi-annual funds and quarterly funds. We call a fund semi-annual (or
quarterly) if it discloses every six months (or every three months) at least 80% of the time during
its whole life span. In the second column we show the mean raw return, in the third, the mean
excess return. Fourth, fifth and the last columns show the CAPM alpha, three factor alpha of
Fama and French and four factor alpha of Carhart (1997) respectively. The significance levels are
denoted by *, **, *** and indicate whether the results ate statistically different from zero at the
10-, 5- and 1-percent significance level.
past perf rank Raw Ret Ex Ret CAPM 3F 4F
Qtly Funds 0 0.74** -0.21* -0.21* -0.29** -0.23**
1 0.84** -0.11 -0.08 -0.15** -0.12*
2 0.84** -0.1* -0.07 -0.14** -0.11**
3 0.94** -0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.04
4 1.2** 0.25* 0.21 0.19** 0.12
Semi Funds 0 0.78** -0.17 -0.17 -0.31** -0.25**
1 0.86** -0.09 -0.05 -0.15* -0.13
2 0.93** -0.02 0.01 -0.06 -0.07
3 1** 0.09 0.09 0.03 -0.01
4 1.4*** 0.45** 0.4** 0.37** 0.28**
Semi-Qtly s-q (0) 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.02 -0.02
s-q (1) 0.02 0.02 0.03 0 -0.01
s-q (2) 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.04
s-q (3) 0.06 0.1 0.07 0.07 0.03
s-q (4) 0.2** 0.2** 0.19** 0.18** 0.16*
s-q 0.082** 0.088** 0.082** 0.062* 0.04
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Table 1.5: Disclosure Frequency and Fund Performance (2005-2008)
This table reports mean monthly returns for quintile portfolios of mutual funds sorted on past 12
month abnormal fund return during the period 2005-2008. We use the four factor model of Carhart
(1997) to determine past 12-month abnormal return. The table reports results for previously
semi-annual and quarterly funds separately. It also reports the difference in performance between
previously semi-annual and quarterly funds. We call a fund previously semi-annual (or quarterly)
if it discloses every six months (or every three months) at least 75% of the time during its existence
prior to 2004. In the second column we show the mean raw return, in the third the mean excess
return. Fourth, fifth and the last columns show the CAPM alpha, three factor alpha of Fama and
French and four factor alpha of Carhart (1997) respectively. The significance levels are denoted by
*, **, *** and indicate whether the results are statistically different from zero at the 10-, 5- and
1-percent significance level
past perf rank Raw Ret Ex Ret CAPM 3F 4F
Qtly Funds 0 -0.62 -0.27** -0.21** -0.21** -0.2**
1 -0.54 -0.18** -0.18** -0.18** -0.16**
2 -0.41 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06
3 -0.4 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.07
4 -0.32 0.03 0.07 0.11 -0.03
Semi Funds 0 -0.7 -0.35** -0.31** -0.27** -0.27**
1 -0.47 -0.12 -0.13 -0.09 -0.08
2 -0.43 -0.08 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06
3 -0.4 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.11**
4 -0.3 0.05 0.11 0.15 -0.01
Semi-Qtly s-q (0) -0.08 -0.08 -0.1 -0.06 -0.07
s-q (1) 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.09* 0.08
s-q (2) -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0
s-q (3) 0 0 0 0 -0.04
s-q (4) 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02
s-q -0.002 -0.004 0.002 0.016 -0.002
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Table 1.6: The Impact of Change in Disclosure Frequency on Mutual Fund Perfor-
mance: the Diff-in-Diff Test
This tables shows the results of the regression with monthly four factor abnormal return as depen-
dent variable. Semii is an indicator variable and takes a value of one if a fund i is semi-annual
between 1990 and 2003 and zero if it is quarterly. POST2004 is an indicator value and takes a
value of one if t is later than 2004 and zero otherwise. Expense ratio and Total net assets are
control variables and are lagged by a month. Panel A shows the results for the successful funds
(funds which are in the top quintiles according to the past 12-month four factor abnormal returns)
funds and panel B shows the results for the poorly performing funds (funds which are in the bottom
quintiles according to the past 12-month four factor abnormal returns). We include year dummies
and use panel corrected standard errors.
Panel A Coefficient Std Error t value p value
Intercept 0.364 0.13 2.8 0.0053
Semi 0.19 0.079 2.4 0.0168
POST2004 -0.255 0.123 -2.08 0.0379
Semi*POST2004 -0.228 0.104 -2.2 0.028
Expense ratio -6.988 1.926 -3.63 0.0003
Total net asset -0.019 0.014 -1.36 0.1744
observations 18190
R-squared 0.019
Panel B Coefficient Std Error t value p value
Intercept -0.09 0.14 -0.64 0.5222
Semi 0.021 0.086 0.25 0.8049
POST2004 0.213 0.142 1.5 0.1343
Semi*POST2004 -0.061 0.125 -0.49 0.6237
Expense ratio -15.856 3.005 -5.28 ¡.0001
Total net asset -0.006 0.016 -0.35 0.7298
observations 18530
R-squared 0.005
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Table 1.7: The Impact of Change in Disclosure Frequency on Mutual Fund Perfor-
mance: the Diff-in-Diff-in-Diff Test
This tables shows the results of the regression with monthly four factor abnormal return as de-
pendent variable. Semii is an indicator variable and takes a value of one if fund i is semi-annual
between 1990 and 2003 and zero if it is quarterly. POST2004 is an indicator value and takes a
value of one if t is later than 2004 and zero otherwise. rank4 is an indicator variable and takes a
value one if a fund belongs to the top quintiles according to the past 12-month four factor abnor-
mal return and zero otherwise. Similarly rank0 is an indicator variable and takes a value one if a
fund belongs to the bottom quintile according to the past 12-month four factor abnormal return
and zero otherwise. Perf is the percentile rank of the fund according to the past 12-month four
factor abnormal return.Expense ratio and Total net assets are control variables and are lagged by
a month. We include year dummies and use panel corrected standard errors.The significance levels
are denoted by *, **, *** and indicate whether the results ate statistically different from zero at
the 10-, 5- and 1-percent significance level.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Intercept 0.172** 0.047 0.152** 0.069 0.219** -0.035
rank4*Semi*POST2004 -0.236** -0.235** -0.225* -0.223*
rank0*Semi*POST2004 -0.048 -0.049 0.012 0.009
rank4 0.205*** 0.105** 0.223*** 0.117**
rank0 -0.073* 0.026 -0.123** 0.088*
rank4*Semi 0.201** 0.201** 0.199** 0.198**
rank0*Semi 0.01 0.011 -0.043 -0.039
Semi -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.051* 0.047
Semi*POST2004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.018 -0.018 -0.068* -0.064*
POST2004 -0.054 -0.054 -0.066 -0.064 -0.072 -0.073
rank4*POST2004 -0.033 -0.034 -0.035 -0.036
rank0*POST2004 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.016
Expense ratio -14.014*** -13.946*** -14.318*** -13.937*** -13.478*** -13.7***
Total net asset -0.011** -0.012** -0.01* -0.012** -0.012** -0.012**
perf 0.251*** 0.215*** 0.428***
observations 93123 93123 93123 93123 93123 93123
R-squared 0.0109 0.011 0.0108 0.011 0.01 0.0107
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Table 1.8: Disclosure Frequency and Illiquid & Liquid Mutual Fund Performance
This table reports mean monthly returns for tertile portfolio of Illiquid mutual funds in Panel A
and Liquid mutual funds in Panel B, sorted on their past 12 month abnormal return during the
period 1990-2003. We use the four factor model of Carhart (1997) to determine past 12-month
abnormal return. The table reports results for semi-annual and quarterly funds separately and
their performance difference. We call a fund illiquid if value weighted average gibb’ estimate of its
individual holdings on the recent report date is in the top tertile and liquid if it is in the bottom
tertile. We call a fund semi-annual (or quarterly) if it discloses every six months (or every three
months) at least 75% of the time during its whole life span. In the second column we show the
mean raw return, in the third, the mean excess return. Fourth, fifth and the last columns show
the CAPM alpha, three factor alpha of Fama and French and four factor alpha of Carhart (1997)
respectively. The significance levels are denoted by *, **, *** and indicate whether the results ate
statistically different from zero at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent significance level.
Panel A Illiquid Funds
past perf Raw Ret Ex Ret CAPM 3F 4F
Qtly Funds 0 0.81 -0.14 -0.22 -0.31** -0.3**
1 0.94* 0 -0.09 -0.18* -0.22**
2 1.3** 0.35 0.22 0.22 0.07
Semi Funds 0 0.71 -0.24 -0.37 -0.42** -0.41**
1 1* 0.1 -0.06 0.01 -0.15
2 1.5** 0.55 0.34 0.54** 0.4*
Semi-Qtly s-q (0) -0.1 -0.1 -0.15 -0.11 -0.11
s-q (1) 0.1 0.1 0.03 0.19* 0.07
s-q (2) 0.2 0.2 0.12 0.32** 0.33**
s-q 0.05 0.07 0 0.13 0.1
Panel B Liquid Funds
past perf Raw Ret Ex Ret CAPM 3F 4F
Qtly Funds 0 0.75** -0.2 -0.08 -0.22*** -0.15**
1 0.85** -0.09 0.02 -0.09* -0.03
2 0.91*** -0.03 0.1 -0.04 0
Semi Funds 0 0.82** -0.12 0.02 -0.13 -0.06
1 0.89** -0.06 0.05 -0.07 -0.02
2 0.98*** 0.03 0.18 0.01 0.01
Semi-Qtly s-q (0) 0.07 0.08 0.1** 0.09* 0.09*
s-q (1) 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01
s-q (2) 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.01
s-q 0.06 0.06 0.07* 0.05* 0.04
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Table 1.9: The Impact of Change in Disclosure Frequency on Illiquid Mutual Fund
Performance: the Diff-in-Diff Test
This tables shows the results of the regression with monthly four factor abnormal return as depen-
dent variable. Here the sample has been restricted to the illiquid funds only. Semii is an indicator
variable and takes a value of one if fund i is semi-annual between 1990 and 2003 and zero if it is
quarterly. POST2004 is an indicator value and takes a value of one if t is later than 2004 and zero
otherwise. Expense ratio and Total net assets are control variables and are lagged by a month.
Panel A shows results for the successful funds only(funds which are in the top quintiles according
to the past 12-month four factor abnormal returns) and panel B shows the results for the poorly
performing funds only(funds which are in the bottom quintiles according to the past 12-month four
factor abnormal returns). We include year dummies and use panel corrected standard errors.
Panel A Coefficient Std Error t value p value
Intercept -0.35 0.29 -1.21 0.2252
Semi 0.21* 0.12 1.81 0.0711
POST2004 0.179 0.29 0.62 0.5324
Semi*POST2004 -0.341** 0.16 -2.1 0.0365
Expense ratio -10.042*** 2.11 -4.77 ¡.0001
Total net assets -0.009 0.02 -0.36 0.72
Observations 9050
R-Square .017
Panel B Coefficient Std Error t value p value
Intercept 0.103 0.296 0.35 0.7272
Semi -0.042 0.147 -0.29 0.7741
POST2004 0.071 0.299 0.24 0.8116
Semi*POST2004 0.038 0.188 0.2 0.8408
Expense ratio -14.799*** 0.93 -15.91 ¡.0001
Total net assets -0.028 0.022 -1.25 0.2115
Observations 9072
R-Square 0.014
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Table 1.10: The Impact of Change in Disclosure Frequency on Illiquid Mutual Fund
performance: the Diff-in-Diff-in-Diff Test
This tables shows the results of the regression with monthly four factor abnormal return as depen-
dent variable. Here the sample has been restricted to the illiquid funds only. Semii is an indicator
variable and takes a value of one if fund i is semi-annual between 1990 and 2003 and zero if it is
quarterly. POST2004 is an indicator value and takes a value of one if t is later than 2004 and zero
otherwise. rank2 is an indicator variable and takes a value one if a fund belongs to the top tertile
according to the past 12-month four factor abnormal return and zero otherwise. Similarly rank0
is an indicator variable and takes a value one if a fund belongs to the bottom tertile according to
the past 12-month four factor abnormal return and zero otherwise. Perf is the percentile rank of
the fund according to the past 12-month four factor abnormal return. Expense ratio and Total net
assets are control variables and are lagged by a month. We include year dummies and use panel
corrected standard errors. The significance levels are denoted by *, **, *** and indicate whether
the results ate statistically different from zero at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent significance level.
1 2 3 4
Intercept -0.141 -0.2 0.014 -0.481***
perf 0.189 0.765***
rank2*Semi*POST2004 -0.368* -0.366*
rank0*Semi*POST2004 0.27 0.266
rank2 0.359*** 0.266**
rank0 -0.137* 0.235***
rank2*Semi 0.19 0.187
rank0*Semi -0.272* -0.259*
Semi 0.058 0.058 0.215*** 0.203***
Semi*POST2004 -0.01 -0.01 -0.228** -0.22**
POST2004 0.036 0.039 -0.048 -0.04
rank2*POST2004 -0.168** -0.169**
rank0*POST2004 0.076 0.084
Expense ratio -14.263*** -14.137*** -13.792*** -13.957***
Total net assets -0.021* -0.023* -0.02 -0.024*
Observations 27564 27564 27564 27564
R-Square 0.012 0.013 .011 .012
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Table 1.11: The Impact of Change in Disclosure Frequency on Liquid Mutual Fund
Performance: the Diff-in-Diff Test
This tables shows the results of the regression with monthly four factor abnormal return as depen-
dent variable. Here the sample has been restricted to the liquid funds only. Semii is an indicator
variable and takes a value of one if fund i is semi-annual between 1990 and 2003 and zero if it is
quarterly. POST2004 is an indicator value and takes a value of one if t is later than 2004 and zero
otherwise. Expense ratio and Total net assets are control variables and are lagged by a month.
Panel A shows the results for the successful funds only(funds which are in the top quintiles accord-
ing to the past 12-month four factor abnormal returns) and panel B shows the results for the poorly
performing funds only(funds which are in the bottom quintiles according to the past 12-month four
factor abnormal returns). We include year dummies and use panel corrected standard errors.
Panel A Coefficient Std Error t value p value
Intercept -0.061 0.145 -0.42 0.6732
Semi 0.031 0.059 0.52 0.6066
POST2004 -0.029 0.154 -0.19 0.8499
Semi*POST2004 0.111 0.08 1.39 0.1661
Expense ratio -1.956 4.486 -0.44 0.6631
Total net assets 0 0.009 0.03 0.9733
Observations 8987
R-Square 0.014
Panel B Coefficient Std Error t value p value
Intercept 0.769 0.779 0.99 0.3245
Semi 0.052 0.073 0.72 0.4744
POST2004 -0.252 0.747 -0.34 0.736
Semi*POST2004 -0.12 0.096 -1.25 0.2137
Expense ratio -19.746*** 6.145 -3.21 0.0014
Total net assets -0.008 0.01 -0.78 0.4362
Observations 8794
R-Square 0.014
55
Table 1.12: The Impact of Change in Disclosure Frequency on Liquid Mutual Fund
Performance: the Diff-in-Diff-in-Diff Test
This tables shows the results of the regression with monthly four factor abnormal return as depen-
dent variable. Here the sample has been restricted to the liquid funds only. Semii is an indicator
variable and takes a value of one if fund i is semi-annual between 1990 and 2003 and zero if it is
quarterly. POST2004 is an indicator value and takes a value of one if t is later than 2004 and zero
otherwise. rank2 is an indicator variable and takes a value one if a fund belongs to the top tertile
according to the past 12-month four factor abnormal return and zero otherwise. Similarly rank0
is an indicator variable and takes a value one if a fund belongs to the bottom tertile according to
the past 12-month four factor abnormal return and zero otherwise. Perf is the percentile rank of
the fund according to the past 12-month four factor abnormal return. Expense ratio and Total net
assets are control variables and are lagged by a month. We include year dummies and use panel
corrected standard errors. The significance levels are denoted by *, **, *** and indicate whether
the results ate statistically different from zero at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent significance level.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Intercept 0.198 0.181 0.16 0.129 0.196 0.132
perf 0.034 0.078 0.099
rank2*Semi*POST2004 0.103 0.102 0.166* 0.166*
rank0*Semi*POST2004 -0.133 -0.133 -0.182* -0.183*
rank2 0.011 0 0.052 0.015
rank0 -0.087* -0.076 -0.093 -0.045
rank2*Semi 0.078 0.078 0.026 0.025
rank0*Semi 0.109 0.109 0.069 0.071
Semi -0.052 -0.052 -0.012 -0.014
Semi*POST2004 0.012 0.013 -0.051 -0.051 0.061 0.063
POST2004 -0.009 -0.009 0.037 0.038 -0.018 -0.017
rank2*POST2004 -0.015 -0.016 -0.061 -0.063
rank0*POST2004 0.096* 0.096* 0.104 0.105
Expense ratio -10.666*** -10.645*** -11.042*** -10.626*** -10.092*** -10.222***
Total net asset 0 0 0 0 0 0
Observations 27210 27210 27210 27210 27210 27210
R-Square .014 .014 .014 .014 .014 .014
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Table 1.13: The Impact of Change in Disclosure Frequency on Small Cap & Large Cap
Mutual Fund Performance: the Diff-in-Diff-in-Diff Test
This tables shows the results of the regression with monthly four factor abnormal return as depen-
dent variable. Here the sample has been restricted to the Small Cap funds in column 1 an 2 and to
Large Cap funds in column 3 and 4. Semii is an indicator variable and takes a value of one if fund
i is semi-annual between 1993 and 2003 and zero if it is quarterly. POST2004 is an indicator value
and takes a value of one if t is later than 2004 and zero otherwise. rank2 is an indicator variable
and takes a value one if a fund belongs to the top tertile according to the past 12-month four factor
abnormal return and zero otherwise. Similarly rank0 is an indicator variable and takes a value one
if a fund belongs to the bottom tertile according to the past 12-month four factor abnormal return
and zero otherwise. Perf is the percentile rank of the fund according to the past 12-month four
factor abnormal return. Expense ratio and Total net assets are control variables and are lagged
by a month. We include year dummies and use panel corrected standard errors. The significance
levels are denoted by *, **, *** and indicate whether the results ate statistically different from zero
at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent significance level.
Small Cap Funds Large Cap Funds
1 2 3 4
Intercept -0.151 -0.347 -0.468** -0.426**
perf 0.34*** 0.746** 0.205*** 0.18**
rank2*Semi*POST2004 -0.366** 0.023
rank0*Semi*POST2004 0.151 -0.036
rank2 0.164** 0.029
rank0 0.158* -0.044
rank2*Semi 0.328** -0.018
rank0*Semi -0.163 0.074
Semi -0.165** -0.012 -0.037 -0.067**
Semi*POST2004 0.166* 0.002 0.015 0.034
POST2004 0.041 -0.033 0.42** 0.348*
rank2*POST2004 -0.152** -0.134***
rank0*POST2004 0.072 0.082
Total net asset -0.014 -0.015 -0.008* -0.009*
Expense ratio -6.91** -6.829** -2.057 -2.259
Observation 25457 25457 33050 33050
R squared .01 .01 .01 .01
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Table 1.14: The Impact of Fund Size on Successful Fund Performance
This table reports results for the test to examine if the asset under management (TNA) has impli-
cations for the trading costs of a fund. Our sample covers 1998-2003 for this test. We rank both
the semi-annual and quarterly funds based on their past 12 months four factor abnormal return
and choose only the top quintile semi-annual and quarterly funds from the sample. Then we rank
these top quintile funds based on their recent total net assets into three groups (funds with rank 2
are the largest) and hold equally weighted portfolio of funds in each group for the next one month.
In Panel A, the second column reports mean raw return, third column, the mean excess return.
Fourth, fifth and the last columns report the CAPM alpha, three factor alpha of Fama and French
and four factor alpha of Carhart (1997) respectively. It also reports the relative performance of
semi-annual funds over the quarterly funds. Next we rank these top quintile funds based on their
recent total net assets into two groups (funds with rank 1 are larger) and hold equally weighted
portfolio of funds in each group for the next one month. The mean and abnormal return of these
two portfolios for the semi-annual funds and quarterly funds are reported in Panel B. The signif-
icance levels are denoted by *, **, *** and indicate whether the results are statistically different
from zero at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent significance level.
Successful Semi-annual Vs Successful Quarterly Funds
Panel A past size rank Raw Ret Ex Ret CAPM 3F 4F
Qtly funds 0 0.94 0.46 0.44 0.29 0.21
1 1.1 0.61** 0.59* 0.4** 0.3
2 0.85 0.36 0.34 0.22 0.09
Semi funds 0 1 0.54** 0.53** 0.36* 0.36
1 1.2 0.75** 0.74** 0.58** 0.4
2 1.1 0.65 0.6 0.59* 0.38
Semi-Qtly s-q (0) 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.15
s-q (1) 0.1 0.14 0.15 0.18 0.1
s-q (2) 0.25 0.29 0.26 0.37* 0.29
Panel B past size rank Raw Ret Ex Ret CAPM 3F 4F
Qtly funds 0 1 0.54* 0.53* 0.37* 0.28
1 0.89 0.41 0.39 0.24 0.12
Semi funds 0 1.1 0.61** 0.6** 0.46** 0.39*
1 1.2 0.68 0.65 0.56** 0.36
Semi-Qtly s-q (0) 0.1 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.11
s-q (1) 0.31 0.27 0.26 0.32** 0.24*
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Table 1.15: The Persistence in Difference of Return Gap
The table below reports mean monthly return gaps for quintile portfolios sorted by their average
lagged return gaps during the previous 12 months in Panel A, 18 months in Panel B and 24 months
in Panel C over the period 1990-2003. First column reports the return gap for all the funds in the
sample, second column for the semi-annual funds, third column for the quarterly funds and the last
column reports the difference in monthly return gaps between semi-annual and quarterly funds.
We call a fund semi-annual (or quarterly) if it discloses every six months (or every three months) at
least 75% of the time during its whole life span. The return gap is defined as the difference between
the reported fund return and the return on a portfolio that invests in previously disclosed fund
holdings. The returns are reported in percentage per month. The significance levels are denoted
by *, **, *** and indicate whether the results are statistically different from zero at the 10-, 5- and
1-percent significance level.
All Semi Qtly Semi-Qtly
Panel A(12)
0 -0.161*** -0.132*** -0.158*** 0.026
1 -0.066*** -0.037* -0.067*** 0.03
2 -0.047*** -0.04** -0.054*** 0.014
3 -0.023** -0.013 -0.033** 0.019
4 0.098*** 0.171*** 0.065*** 0.106**
Panel B(18)
0 -0.165*** -0.175*** -0.157*** -0.018
1 -0.072*** -0.045** -0.082*** 0.037
2 -0.041*** -0.033* -0.054*** 0.021
3 -0.023** 0.046* -0.032** 0.077
4 0.094*** 0.178*** 0.081*** 0.097**
Panel C (24)
0 -0.15*** -0.143*** -0.157*** 0.015
1 -0.069*** -0.055** -0.06*** 0.005
2 -0.042*** -0.029 -0.057*** 0.028
3 -0.017* 0.018 -0.02 0.037
4 0.071*** 0.153*** 0.066** 0.087*
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Table 1.16: Return Gap Predicts Performance
This table reports the mean monthly returns for decile portfolios of semi-annual and quarterly
funds sorted according to their lagged 12-month return gaps over the period 1990-2003. It also
reports the difference in performance of semi-annual and quarterly funds. Here we have allowed
for a two month lag for the disclosed portfolios to be made public so that this trading strategy
can be implemented in practice. The return gap is defined as the difference between the reported
return and the holding returns of the portfolio disclosed in the previous period. We call a fund
semi-annual (or quarterly) if it discloses every six months (or every three months) at least 75% of
the time during its whole life span. In the second column we show the mean raw return, in the third
the mean excess return. Fourth, fifth and the last columns show the CAPM alpha, three factor
alpha of Fama and French and four factor alpha of Carhart (1997) respectively. The returns are
reported in percentage per month. The significance levels are denoted by *, **, *** and indicate
whether the results are statistically different from zero at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent significance
level
lag3 past rg rank Raw Ret Ex Ret CAPM 3F 4F
Qtly Funds 0 0.73** -0.21* -0.21* -0.19* -0.25**
1 0.85** -0.1 -0.08 -0.11 -0.12*
2 0.94** -0.01 0.03 -0.03 -0.05
3 0.87** -0.07 -0.04 -0.13** -0.1*
4 0.91** -0.04 0 -0.11 -0.06
5 0.94** 0 0.04 -0.04 -0.01
6 0.93** -0.02 0.02 -0.09 -0.05
7 1** 0.06 0.08 -0.03 -0.01
8 1** 0.07 0.07 0.01 0
9 0.99** 0.04 0 -0.04 -0.07
Semi Funds 0 0.68* -0.26 -0.26 -0.25** -0.3**
1 0.85** -0.09 -0.1 -0.12 -0.19**
2 0.95** 0 0.01 -0.04 -0.08
3 1** 0.05 0.05 -0.07 -0.08
4 0.97** 0.03 0.05 -0.05 -0.03
5 1** 0.08 0.1 0 0.01
6 1.1** 0.13 0.15 0.04 0.06
7 0.97** 0.02 0.03 -0.11 -0.09
8 1.1** 0.12 0.11 0.01 -0.01
9 1.3** 0.35 0.24 0.3* 0.17
Semi-Qtly semi-qly(0) -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05
semi-qly(1) 0 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07
semi-qly(2) 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03
semi-qly(3) 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.02
semi-qly(4) 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.03
semi-qly(5) 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02
semi-qly(6) 0.17* 0.15* 0.13 0.13 0.11
semi-qly(7) -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.08 -0.08
semi-qly(8) 0.1 0.05 0.04 0 -0.01
semi-qly(9) 0.31* 0.31* 0.24 0.34** 0.24
semi-qly 0.07* 0.07* 0.05 0.05 0.02
60
Chapter 2
Competition and Incentive to reveal
Information in Financial Markets
2.1 Introduction
Opinion is divided on the role of competition in bringing about market transparency. Some
argue that competition can force the market participants to reveal more information. Others
do not agree. In this paper, I study the impact of competition on discretionary disclosure
policies and advertising efforts of mutual funds.
Initial works in the disclosure theory suggest that in the absence of disclosure costs or
asymmetric information, firms will opt for full disclosure (Grossman and Hart (1980), Gross-
man (1981), and Milgrom (1981)) and hence there is no need for regulatory interventions.
Their arguments were based on the concept of adverse selection: high value firms would like
to separate themselves from the low value ones by disclosing their information. Faced with
the prospect that market may associate them with low value firms, the remaining firms too
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disclose their information. So in equilibrium every firm discloses. However, later works pro-
posed that full disclosure may not occur because of various reasons such as cost of disclosure,
presence of unsophisticated participants in the market or the possibility that firms may have
asymmetric information.1
In this debate not much attention seems to have gone towards impact of tournament like
competition in the financial market (where superior relative performance is rewarded with
convex payoffs) on market transparency2. Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) were the first to
point out the tournament-nature of mutual fund markets and its effects on managerial incen-
tives. Capon, Fitzsimons, and Prince (1996) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) show that investors
put a lot of emphasis on past performance while choosing mutual funds. Sirri and Tufano
(1998) show that consumers base their fund purchase decisions on prior performance infor-
mation asymmetrically, investing disproportionately more in funds that performed very well
the prior period. Also, they provide evidence that search cost 3 is an important determinant
of fund flows. Using different measures of search cost, they find that the performance-flow
relationship is most pronounced among funds with higher marketing efforts. They infer
that marketing efforts reduce the consumer search costs and facilitate fund flows. There
are other recent papers which further establish positive relationship between advertising and
fund flows (Gallaher, Kaniel, and Starks (2005), Gualtieri and Petrella (2005), Korkeamaki,
and Puttonen, Smythe (2007)).
In addition to advertising, periodic disclosure of fund holdings help lower the search costs
1Please see Verrecchia 1983; Fishman and Hagerty 1990, Fishman and Hagerty 2003, Dye, 1985; Jung
and Kwon, 1988; Shin, 2003; Acharya, DeMarzo, and Kremer, 2010 for more details.
2Please see Carlin, Davis and Iannaccone (2010) for a detailed discussion on this.
3They argue that most retail investors are not formally trained in portfolio analysis, nor do they have
access to up-to-date information on all potential fund investments. They compare a household’s fund pur-
chase decision to buying a large durable good, such as an automobile. In both the cases, consumers must
choose from a large number of alternatives, and as in the case of buying a car, brand name, advertising,
and distribution ability etc. will matter for investing in mutual funds,in addition to risk adjusted return
measures. Thus consumers’ purchase decisions-whether for cars or funds-are complicated by the phenomenon
of costly search.
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too. It serves two important purposes. First, it helps in selling the fund and in building
public confidence in the fund. It also facilitates the marketing efforts through third parties
in the professional investment businesses, such as investment advisors, plan consultants and
fund tracking services, in publicizing fund holdings and strategies. These businesses always
demand for additional information on fund investments for their own business purposes
and to redistribute the data to their clients. These businesses serve a valuable commercial
purpose in advising investors, who find it difficult to make use of the holding information
from fund companies directly or who seek an additional third party view.4 Second, Periodic
disclosure help shareholders monitor the fund investment activities and help balance their
personal investment portfolios. Investors appears to value periodic portfolio disclosures. Ge
and Zheng (2005) show that funds with more frequent disclosure are rewarded with higher
investments. 5
However, periodic portfolio holdings disclosure is also costly for the mutual funds. Fund
managers are concerned that frequent disclosure of information on their holdings may expose
them to front-running or free-riding activities by other market participants. Front-running
refers to a situation where other traders buy (sell) securities in anticipation of buy (sell)
trades by the fund. The original fund may therefore be forced to trade at unfavorable
prices. Cai(2003), Coval & Stafford(2007), Chen, Hanson, Hong and Stein (2008) et al. give
empirical evidence on front running activities in the financial markets. Similarly, free-riding
of the funds’ proprietary research by copycat funds may result in higher trading cost and
less investor flows as the fund faces competition from other copycat funds. Frank, Poterba,
Shackelford and Shoven(2004), Wang and Verbeek (2010) et al. give evidence on profit from
4See -RE: Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure of Registered Management Investment
Companies, Release No. 33-8164; File No. S7-51-02 by Fidelity Investments, 2003 for a detailed discussion.
Also, see Sirri and Tufano (1998).
5Fund managers seem to be aware of this fact too. Meiera & Schaumburg (2006) show that sometimes
fund managers resort to ‘window dressing’ (sprucing up the holdings just before the report date) to keep the
shareholders happy. Also, see 17 CFR Parts 210, 239, et al. Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Portfolio
Disclosure of Registered Management Investment Companies; Final Rule, March 9, 2004.
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copycat activities. Also, investors may even try to replicate the funds’ portfolios instead of
investing in the fund directly which may reduce fund flows.
Thus we see that the decision to spend more on advertising and go for more frequent
portfolio holding disclosure is a trade off between the desire to receive higher investments
next period and the direct cost of advertising as well as the cost coming from activities such
as front running and free riding (the later cost increases with more disclosure) against the
fund. Hence, rational mutual funds will spend on advertising past performance and resort
to discretionary costly portfolio disclosure as long as they expect to profit from it, in terms
of receiving a share of the new investments. In this context, it will be interesting to study,
how the funds’ disclosure policy and advertising efforts will change when competition for the
new investment goes up.
This will, of course, depend on how competition is going to modify the benefits and costs
of disclosure and advertising activities for a fund. What makes the markets for mutual funds
interesting is the convex nature of the payoff. In this set up, it is rather intuitive that with
more funds crowding the market, each fund’s chance of making to the top will diminish and
this will adversely affect its expected payoff(as only the top performing funds can attract new
investments). Carlin, Davies and Iannaccone (2010) present this with a theoretical model.
They focus on only the benefits of disclosure (not the cost ) and predict that performance
announcements, advertising and voluntary disclosure will reduce with competition. However,
it is reasonable to assume that the cost of disclosure will go up with competition. With more
competition and in the absence of enough investment opportunities, funds will try to free
ride on others’ research ideas and aggressively pursue front running strategies, whenever
they spot an opportunity. This will add to the trading costs of the original funds. Thus,
we see that competition affects both the expected benefits and disclosure costs adversely -
lower expected pay off and higher cost together will force the funds operating in the higher
competitive market segments to cut down on discretionary disclosure and advertising related
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activities.
I test these hypotheses with a sample of mutual fund data. Prior to 2004, the mandatory
disclosure frequency for mutual funds was semi-annual.6 However, during that period a large
number of funds had opted to disclose every quarter. This gives me an opportunity to test
the impact of competition on the level of discretionary disclosure. Also, I study the impact
of competition on funds’ advertising expenses. These two constitute my main hypothesis.
I find that semi-annual disclosure goes up with competition as captured by Herfindal index
for investment style market segments. A mutual fund operating in the highest competitive
segment is between 10 to 13% (13 to 17.5%) more likely to disclose semi-annually than
a fund operating in the lowest (middle) competitive segment. I, then, test the impact of
competition on advertising efforts. I take the annual 12b1 fees as a proxy for advertising
expenses. It is the fee paid by the funds out of fund assets to cover distribution expenses
such as paying for advertising, the printing and mailing of prospectuses to new investors,
and the printing and mailing of sales literature. I find that 12b1 fees goes down by between
4 and 5 basis points for the funds in the highest competitive sector, compared to the funds in
the lowest competitive sector. This is economically very significant as the average 12b1 fees
for my sample is 27.5 basis point. Thus I find evidence that competition adversely affects
discretionary disclosure as well as advertising efforts of a mutual fund.
Next, I study the section of funds, which are more likely to be affected by higher compe-
tition such as funds holding illiquid assets and funds which are relatively more successful.
Cost of disclosure from activities such as front running is not the same across all the
funds. It will be more for the funds holding illiquid assets. Trades by illiquid funds will
incur larger price impacts and will attract more front runners. With higher competition, the
6Mutual funds are required to periodically disclose their portfolio holdings. It was semi-annual between
1985 and 2003.In 2004, the SEC adopted enhanced regulations that increased the frequency of portfolio
disclosure from semi-annually to quarterly.
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expected pay off of funds will come down and funds holding illiquid assets will be forced more
compared to the rest of the funds to cut down on discretionary disclosure (to reduce cost
coming from activities such as front running). Also, it is reasonable to assume that the cost of
disclosure will go up more for the illiquid funds with competition and this may also reinforce
their decision to disclose less often compared to other funds when the competition goes up. 7
Hence, next I test the impact of competition on discretionary portfolio disclosure of illiquid
funds vis-a-vis liquid funds. My conjecture is that the the adverse effects of competition on
discretionary disclosure will be pronounced for the illiquid funds.
I divide my sample into two, based on the liquidity of their holdings. I find that funds
holding illiquid assets (illiquid funds) disclose less frequently with competition. An illiquid
fund in the most competitive sector is about 24% more likely to disclose semi-annually than
an illiquid fund in the least competitive sector. Liquid funds initially seem to disclose more
frequently with competition. A liquid fund in the mid-competitive sector is between 15% and
17% less likely to disclose semi-annually compared to a liquid fund in the lowest competitive
sector. However, faced with more competition, their disclosure comes down to the extent
that there is no difference between the frequencies of disclosure in the lowest and highest
competitive sectors. Also the decrease in the 12b1 fees appears more pronounced, around
8 basis points for the illiquid funds operating in the most competitive sector compared to
the illiquid funds operating in the lowest competitive sector. This suggests that illiquid
funds follow an integrated cost cutting strategy and disclose less and advertise less when the
competition is high. I do not find much difference in the 12b1 fees across various competitive
sectors for the liquid funds. Thus, I find strong support for the hypothesis that funds are
worried about disclosure costs and are likely to disclose less often and cut down on advertising
efforts with higher competition.
7Aragon, Hertzel, Shi(2010) find evidence that hedge fund managers seek confidential treatment for their
portfolio holdings (i.e. they defer 13f disclosure) to mitigate costs associated with front-running and are
more likely to seek confidential treatment of illiquid positions that are more susceptible to front-running.
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Next, I examine relatively better performing funds. I would expect the impact of compe-
tition on these funds to be higher compared to average performing funds. Because, relatively
successful funds are the ones who have a realistic chance to get a part of the convex new in-
vestments. Hence, when competition is low, they will spend more on advertising and disclose
more often to attract attention of the investors. With higher competition, each fund’s chance
to make it to the top (only top performing funds can attract new investments) and get a
share of the payoff will go down and the funds will respond by cutting down on discretionary
disclosure as well as advertising activities. Also, relatively successful funds will attract more
copycat funds, especially when the competition is high and investment opportunities are
rather scarce. Higher trading costs coming from copycat activities may also contribute to
the successful funds’ decision to disclose less when competition goes up.
I find evidence that the successful funds disclose the most in the least competitive sector.
Successful funds operating in the middle competitive sectors are 24% more likely to disclose
semi-annually, compared to successful funds operating in the least competitive sector. So
there is a sharp fall in discretionary disclosure with competition. I do not find any variation
in the disclosure policy across the competition segments for the average performing funds.
Similarly advertising expenses for the successful funds comes down by a higher percentage
with competition, compared to the average performing funds.
Overall, I find evidence that competition affects the disclosure and advertising policies
of mutual funds adversely. However, it is difficult to identify, if the higher cost of disclosure
or the lower expected pay off, brought about by higher competition, is forcing funds to cut
down on disclosure and advertising activities. That is why I primarily focus on the overall
effects of competition. However, the amplified effects of competition on the illiquid funds,
and the findings that advertising expenses are coming down for both the whole sample and
the successful funds suggest that both the lower expected pay off and higher disclosure costs
force the funds to disclose less and advertise less, when competition goes up.
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There are other empirical papers which provide similar results in other settings8. Deegan
and Carroll (1993) provide evidence that propensity of Australian firms to make voluntarily
disclosures and compete for reporting excellence awards decreases with competition in the
industry. Wong (1988) and Deegan and Hallam (1991) find that the extent to which firms
augment their financial reports with discretionary items is negatively related to industry
competition. In a sample of Spanish firms, Gallego-Alvarez et al.(2008) find that the degree
to which firms disclose voluntary information on their websites is positively correlated with
industry concentration. My paper adds to this literature. To my knowledge, this is the first
empirical work to study the effects of competition on market transparency in a tournament-
like financial market. It confirms some of the predictions of Carlin, Davis and Iannaccone
(2010).
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 formulates the hypotheses, Section 2.3
describes the data and methodology, Section 2.4 provides the summary statistics , Section 2.5
presents the empirical analysis, Section 2.6 carries out the robustness analysis and Section
2.7 concludes.
2.2 Hypotheses
Consumers base their fund purchase decisions on prior performance information asymmetri-
cally, investing disproportionately more in funds that performed very well the prior period.
Also, search costs significantly affect the fund flows. The performance-flow relationship is
most pronounced among funds with higher marketing efforts.
Mutual funds are mindful about these facts and use discretionary costly portfolio disclo-
sure and advertising as marketing tools to reduce the consumer search cost and attract new
8Please see Carlin, Davis and Iannaccone (2010) for a detailed discussion on this.
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investments in financial markets. The decision to spend more on advertising and go for more
frequent disclosure is a trade off between the desire to receive higher investments next period
and the cost of advertising as well as the cost coming from activities such as front running
and free riding (the later cost increases with more disclosure) against the fund. Rational
funds spend on advertising past performance and resort to discretionary costly portfolio dis-
closure as long as they expect to profit from it, in terms of receiving a share of the new
investments.
With higher competition in the market, each fund’s chance of making to the top dimin-
ishes, adversely affecting its expected payoff (due to convex nature of the pay offs, only the
top performing funds can attract significant new investments) and hence funds respond by
cutting down on discretionary disclosure of costly portfolio holding information and adver-
tising related activities.
Also, it is reasonable to assume that the cost of disclosure will go up with competition.
With more competitors in the market and in the absence of enough investment opportunities,
funds will try to free ride on others’ research ideas and aggressively pursue front running
strategies, whenever they spot an opportunity. Thus, higher cost of disclosure may also
contribute towards funds’ decisions to cut down on discretionary disclosure with higher
competition. The following hypothesis captures this.
Hypothesis 1: Mutual Funds operating in higher competitive market segments disclose less
frequently and spend less on advertising related activities, compared to mutual funds operating
in lower competitive segments.
Cost of disclosure from activities such as front running is not the same across all the
funds. It will be more for the funds holding illiquid assets. Trades by illiquid funds will
incur larger price impacts and will attract more front runners. With higher competition, the
expected pay offs of funds will come down and funds holding illiquid assets will be forced
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more compared to the rest of the funds to cut down on discretionary disclosure (to reduce the
cost coming from activities such as front running). Also, it is reasonable to assume that the
cost of disclosure will go up more for the illiquid funds with competition and this may also
reinforce their decision to disclose less often compared to other funds when the competition
goes up. I test this with the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: The effects of competition on disclosure mentioned in Hypothesis 1 will be
amplified for funds holding illiquid assets.
Given that in the mutual fund markets superior relative performance is rewarded with
convex pay offs, it is the relatively successful funds who are expected to spend more on ad-
vertising and disclose more often to attract attention of the investors when the competition
is low (or when chances of receiving a part of the convex payoffs are high), compared to
the average performing funds. So when the competition goes up, it is again the relatively
successful funds, which will respond by cutting down on discretionary disclosure and ad-
vertising related activities more than average performing funds. Also, relatively successful
funds will attract more copycat funds, especially when the competition is high and invest-
ment opportunities are rather scarce. Higher trading costs coming from copycat activities
may also contribute to the successful funds’ decision to disclose less when competition goes
up. The following hypothesis captures this.
Hypothesis 3: The effects of competition on disclosure and advertising mentioned in Hy-
pothesis 1 will be amplified for relatively successful funds.
2.3 Data and Methodology
I merge the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Survivorship Bias Free Mutual
Fund Database with the Thompson Financial CDA/Spectrum holdings database and the
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CRSP stock price data. The CRSP mutual fund database includes information on fund
returns, total net assets (TNA), different types of fees, investment objectives, and other
fund characteristics. The CDA/Spectrum database provides stock holdings of mutual funds.
The data are collected both from reports filed by mutual funds with the SEC and from
voluntary reports generated by the funds.
I focus on open-end US domestic equity mutual funds. I select funds with the following
Lipper classifications: EIEI, H, LCCE, LCGE, LCVE, MCCE, MCGE, MCVE, MLCE,
MLGE, MLVE, RE, SCCE, SCGE, SCVE, TK. The lowest number of unique funds in a
segment is 43 (in the lipper class H). I include a report date observation in my analysis only
if there are more than 20 fund families present in a market segment on that date.
My sample covers the time period between 1999 and 2006. This is because the Lipper
classifications for the mutual funds are available in the database only from 1999. I do not
consider data after 2006 to avoid the recent financial crises to influence my results. The
mandatory disclosure frequency of mutual funds was changed to quarterly from semi-annual
in 2004. So I have included data from 1999 to 2003 for the discretionary disclosure frequency
test and the entire sample from 1999 to 2006 for the advertising expenses test.
The reported objectives do not always indicate whether a fund portfolio is balanced or
not, and hence I exclude funds that, on average, hold less than 65% or more than 105% in
stocks. I also exclude funds that hold fewer than 10 stocks and those which in the previous
month managed less than $5 million.
If a fund has multiple share classes, I eliminate the duplicate funds and compute the
fund-level variables by aggregating across the different share classes - for the TNA under
management, we sum the TNAs of the different share classes. For the other quantitative
attributes of funds (e.g., returns, expenses etc), we take the weighted average of the attributes
of the individual share classes, where the weights are the lagged TNAs of the individual share
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classes.
To identify illiquid and liquid funds, I adopt the following approach. I retrieve detailed
holding data for each fund in the sample from the Thompson database and obtain the Gibb’s
estimate9 for each of the stocks held by funds. The liquidity measure of the fund is then
calculated as the value weighted average liquidity measure of the funds’ underlying securities.
Every month I divide the funds into two groups based on their fund level liquidity measure
and call the top group as illiquid funds and the bottom group as liquid funds. For the sake
of robustness analysis, I rerun my tests using Amihud liquidity measure ( Section 2.6) and
find similar results.
I use Lipper classification for market segmentation and Herfindahl index as a proxy for
competition in each of these market segments. The Herfindahl index is a measure of the size
of firms in relation to the industry and an indicator of the amount of competition among
them.
I recognize the fact that several funds from a single family of funds can coexist within
a Lipper classification on any date and hence I aggregate assets by family to calculate this
measure. Thus, the value of Herfindahl index for each segment is the sum across families of
the square of each family’s assets as a proportion of a sector’s total assets. i.e.
h indexjt =
∑n
i=1 S
2
it
where h indexjt is the Herfindahl index of Lipper Class j at time t. Sit is the TNA share
9I download the estimates from Joel Hasbrouck’s website at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/ jhasbrou/. The
Gibbs estimator is a Bayesian version of Rolls (1984) transactions cost measure
c =
{ √−cov(rt, rt−1) if cov(rt, rt−1) < 0
0 otherwise
This measure derives from a model in which rt = c ∗ δq+ut where qt is a trade direction indicator (buyer or
seller initiated), c the parameter to be estimated, δqt the change in the indicator from period t− 1 to t, and
ut an error term. A couple of algebraic steps leads to the previous expression under the assumption that
buyer and seller initiated trades are equally likely.
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of fund family i in Lipper class j at time t, and n is the number of fund families in lipper
class j at time t.
At every report date, I classify a fund as semi-annual if the previous disclosure for that
fund was six months earlier and quarterly if the previous disclosure for that fund was three
months earlier.
2.4 Summary Statistics
My sample for the Disclosure Frequency Test has 2109 unique funds and 17282 observations,
out of which 3270 are semi-annual and 12989 are quarterly.
Table 2.1 displays the mean, the median, the standard deviation, the 25th and the 75th
percentile of the Age, Total Net Assets, Expense ratio, 12b1 fees and annual Turnover of all
the funds in the sample.
Table 2.2 reports number of funds, the mean fund characteristics and mean Herfindahl
index for each Lipper class market segment. As we can see there are a lot of variations in
each of these characteristics. Some of the segments are very competitive such as SCVE,
which has a Herfindahl index of just 0.038 and some are very concentrated such as H whose
Herfindahl index is 0.283. I have excluded observations with Herfindahl index greater than
0.20 in the analysis so that the highly concentrated segments do not affect the results. We
also see a lot of variation in the Expenses ratios and 12b1 fees.
Table 2.3 reports the average Age, average Total Net Assets, average Expense ratio, av-
erage 12b1 fees and average annual Turnover ratio of semi-annual and quarterly observations
and their difference. We can see that there is no significant differences between the semi-
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annual and quarterly funds in terms of Age or TNA. However, the expense ratio and 12b1
fees of quarterly funds are more than that of the semi-annual funds. This is intuitive in the
sense that funds decide to disclose more often as a part of marketing strategy and it comes
with higher efforts on marketing and distribution activities which is captured by 12b1 fees
and total expenses ratio. The turn over ratios for semi-annual funds are higher than that of
the quarterly funds and it may indicate higher information based trades by the semi-annual
funds as referred to by Ge and Zheng(2006).
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2.5 Empirical Analysis
2.5.1 Hypothesis 1: The Effect of Competition
Competition and Discretionary Disclosure
In this and the next sections, I test the impact of competition on the disclosure and ad-
vertising policies of mutual funds. Mutual funds use discretionary portfolio disclosure and
advertising as marketing tools to attract new investments in a financial market, which of-
ten resemble a tournament (where superior relative performance and greater visibility are
rewarded with convex payoffs). With higher competition, the likelihood of landing new in-
vestments goes down and funds respond by cutting down on discretionary disclosure of costly
portfolio holding information and advertising related activities.
Every month, I divide the funds into three groups based on the level of market com-
petition, as captured by herfindahl index, they operate in and run the following logistic
regression to explore the impact of competition on discretionary disclosure decisions of the
funds.
Prob(Semi Disci,t) = F (β0 +β1 ∗Rank1 hi,t−1 +β2 ∗Rank0 hi,t−1 +β3 ∗PastPerfi,t−1 +
β4 ∗ Log Agei,t−1 + β5 ∗ Log TNAi,t−1 + β6 ∗ Exp Ratioi,t−1 + β7 ∗ Turn Overi,t + β8 ∗
StdDev(Ret)i,t + i,t)
Where Semi Disc is an indicator variable and takes on the value of one, if the fund
provides semi annual disclosure during the past six months and zero otherwise. Rank1 h is
an indicator variable, which takes on the value of one, if the fund is operating in the middle
competitive sector and zero otherwise. Rank0 h is an indicator variable which takes on the
value of one, if the fund is operating in the most competitive sector and zero otherwise. I
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use the dummy variables for competition levels instead of a continuous independent variable,
because I expect the competition to affect the disclosure behavior in a non-linear way. Past
Perf is the past six month average return of the funds. Log Age is the natural logarithm of
the fund age. Log TNA is the natural logarithm of total net assets of the fund. Exp Ratio
is the annual expense ratio of a fund. Turn Over is the turnover ratio of the fund. Std
Dev(Ret) is the monthly standard deviation of the fund returns calculated over the past 12
months.
The results of this regression is reported in the panel A of table 2.4. Here, Rank2 h, the
least competitive segment, is the reference category. We see that the coefficient on Rank0 h is
positive and statistically significant. That means the funds operating in the most competitive
sectors are more likely to disclose semi-annually by 13% compared to funds operating in the
least competitive sectors. That is competition has negative impact on fund disclosure. We
do not see much difference between the disclosure policy of the funds working in the least
competitive sector and the middle competitive sector. However, funds operating in the most
competitive sectors are more likely to disclose semi-annually by 17.5% compared to funds
operating in the middle competitive sectors.
Looking at the other coefficients, we realize that past performance has a negative co-
efficient on it. That is, good performing funds tend to disclose more. That supports our
reasoning that successful funds use discretionary disclosure as a marketing tool to capture
investors’ attention. The coefficient on the expense ratio is negative. This is consistent with
the difference in the expense ratios between semi and quarterly observations in table 2.3. As
marketing expenses are a part of expense ratio, we can conjecture that funds use disclosure
and marketing efforts together to obtain a larger share of the next period’s investments.
Also, we find that bigger funds are quarterly.
It is possible that funds may stick to one disclosure frequency for a period of time owing
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to various reasons, such as inertia, fund family decision etc. This can create a potential
bias in the pooled-logit estimates. I have controlled for this by having the past disclosure
decision as an independent variable in the regression and reported the results in panel B. The
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is positive and significant implying a significant
correlation between the past and current disclosure policy. The coefficients on the variables
becomes smaller in magnitude. But, they are still economically and statistically significant,
particularly the coefficient on rank0 h, which is of interest here. The funds operating in the
most competitive sectors are more likely to disclose semi-annually by 10% compared to funds
operating in the least competitive sectors. This is statistically significant at the 10% level.
As before, we do not see much difference between the disclosure policy of the funds working
in the least competitive sector and the middle competitive sector. However, funds operating
in the most competitive sectors are more likely to disclose semi-annually by 13% compared
to funds operating in the middle competitive sectors. This is statistically significant at the
5% level.
Competition and Advertising Efforts
Continuing from the previous section, I test the impact of competition on advertising ex-
penses of the mutual funds. The hypothesis is - advertising expense will go down with
competition.
I use annual 12b1 fees as a proxy for the advertising expenses. SEC website defines ‘12b-1
fees’ as fees paid by the fund out of fund assets to cover distribution expenses and sometimes
shareholder service expenses. It gets its name from the SEC rule that authorizes a fund to
pay them. The rule permits a fund to pay distribution fees out of fund assets only if the fund
has adopted a plan (12b-1 plan) authorizing their payment. ”Distribution fees” include fees
paid for marketing and selling fund shares, such as compensating brokers and others who
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sell fund shares, and paying for advertising, the printing and mailing of prospectuses to new
investors, and the printing and mailing of sales literature.
I run the following OLS regression for the three competition market segment.
12b1 Expensesi,t = β0+β1∗Rank1 hi,t+β2∗Rank0 hi,t+β3∗Cashi,t+β4∗PastPerfi,t+
β5∗Log Agei,t+β6∗Log TNAi,t+β7∗StdDev(Ret)i,t+β8∗Flowi,t+β9∗StdDev(Flow)i,t+
β10 ∗ Turn Overi,t + β11 ∗ Log Family TNAi,t + i,t
Rank2 h is an indicator variable for the reference competition segment, which takes on
the value of one, if the fund is operating in the lowest competitive sector and zero otherwise.
Rank1 h is an indicator variable which takes on the value of one, if the fund is operating
in the middle competitive sector and zero otherwise and so on . Rank0 h is an indicator
variable which takes on the value of one, if the fund is operating in the highest competitive
sector and zero otherwise. Cash is the percentage of the TNA held in cash. Past Perf is the
past six-month holding period return of the funds. Log Age is the natural logarithm of the
fund age. Log TNA is the natural logarithm of total net assets of the fund. Std Dev(Ret)
is the monthly standard deviation of the fund returns calculated over the past 12 months.
Flow is the new money flow into the fund and calculated over the previous six month period
by the following expression:
flowi,t =
(
TNAi,t−TNAi,t−1∗(1+reti,t)
TNAi,t−1
)
,
where TNAi,t is TNA of fund i on any date t, TNAi,t−1 is TNA of fund i six month earlier
and reti,t is the cumulative monthly return over the semi-annual period. Std Dev(Flow) is the
monthly standard deviation of the fund flows calculated over the past 12 months. Turn Over
is the turnover ratio of the fund. Log Family TNA is the total TNA of the family a funds
belongs to.
The results of this regression are reported in Table 2.5. We see that the coefficients on
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the bottom competitive sector is negative and significant. That is, if a fund is operating
in the highest competitive sector, it is likely to spend between 4 and 5 basis points less in
advertising related efforts, compared to a fund operating in the lowest competitive sector.
This is sizable, given that the average 12b1 fees in the whole sample is 27.5 basis points.
Thus mutual funds operating in more competitive sectors seem to spend less in advertising
related activities, compared to mutual funds operating in the less competitive sectors.10
Coefficient on Cash is positive and significant, which implies that a fund tend to spend
more on advertising if they have more cash with them. Coefficient on past performance is
negative and significant in most of the specifications. Advertising expenses seems to go up
when the past performance goes down. This may appear as efforts to minimize redemptions
after adverse performance outcomes. The age of a fund, included as natural logarithm of
the age to address non-linearity, has a negative relationship with advertising expenses. It
probably implies that as a fund becomes mature, it builds a client base and a reputation for
itself and hence the need for advertising goes down. The coefficient on natural logarithm
of fund TNA is negative. This means larger funds spend less on advertising. This may be
because it is already visible in the market due to its large size. Standard deviation of the past
return has a strong positive coefficient. It implies that funds having relatively risky returns
tend to spend more on advertising to attract (and keep) investment( Cronqvist(2006) finds
that advertisement is effective in attracting funds towards risky investments). Past flow has
a negative coefficient on it, which is intuitive - need for advertisement goes down with higher
flow. However, the negative coefficient on standard deviation of flow means: risker the flow,
lower is the advertising expenses. Turnover does not seem to be significant in explaining
variation in advertising expenses. Finally, we see that advertising expenses goes up with
fund family size. That is, bigger families have higher budget for marketing and distribution.
10I have repeated this regression for 5 competitive market segments and have found similar results (not
reported here). A fund operating in the highest competitive sector is likely to spend around 6 basis points
less, compared to a fund operating in the lowest competitive sector.
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There may be an alternate story for why the fees are coming down with competition. We
can think of mutual funds as firms providing various products for a price i.e. fees. Then the
lower fees in the higher competitive sectors could be explained by mark-downs by the funds
due to competitive pressure from other funds in the market. This argument may be valid
for the total fees charged by the funds. In stead, we have considered fees charged for only
marketing and distribution.
However, to explore this further, I look at the non-12b1 expenses (i.e. the total expense
ratio - 12b1 fees) of the funds. I use this expenses as the dependent variable (instead of 12b1)
in the previous regression and report the results for the three competitive market segments
in Table 2.6. I see that instead of decreasing, the Non-12b1 expenses is in fact increasing
with competition. I also run this exercise for five competition market segments and find
similar results(not reported here) - it is just the marketing expenses which goes down with
competition.
To sum up the results so far, we have fairly strong results that competition has adverse
impact on both discretionary disclosure as well as advertising expenses.
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2.5.2 Hypothesis 2: Competition and Illiquid Funds
Competition and Frequency of Disclosure: Illiquid Vs Liquid Funds
In this section, I test the the impact of competition on disclosure policy of funds holding
relatively illiquid assets vis-a-vis funds holding relatively liquid assets.
Cost of disclosure from activities such as front running is not the same across all the
funds. It will be more for the funds holding illiquid assets. Trades by illiquid funds will
incur larger price impacts and will attract more front runners. With higher competition, the
expected pay offs of funds will come down and funds holding illiquid assets will be forced
more compared to the rest of the funds to cut down on discretionary disclosure (to reduce the
cost coming from activities such as front running). Also, it is reasonable to assume that the
cost of disclosure will go up more for the illiquid funds with competition and this may also
reinforce their decision to disclose less often compared to other funds when the competition
goes up.
On every report date, I divide the funds into two categories - illiquid and liquid, according
to their fund level liquidity measure(see Section 2.3 for more details). Then I run the logistic
regression in the previous section separately for illiquid and liquid funds.
Prob(Semi Disci,t) = F (β0 +β1 ∗Rank2 hi,t−1 +β2 ∗Rank0 hi,t−1 +β3 ∗PastPerfi,t−1 +
β4 ∗ Log Agei,t−1 + β5 ∗ Log TNAi,t−1 + β6 ∗ Exp Ratioi,t−1 + β7 ∗ Turn Overi,t + β8 ∗
StdDev(Ret)i,t + i,t)
Panel A in Table 2.7 reports the logistic regression results for the illiquid funds. The
coefficient on Rank0 h is much bigger(compared to the regression for the whole sample in
the previous section) and it is significant at 5% level. We find that illiquid funds operating
in the most competitive sectors are more likely to disclose semi-annually by around 24% (it
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was 10% for the whole sample), compared to illiquid funds operating in the least competitive
sector.
Thus we find support for our hypothesis that with competition, the cost arising from
activities such as front running goes up and hence funds holding illiquid assets (with higher
price impact) are even more reluctant to disclose portfolio holding information compared to
the whole sample of funds. These results are similar to what Aragon, Hertzel, Shi(2010) has
found for 13f disclosures of the hedge funds.
In Section 2.6, I use another liquidity measure (Amihud liquidity measure) to define
illiquid and liquid funds and have repeated the above regression for illiquid funds. I find
similar results.
We also find positive and economically significant coefficient on the middle level compe-
tition indicator variable. That is a fund operating in the middle level competition market
segment is more likely to disclose semi-annually by 16% ,compared to illiquid funds operating
in the least competitive sector. However, it is not statistically significant. The estimates of
other coefficients are similar to those for the regression for the whole sample.
Panel B in Table 2.7 reports the logistic regression results for the liquid funds. Liquid
funds are not overly worried about the cost of disclosure. So when moving from the least
competitive sector to mid-competition sector, they in fact disclose more frequently. Liquid
funds operating in the mid-competition sector are 13% less likely to disclose semi-annually.
This may be because of the peer pressure coming from the competition - they disclose more
frequently because other funds are doing the same. However, when the competitions goes
up even more, the disclosure frequency comes down to the extent that there is no statistical
difference in the frequency of disclosure between the funds operating in the lowest and the
highest competition sectors. This decrease in disclosure frequency from mid-competition
sector to the highest competition sector can be explained by the theory that the benefit to
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disclosure with respect to cost comes down with competition.
Comparing the results of illiquid and liquid funds, we can infer that with competition,
disclosure cost goes up more for the illiquid funds compared to the liquid funds and forces
them to disclose less often.
Next, I study the impact of competition on advertising efforts of the illiquid funds.
Competition and Advertising: Illiquid Vs Liquid Funds
In this section, I test the impact of competition on advertising policies of Illiquid Vs Liquid
funds.
As before, on every report date, I divide the funds into two categories - illiquid and liquid
according to their fund level liquidity measure. Then I run the regression for 12b1 fees in
the previous section separately for illiquid and liquid funds.
12b1 Expensesi,t = β0+β1∗Rank1 hi,t+β2∗Rank0 hi,t+β3∗Cashi,t+β4∗PastPerfi,t+
β5∗Log Agei,t+β6∗Log TNAi,t+β7∗StdDev(Ret)i,t+β8∗Flowi,t+β9∗StdDev(Flow)i,t+
β10 ∗ Turn Overi,t + β11 ∗ Log Family TNAi,t + i,t
Table 2.8 reports the results of the regression for illiquid funds. We see that the co-
efficients on the highest competitive sector is negative and significant at 1% level and the
magnitudes are bigger than those for the whole sample. If a fund is operating in the highest
competitive sector, it is likely to spend between 7 and 8 basis points less in advertising ef-
forts(it was between 4 and 5 basis points for the whole sample) compared to a fund operating
in the lowest competitive sector.11
11I repeat the previous regressions with non-12b1 expenses ratio (total expense ratio-12b1 fees ) of the
illiquid funds as the dependent variable ( in the place of the 12b1 expenses). In unreported results, I find
that the non-12b1 expense ratios does come down with competition for the last four specifications. However,
it does not come down as much as the 12b1 fees . This rules out ‘markdown’ as the explanation for the lower
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It appears that with competition, funds holding illiquid assets (who are concerned about
trading costs arising from activities such as front running) are even more reluctant (compared
to the whole sample) to advertise and reveal more private information in the process. This
may be a part of the integrated strategy to disclose less and advertise less.
The magnitude, statistical significance and interpretation of other coefficients are similar
to those for the regression for the whole sample.
Table 2.9 reports the results of the 12b1 fee regression for the Liquid funds. I do not find
any difference in advertising expenses across the competition quintiles.
To sum up , we find evidence that funds holding illiquid assets cut down on their discre-
tionary disclosure and advertising activities more than funds holding relatively liquid assets
as a response to higher competition.
advertising expense in the highest competition sector for the illiquid funds.
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2.5.3 Hypothesis 3: Competition and Successful Funds
Competition and Frequency of Disclosure: Successful Funds
In this and the next sections, I examine the disclosure and advertising policies of relatively
better performing funds. I would expect the impact of competition on successful funds to
be higher compared to average performing funds. Because, successful funds are the ones
who have a realistic chance to receive a part of the new investments. Hence, they are
expected to spend more on advertising and disclose more often to attract attention of the
investors, when competition is low(or when chances of receiving a part of the convex payoffs
are high), compared to the average performing funds. When the competition goes up, it is
again the relatively successful funds, which will respond by cutting down on discretionary
disclosure and advertising related activities more than average performing funds. Also,
relatively successful funds will attract more copycat funds, especially when the competition
is high and investment opportunities are rather scarce. Higher trading costs coming from
copycat activities may also contribute to the successful funds’ decision to disclose less when
competition goes up.
First, I divide the funds into three groups based on their past 12 months four factor
alpha. I then run the following regression for the top performing and middle performing
funds separately
Prob(Semi Disci,t) = F (β0 +β1 ∗Rank1 hi,t−1 +β2 ∗Rank0 hi,t−1 +β3 ∗PastPerfi,t−1 +
β4 ∗ Log Agei,t−1 + β5 ∗ Log TNAi,t−1 + β6 ∗ Exp Ratioi,t−1 + β7 ∗ Turn Overi,t + β8 ∗
StdDev(Ret)i,t + i,t)
Table 2.10 lists the results for the top third performing funds. Our variables of interest
are Rank1 h and Rank0 h. I see that the coefficient on Rank1 h is both statistically and
economically significant. That is successful funds disclose the most in the least competitive
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sector. A successful fund operating in the middle competitive sector is 24% more likely to
disclose semi-annually compared to a fund in the least competitive sector. So we see that
there is a sharp fall in discretionary disclosure with competition. A successful fund operating
in the top competitive sector is around 12.5% more likely to disclose semi-annually compared
to a fund in the least competitive sector. However, it is not statistically significant.
Panel B of the Table 2.10 lists the results for the middle third performing funds. Again
our variables of interest are Rank1 h and Rank0 h and we see that coefficients on them are
not statistically significant. Thus, I find support for the above hypothesis.
The coefficients on the other variables are similar to what we had seen in the regression
for the whole sample.
Competition, Successful Funds and Advertising:
In this section, I test the impact of competition on advertising efforts of successful funds Vs
average performing funds. As discussed in the previous section, I would expect the impact
of competition to be more for the top performing funds compared to the average performing
funds. That is, top performing funds will cut down on their advertising efforts as a response
to competition by a higher margin compared to averaging performing funds.
I divide the funds into three performance categories according to their past performance.
Then I run the regression for 12b1 fees in the previous section separately for top performance
quintile funds as well as middle quintile performance funds.
12b1 feesi,t = β0+β1∗Rank1 hi,t+β2∗Rank0 hi,t+β3∗Cashi,t+β4∗PastPerfi,t+β5∗
Log Agei,t + β6 ∗Log TNAi,t + β7 ∗ StdDev(Ret)i,t + β8 ∗ Flowi,t + β9 ∗ StdDev(Flow)i,t +
β10 ∗ Turn Overi,t + β11 ∗ Log Family TNAi,t + i,t
86
Table 2.11 reports the results of the regression for successful funds. We see that the
coefficients on highest competitive sector dummy is negative and significant at 5% level. If
a successful fund is operating in the highest competitive sector, it is likely to spend between
4.5 and 5.5 basis points less in advertising efforts compared to a successful fund operating
in the lowest competitive sector. 12
Table 2.12 reports the results of the regression for average performing funds (middle third
funds). I see that the coefficient on the highest competition dummy variable is significant only
in the last four specifications. And, its magnitude is lower than that for the successful funds.
That means, successful funds cut down their advertisement expenses by higher percentage
compared to mid-performing fund, when the competition goes up.
I interpret these results as follow: Successful funds strategically spend more money on
advertising while operating in a less competitive sector to grab the attention of the investors,
so as to gain a slice of the next period’s investments. Average performing funds do not have
any incentive to spend more on advertising while operating in the lowest competition market
segment as it will not lead to higher flow.
Overall, I find evidence that relatively successful funds advertise more and disclose more
often when operating in the lowest competition sectors compared to average performing
funds. This supports the Hypothesis 3.
Next, I carry out a few robustness analysis.
12I repeat the above regression with non-12b1 expenses (total expense ratio-12b1 fees ) of the funds as
the dependent variable ( in the place of the 12b1 expenses) for the successful funds. In unreported results,
I find that non-12b1 expense ratios does not come down with competition. This rules out ‘markdown’ with
competition as the explanation for the lower advertising expense in the highest competition sector.
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2.6 Robustness Analysis:
2.6.1 Alternative Liquidity Measure (Amihud Measure)
In this section, I rerun the tests in section 2.5.2 to study the the impact of competition on
funds holding relatively illiquid assets vis-a-vis liquid assets. However, I use the Amihud
measure to calculate the fund level liquidity measure instead of Gibb’s estimate to check the
robustness of my results.
On every report date, I divide the funds into two categories - illiquid and liquid, according
to their fund level liquidity measure. Then I run the following logistic regression separately
for illiquid and liquid funds.
Prob(Semi Disci,t) = F (β0 +β1 ∗Rank2 hi,t−1 +β2 ∗Rank0 hi,t−1 +β3 ∗PastPerfi,t−1 +
β4 ∗ Log Agei,t−1 + β5 ∗ Log TNAi,t−1 + β6 ∗ Exp Ratioi,t−1 + β7 ∗ Turn Overi,t + β8 ∗
StdDev(Ret)i,t + i,t)
Panel A in Table 2.13 reports the logistic regression results for the illiquid funds. The
coefficient on Rank0 h is similar to what I had found in section 2.5.2. That is illiquid funds
operating in the most competitive sectors are more likely to disclose semi-annually by around
27% (it was 10% for the whole sample), compared to illiquid funds operating in the least
competitive sector.
Thus my results for Illiquid funds are robust to different liquidity specifications.
Panel B in Table 2.13 reports the logistic regression results for the liquid funds. We
do not see any difference in their disclosure policy across the competition market segments.
Earlier, with the Gibb’s estimate, we had first seen improvement with disclosure frequency
with higher competition. However, it does not affect my results.
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2.6.2 Marketing Expenses including Front-End Load
Some funds collect a front-end load and this often goes towards marketing expenses. I test
the impact of competition on advertising expenses of the mutual funds as in section 2.5.1.
However, here, I add one seventh of front-end load to 12b1 fees and designate it as marketing
expenses. Some earlier works use this proxy.
I run the following OLS regression for the three competition market segment.
MarketingExpensesi,t = β0 + β1 ∗ Rank1 hi,t + β2 ∗ Rank0 hi,t + β3 ∗ Cashi,t + β4 ∗
PastPerfi,t + β5 ∗ Log Agei,t + β6 ∗ Log TNAi,t + β7 ∗ StdDev(Ret)i,t + β8 ∗ Flowi,t + β9 ∗
StdDev(Flow)i,t + β10 ∗ Turn Overi,t + β11 ∗ Log Family TNAi,t + i,t
The results of this regression are reported in Table2.14. We see that the coefficients on
the highest competitive sector is negative and significant as in section 2.5.1. That is, if a
fund is operating in the highest competitive sector, it is likely to spend between 6 and 8
basis points less in marketing and distribution efforts.
The results of this regression for 5 competitive market segments are similar.
We see that our results for advertising expenses are robust to different specifications.
2.6.3 Competition and Family level Marketing Expenses
Often marketing strategy and level of advertising activities are decided at the fund family
level. So in this section, I try to find out the impact of competition on average fund family
marketing expenses (12b1 plus one seventh of the front-end load) and 12b1 fees for three
competition market segments.
Table 2.15 displays results for marketing expenses including the front-end load. We see
89
that the coefficients on the competition dummies are negative and significant. That is a fund
family operating in the highest competition segment spends 5 basis points less in marketing
related expenses on average, compared to a fund family operating in the lowest competition
segment.
Table 2.16 displays the results for 12b1 fees. And as we can see that a fund family
operating in the highest competition sector charges around 3.2 basis point less in 12b1 fees
on average, compared to a fund family operating in the lowest competition segment.
These results are similar to the results for fund level expenses.
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2.7 Conclusion
In this paper I study the impact of competition in financial markets on incentive to reveal
private information. The main hypothesis of the paper is that mutual funds use discretionary
portfolio disclosure and advertising as marketing tools to attract new investments in a finan-
cial market, which often resemble a tournament (where superior relative performance and
greater visibility are rewarded with convex payoffs). With higher competition, the likelihood
of receiving new investments goes down for every fund and and at the same time the cost
of disclosure goes up. Funds respond to it by cutting down on discretionary disclosure of
costly portfolio holding information and advertising related activities.
In a sample of mutual funds, I find support for this hypothesis, i.e. discretionary portfolio
disclosure and advertising related expenses indeed decrease with competition. And these
effects are especially pronounced for funds holding illiquid assets, and for funds, which are
relatively more successful.
These results are interesting because, they suggest that competition may actually hinder
market transparency in financial markets, and may add to the consumer search cost. These
also suggest that competition may not have the same desired effects across all the markets,
and one needs to carefully consider market participants’ incentives to reveal information and
the impact of competition on these incentives.
To my knowledge it is the first empirical paper to study the impact of competition on
market transparency in financial markets for the mutual funds.
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Table 2.1: Fund Characteristics
This table displays the mean, the median, the standard deviation, the 25th and the 75th percentile
of the Age, Total Net Assets, Expense Ratio, 12b1 Expenses and Annual Turnover Ratio of all the
funds in the sample
Variable Mean Median N Std Dev LQuartile UQuartile
Age 10.788 6.667 17365 12.72 3.75 11.417
Fund TNA 879.657 167.75 16576 3059.6 48 584.2
Expenses Ratio 1.404 1.318 17176 0.944 1.05 1.677
12b1 Expenses 0.346 0.278 11527 0.264 0.099 0.55
Turn Over 117.571 75 17044 210.507 40 132
Table 2.2: Fund Characteristics and Competition by Lipper Class
This table reports number of funds, the mean Age, Total Net Assets, Expense Ratio, 12b1 fees ,
Annual Turnover ratio and Herfindahl index for the lipper class market segments. I calculate the
Herfindahl index measure for each lipper class as the sum across families of the square of each
family’s assets as a proportion of a lipper class’s total assets. i.e. h indexjt =
∑N
i=1 S
2
it where
h indexjt is the Herfindahl index of lipper class j at time t. Sit is the TNA share of fund family i
in lipper class j at time t, and N is the number of fund families in lipper class j at time t.
Lipper Class No of Funds Age Fund TNA Exp Ratio 12b1 Ratio Turnover H index
EIEI 72 15.02 708.89 1.272 0.276 60.184 0.13296
H 43 5.288 380.32 1.743 0.474 289.613 0.28282
LCCE 368 13.505 990.67 1.252 0.33 77.678 0.134
LCGE 313 12.38 1126.41 1.346 0.342 105.173 0.08834
LCVE 216 16.204 2323.07 1.175 0.332 79.226 0.20999
MCCE 162 8.939 572.92 1.354 0.308 142.227 0.10022
MCGE 239 10.652 589.1 1.487 0.322 168.579 0.05596
MCVE 156 9.03 414.39 1.384 0.31 103.231 0.08327
MLCE 295 11.996 900.08 1.312 0.337 104.204 0.1265
MLGE 297 11.503 1498.75 1.554 0.407 173.192 0.15704
MLVE 309 11.936 924.44 1.273 0.37 68.248 0.07467
RE 56 6.594 195.69 1.457 0.323 96.865 0.0925
SCCE 209 7.687 338.95 1.413 0.29 95.726 0.06845
SCGE 214 7.625 345.86 1.508 0.333 150.692 0.04302
SCVE 173 7.579 377.56 1.527 0.33 72.199 0.03814
TK 110 5.445 900.74 1.945 0.482 291.02 0.1046
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Table 2.3: Semi-annual Vs Quarterly Observations
This table reports the average Age, average Total Net Assets, average expense ratio, average 12b1
fees and average annual Turnover of semi-annual and quarterly observations and their difference.
At every report date, I classify a fund as semi-annual if the previous disclosure for that fund was
six months earlier and quarterly if the previous disclosure for that fund was three months earlier.
Semi Qtly Semi-Qtly t value
Age 10.557 10.946 -0.379 -1.03
Fund TNA 899.782 872.937 28.069 0.24
Expenses Ratio 1.362 1.409 -0.054 -2.67
12b1 Expenses 0.319 0.352 -0.034 -3.26
Turn Over 136.772 112.534 18.553 1.72
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Table 2.4: Competition and Frequency of Mutual Fund Disclosure
This table displays the results of the logistic regression with Semi Disc as the dependent variable.
It is an indicator variable and takes on the value of one, if the fund provides semi annual disclosure
during the past six months and zero otherwise. Rank1 h is an indicator variable which takes on
the value of one, if the fund is operating in the middle competitive sector and zero otherwise.
Rank0 h is an indicator variable which takes on the value of one, if the fund is operating in the
most competitive sector and zero otherwise. Past Perf is the past six-month holding period return
of the fund. Log(Age) is the natural logarithm of the fund age. Log(Fund TNA) is the natural
logarithm of total net assets of the fund. Expense Ratio is the annual expense ratio of a fund.
Turn Over is the turnover ratio of the fund. Std Dev(Ret) is the monthly standard deviation of the
fund returns calculated over the past 12 months. All the independent variables in the regression
has been lagged by six months. I include the dummy variables for the years.
1999-2003 Parameter Estimate: All the funds
A B
Parameter P Stat Parameter P Stat
Intercept -0.749 < 0.0001 -1.526 < 0.0001
rank1 h -0.04 0.4394 -0.028 0.6303
rank0 h 0.12 0.0186 0.095 0.0978
Past Perf -1.206 < 0.0001 -1.266 < 0.0001
Log (Age) -0.029 0.2981 -0.027 0.3885
Log (Fund TNA) -0.052 0.0003 -0.038 0.0165
Expense Ratio -36.904 < .0001 -25.715 < 0.0001
Turn Over 0.021 0.1748 0.003 0.8714
StdDev(Ret) -0.78 0.2961 -0.577 0.486
semi1 1.976 < 0.0001
No of Obs(16694) 14438 13737
R squared 0.0227 0.1990
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Table 2.5: Competition and Advertising
This table displays the results of the OLS regression with 12b1 fees as the dependent variable. The
reference indicator variable, Rank2 h, takes on the value of one, if the fund is operating in the
lowest competitive quintile sector and zero otherwise Rank1 h is an indicator variable which takes
on the value of one, if the fund is operating in the middle competitive sector and zero otherwise.
Rank0 h is an indicator variable which takes on the value of one, if the fund is operating in the
highest competitive sector and zero otherwise. Cash is the percentage of the fund’s total net asset
held in cash. Past Perf is the past six-month holding period return of the fund. Log(Age) is the
natural logarithm of the age of the fund. Log(Fund TNA) is the natural logarithm of total net
assets of the fund. Std Dev(Ret) is the monthly standard deviation of the fund returns calculated
over the past 12 months. Flow is the new money flow to the fund and calculated over the previous
six month period as, flowi,t =
(
TNAi,t−TNAi,t−1∗(1+reti,t)
TNAi,t−1
)
. StdDev(Flow) is the monthly standard
deviation of the fund flows calculated over the past 12 months. Turn Over is the annual turnover
ratio of the fund. Log(Family TNA) is the natural logarithm of the total TNA of the fund family. I
include the dummy variables for the years and use panel corrected standard errors. The significance
levels are denoted by *, **, *** and indicate whether the results are statistically different from zero
at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent significance level.
12b1 fees
1999-2006 Parameter Estimate
A B C D E F G H
Intercept 0.312*** 0.273*** 0.424*** 0.41*** 0.192*** 0.161** 0.237*** 0.227***
rank1 h -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.009 -0.009
rank0 h -0.038** -0.037** -0.036** -0.036** -0.048** -0.045** -0.047** -0.047**
Cash 0.003** 0.003** 0.002* 0.002*
Past Perf -0.012 -0.012 -0.025* -0.024* -0.072** -0.078** -0.093** -0.091**
Log (Age) -0.032*** -0.027** -0.038*** -0.036*** -0.015* -0.011 -0.022** -0.018**
Log (Fund TNA) -0.013** -0.012** 0.012** 0.012** -0.019** -0.018** 0.003 0.004
StdDev(Ret) 0.818** 0.81** 0.695** 0.682** 0.895** 0.865** 0.803** 0.733**
Flow 0.009 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.014** -0.015** -0.015**
StdDev(Flow) -0.441*** -0.343***
Turn Over 0.005 -0.005 -0.003 0.003 -0.007** -0.005
Log (Family TNA) 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.023*** 0.023***
No of Obs 23505 23538 23538 23647 13034 13047 13047 13098
R squared 0.084 0.074 0.041 0.04 0.063 0.056 0.029 0.027
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Table 2.6: Competition and Non-12b1 Expenses
This table displays the results of the OLS regression with Non-12b1 Expenses as the dependent
variable. The reference indicator variable, Rank2 h, takes on the value of one, if the fund is
operating in the lowest competitive quintile sector and zero otherwise Rank1 h is an indicator
variable which takes on the value of one, if the fund is operating in the middle competitive sector
and zero otherwise. Rank0 h is an indicator variable which takes on the value of one, if the fund is
operating in the highest competitive sector and zero otherwise. Cash is the percentage of the fund’s
total net asset held in cash. Past Perf is the past six-month holding period return of the fund.
Log(Age) is the natural logarithm of the age of the fund. Log(Fund TNA) is the natural logarithm
of total net assets of the fund. Std Dev(Ret) is the monthly standard deviation of the fund returns
calculated over the past 12 months. Flow is the new money flow to the fund and calculated over the
previous six month period as, flowi,t =
(
TNAi,t−TNAi,t−1∗(1+reti,t)
TNAi,t−1
)
. StdDev(Flow) is the monthly
standard deviation of the fund flows calculated over the past 12 months. Turn Over is the annual
turnover ratio of the fund. Log(Family TNA) is the natural logarithm of the total TNA of the
fund family. I include the dummy variables for the years and use panel corrected standard errors.
The significance levels are denoted by *, **, *** and indicate whether the results are statistically
different from zero at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent significance level
Non-12b1 Expenses
1999-2006 Parameter Estimate
A B C D E F G H
Intercept 1.698*** 1.669*** 1.408*** 1.404*** 1.551*** 1.525*** 1.368*** 1.32***
rank1 h 0.02 0.02 0.023* 0.023* 0.013 0.015 0.021 0.022
rank0 h 0.063*** 0.064*** 0.062*** 0.06*** 0.045** 0.047** 0.051** 0.048**
Cash 0.004** 0.004** 0.005** 0.006**
Past Perf 0.116*** 0.117*** 0.139*** 0.152*** 0.113** 0.107** 0.137** 0.154**
Log (Age) -0.02** -0.016* 0.005 0.013 -0.011 -0.007 0.016 0.027*
Log (Fund TNA) -0.066*** -0.065*** -0.105*** -0.11*** -0.064*** -0.063*** -0.106*** -0.11***
StdDev(Ret) 2.999*** 2.995*** 3.192*** 3.748*** 6.043*** 6.018*** 6.145*** 6.654***
Flow -0.009* -0.019** -0.018** -0.015** -0.02** -0.027** -0.024** -0.023**
StdDev(Flow) -0.334*** -0.289**
Turn Over 0.038*** 0.032*** 0.029*** 0.026** 0.019** 0.014**
Log (Family TNA) -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.048*** -0.048***
No of Obs 23505 23538 23538 23647 13034 13047 13047 13098
R squared 0.368 0.366 0.325 0.309 0.379 0.377 0.336 0.331
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Table 2.7: Competition and Frequency of Disclosure: Illiquid Vs Liquid Funds
This table displays results for the logistic regression with Semi Disc as the dependent variable for
the illiquid funds in panel A and liquid funds in panel B. It is an indicator variable and takes
on the value of one, if the fund provides semi annual disclosure during the past six months and
zero otherwise. Rank1 h is an indicator variable which takes on the value of one, if the fund is
operating in the middle competitive sector and zero otherwise. Rank0 h is an indicator variable
which takes on the value of one, if the fund is operating in the most competitive sector and zero
otherwise. Past Perf is the past six-month holding period return of the fund. Log(Age) is the
natural logarithm of the fund age. Log(Fund TNA) is the natural logarithm of total net assets of
the fund. Expense Ratio is the annual expense ratio of a fund. Turn Over is the turnover ratio of
the fund. Std Dev(Ret) is the monthly standard deviation of the fund returns calculated over the
past 12 months. All the independent variables in the regression has been lagged by six months.
I include the dummy variables for the years. The significance levels are denoted by *, **, ***
and indicate whether the results are statistically different from zero at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent
significance level.
1999-2003 Parameter Estimate
A B
Illiquid Funds Liquid Funds
Intercept -1.823*** -1.03***
rank1 h 0.15 -0.143*
rank0 h 0.212** 0.034
Past Perf -1.193*** -1.253***
Log (Age) 0.031 -0.073*
Log (Fund TNA) -0.061** -0.031
Expense Ratio -19.174** -34.31***
Turn Over 0.005 0.028
StdDev(Ret) -0.401 -2.947
semi1 1.856*** 1.759***
No of Obs(7637) 6203 6359
R squared 0.183 0.159
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Table 2.8: Competition, Illiquid Funds and Advertising
This table displays the results of the OLS regression with 12b1 fees as the dependent variable for
the illiquid Funds(on every report date I identify the illiquid Funds according to their fund level
liquidity measure). The reference indicator variable, Rank2 h, takes on the value of one, if the fund
is operating in the lowest competitive segment and zero otherwise Rank1 h is an indicator variable
which takes on the value of one, if the fund is operating in the middle competitive segment and
zero otherwise. Rank0 h is an indicator variable which takes on the value of one, if the fund is
operating in the highest competitive segment and zero otherwise. Cash is the percentage of the
fund’s total net asset held in cash. Past Perf is the past six-month holding period return of the fund.
Log(Age) is the natural logarithm of the age of the fund. Log(Fund TNA) is the natural logarithm
of total net assets of the fund. Std Dev(Ret) is the monthly standard deviation of the fund returns
calculated over the past 12 months. Flow is the new money flow to the fund and calculated over the
previous six month period as, flowi,t =
(
TNAi,t−TNAi,t−1∗(1+reti,t)
TNAi,t−1
)
. StdDev(Flow) is the monthly
standard deviation of the fund flows calculated over the past 12 months. Turn Over is the annual
turnover ratio of the fund. Log(Family TNA) is the natural logarithm of the total TNA of the
fund family. I include the dummy variables for the years and use panel corrected standard errors.
The significance levels are denoted by *, **, *** and indicate whether the results are statistically
different from zero at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent significance level
12b1 fees: Illiquid funds
1999-2006 Parameter Estimate
A B C D E F G H
Intercept 0.363*** 0.322*** 0.468*** 0.456*** 0.197** 0.167** 0.254*** 0.248***
rank1 h -0.016 -0.019 -0.022 -0.021 -0.025 -0.027 -0.03 -0.028
rank0 h -0.069*** -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.07*** -0.081*** -0.082*** -0.084*** -0.082***
Cash 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
Past Perf -0.01 -0.009 -0.025* -0.026* -0.051* -0.053** -0.067** -0.067**
Log (Age) -0.044*** -0.037** -0.048*** -0.047*** -0.02 -0.014 -0.026** -0.025**
Log (Fund TNA) -0.006 -0.005 0.019** 0.019** -0.011 -0.01 0.01* 0.011*
StdDev(Ret) 0.832** 0.78** 0.634** 0.611** 1.013** 0.9** 0.753* 0.662
Flow 0.012 -0.01 -0.012 -0.011 0.001 -0.02 -0.025* -0.025*
StdDev(Flow) -0.53*** -0.403***
Turn Over 0.005 -0.005 -0.004 0.003 -0.007* -0.005
Log (Family TNA) 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.022*** 0.022***
No of Obs 10975 10994 10994 11034 6119 6126 6126 6138
R squared 0.122 0.107 0.076 0.075 0.09 0.079 0.053 0.053
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Table 2.9: Competition, Liquid Funds and Advertising
This table displays the results of the OLS regression with 12b1 fees as the dependent variable
for the liquid Funds(on every report date I identify the liquid Funds according to their fund level
liquidity measure). The reference indicator variable, Rank2 h, takes on the value of one, if the fund
is operating in the lowest competitive segment and zero otherwise Rank1 h is an indicator variable
which takes on the value of one, if the fund is operating in the middle competitive segment and
zero otherwise. Rank0 h is an indicator variable which takes on the value of one, if the fund is
operating in the highest competitive segment and zero otherwise. Cash is the percentage of the
fund’s total net asset held in cash. Past Perf is the past six-month holding period return of the fund.
Log(Age) is the natural logarithm of the age of the fund. Log(Fund TNA) is the natural logarithm
of total net assets of the fund. Std Dev(Ret) is the monthly standard deviation of the fund returns
calculated over the past 12 months. Flow is the new money flow to the fund and calculated over the
previous six month period as, flowi,t =
(
TNAi,t−TNAi,t−1∗(1+reti,t)
TNAi,t−1
)
. StdDev(Flow) is the monthly
standard deviation of the fund flows calculated over the past 12 months. Turn Over is the annual
turnover ratio of the fund. Log(Family TNA) is the natural logarithm of the total TNA of the
fund family. I include the dummy variables for the years and use panel corrected standard errors.
The significance levels are denoted by *, **, *** and indicate whether the results are statistically
different from zero at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent significance level
12b1 fees: Lliquid funds
1999-2006 Parameter Estimate
A B C D E F G H
Intercept 0.239*** 0.209*** 0.363*** 0.348*** 0.22** 0.198** 0.333*** 0.312***
rank1 h -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.003
rank0 h 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.014 -0.011 -0.009 -0.012 -0.012
0.005** 0.005** 0.004** 0.004**
Past Perf -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 0.003 -0.174** -0.175** -0.179** -0.176**
Log (Age) -0.02* -0.016 -0.027** -0.023** -0.01 -0.007 -0.016 -0.012
Log (Fund TNA) -0.018** -0.017** 0.007 0.007 -0.024** -0.023** -0.002 -0.002
StdDev(Ret) 1.026** 0.995* 0.906* 0.922* 0.756 0.747 0.868 0.819
Flow 0.012 0.002 0.003 0.004 -0.012** -0.017** -0.017** -0.017**
StdDev(Flow) -0.365*** -0.259**
Turn Over 0.008 -0.003 -0.001 0.003 -0.006 -0.004
Log (Family TNA) 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.024*** 0.024***
No of Obs 11100 11113 11113 11173 6192 6197 6197 6231
R squared 0.062 0.057 0.022 0.02 0.052 0.049 0.022 0.021
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Table 2.10: Competition and Frequency of Mutual Fund Disclosure: Successful Funds
This table displays the results of the logistic regressions with Semi Disc as the dependent variable
for the top third funds based on their past 12 months four factor alpha. It is an indicator variable
and takes on the value of one, if the fund provides semi annual disclosure during the past six months
and zero otherwise. Rank1 h is an indicator variable which takes on the value of one, if the fund is
operating in the middle competitive segment and zero otherwise. Rank0 h is an indicator variable
which takes on the value of one, if the fund is operating in the most competitive segment and
zero otherwise. Log(Age) is the natural logarithm of the fund age. Log(Fund TNA) is the natural
logarithm of total net assets of the fund. Expense Ratio is the annual expense ratio of a fund.
Turn Over is the turnover ratio of the fund. Std Dev(Ret) is the monthly standard deviation of the
fund returns calculated over the past 12 months. All the independent variables in the regression
has been lagged by six months. I include the dummy variables for the years.
Successful Funds
A B
top third middle third
Parameter Estimate P Stat Estimate P Stat
Intercept -2.065 < .0001 -1.501 < .0001
rank1 h 0.213 0.038 -0.147 0.113
rank0 h 0.117 0.231 -0.084 0.408
Log (Age) 0.022 0.698 -0.057 0.281
Log (Fund TNA) -0.074 0.007 -0.03 0.272
Expense Ratio -24.891 0.006 -26.536 0.005
Turn Over -0.032 0.269 0.031 0.357
StdDev(Ret) 1.304 0.273 1.508 0.346
Semi1 1.971 < .0001 1.867 < .0001
No of Obs 5408 5314
R squared 0.2003 0.1767
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Table 2.11: Successful Funds and Advertising
This table displays the results of the OLS regression with 12b1 fees as the dependent variable for
top third funds based on their past performance. The reference indicator variable, Rank2 h, takes
on the value of one, if the fund is operating in the lowest competitive sector and zero otherwise
Rank1 h is an indicator variable which takes on the value of one, if the fund is operating in the
middle competitive sector and zero otherwise. Rank0 h is an indicator variable which takes on the
value of one, if the fund is operating in the highest competitive sector and zero otherwise. Cash is
the percentage of the fund’s total net asset held in cash. Past Perf is the past six-month holding
period return of the fund. Log(Age) is the natural logarithm of the age of the fund. Log(Fund
TNA) is the natural logarithm of total net assets of the fund. Std Dev(Ret) is the monthly standard
deviation of the fund returns calculated over the past 12 months. Flow is the new money flow to the
fund and calculated over the previous six month period as, flowi,t =
(
TNAi,t−TNAi,t−1∗(1+reti,t)
TNAi,t−1
)
.
StdDev(Flow) is the monthly standard deviation of the fund flows calculated over the past 12
months. Turn Over is the annual turnover ratio of the fund. Log(Family TNA) is the natural
logarithm of the total TNA of the fund family. I include the dummy variables for the years and
use panel corrected standard errors. The significance levels are denoted by *, **, *** and indicate
whether the results are statistically different from zero at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent significance
level.
12b1 Expenses: Successful Funds
1999-2006 Parameter Estimate
A B C D E F G H
Intercept 0.277*** 0.236*** 0.367*** 0.341*** 0.23*** 0.194** 0.317*** 0.299***
rank1 h -0.02 -0.021 -0.021 -0.02 -0.027* -0.027* -0.029* -0.029*
rank0 h -0.044** -0.044** -0.044** -0.044** -0.053** -0.052** -0.055** -0.055**
Cash 0.003* 0.002 0.002 0.002
Past Perf 0.04* 0.043** 0.026 0.026 -0.011 -0.016 -0.029 -0.028
Log (Age) -0.037*** -0.032*** -0.041*** -0.037*** -0.023** -0.019** -0.028** -0.024**
Log (Fund TNA) -0.009 -0.008 0.012** 0.012** -0.013** -0.012* 0.005 0.005
StdDev(Ret) 1.158*** 1.157*** 1.062*** 0.983*** 1.387** 1.377** 1.311** 1.209**
Flow 0.016** 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.002 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008
StdDev(Flow) -0.397*** -0.32***
Turn Over -0.001 -0.009** -0.008** 0.001 -0.008** -0.006
Log (Family TNA) 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.019***
No of Obs 7558 7567 7567 7599 4344 4349 4349 4365
R squared .086 .077 .054 .051 .073 .066 .046 .04375
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Table 2.12: Mid-performing Funds and Advertising
This table displays the results of the OLS regression with 12b1 fees as the dependent variable for
middle third funds based on their past performance. The reference indicator variable, Rank2 h,
takes on the value of one, if the fund is operating in the lowest competitive quintile sector and zero
otherwise Rank1 h is an indicator variable which takes on the value of one, if the fund is operating in
the middle competitive sector and zero otherwise. Rank0 h is an indicator variable which takes on
the value of one, if the fund is operating in the highest competitive sector and zero otherwise. Cash
is the percentage of the fund’s total net asset held in cash. Past Perf is the past six-month holding
period return of the fund. Log(Age) is the natural logarithm of the age of the fund. Log(Fund
TNA) is the natural logarithm of total net assets of the fund. Std Dev(Ret) is the monthly standard
deviation of the fund returns calculated over the past 12 months. Flow is the new money flow to the
fund and calculated over the previous six month period as, flowi,t =
(
TNAi,t−TNAi,t−1∗(1+reti,t)
TNAi,t−1
)
.
StdDev(Flow) is the monthly standard deviation of the fund flows calculated over the past 12
months. Turn Over is the annual turnover ratio of the fund. Log(Family TNA) is the natural
logarithm of the total TNA of the fund family. I include the dummy variables for the years and
use panel corrected standard errors. The significance levels are denoted by *, **, *** and indicate
whether the results are statistically different from zero at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent significance
level.
12b1 Expenses: Mid-performing Funds
1999-2006 Parameter Estimate
A B C D E F G H
Intercept 0.192*** 0.159** 0.341*** 0.335*** 0.155** 0.134** 0.291*** 0.277***
rank1 h -0.005 -0.004 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.004 -0.01 -0.01
rank0 h -0.025 -0.023 -0.022 -0.023 -0.036** -0.033* -0.035** -0.035**
Cash 0.004** 0.004** 0.003** 0.003**
Past Perf 0.033 0.038 0.022 0.021 -0.04 -0.039 -0.04 -0.04
Log (Age) -0.017* -0.014 -0.025** -0.024** -0.001 0.004 -0.009 -0.007
Log (Fund TNA) -0.022** -0.021** 0.006 0.006 -0.025** -0.024** -0.002 -0.001
StdDev(Ret) 0.825** 0.842** 0.751** 0.764** 0.833* 0.795* 0.897* 0.857*
Flow 0.016* -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.007 -0.015 -0.019* -0.018*
StdDev(Flow) -0.425*** -0.315**
Turn Over 0.008 -0.003 -0.001 0.004 -0.008 -0.005
Log (Family TNA) 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.025*** 0.026***
No of Obs 7957 7963 7963 7998 4416 4419 4419 4437
R squared 0.071 0.063 0.023 0.022 0.05 0.045 0.015 0.014
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Table 2.13: Competition and Frequency of Disclosure: Illiquid Vs Liquid Funds: Alter-
native Liquidity Measure
This table displays results for the logistic regression with Semi Disc as the dependent variable for
the illiquid funds in panel A and liquid funds in panel B. It is an indicator variable and takes on
the value of one, if the fund provides semi annual disclosure during the past six months and zero
otherwise. Amihud liquidity measure has been used here to calculate fund level liquidity measures.
Rank1 h is an indicator variable which takes on the value of one, if the fund is operating in the
middle competitive sector and zero otherwise. Rank0 h is an indicator variable which takes on the
value of one, if the fund is operating in the most competitive sector and zero otherwise. Past Perf
is the past six-month holding period return of the fund. Log(Age) is the natural logarithm of the
fund age. Log(Fund TNA) is the natural logarithm of total net assets of the fund. Expense Ratio
is the annual expense ratio of a fund. Turn Over is the turnover ratio of the fund. Std Dev(Ret)
is the monthly standard deviation of the fund returns calculated over the past 12 months. All
the independent variables in the regression has been lagged by six months. I include the dummy
variables for the years. The significance levels are denoted by *, **, *** and indicate whether the
results are statistically different from zero at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent significance level.
1999-2003 Parameter Estimate
A B
Illiquid Funds Liquid Funds
Intercept -1.141*** -1.914***
rank1 h -0.114 0.04
rank0 h 0.238** 0.36
Past Perf -1.9*** -0.85***
Log (Age) -0.046 0.015
Log (Fund TNA) -0.039* -0.034
Expense Ratio -31.004** -19.48**
Turn Over 0.023 -0.007
StdDev(Ret) -3.573** 1.02
semi1 2.052*** 1.902***
No of Obs 6446 6419
R squared 0.214 0.185
103
Table 2.14: Marketing Expenses Including Front-End Load
This table displays the results of the OLS regression with 12b1 fees as the dependent variable. The
reference indicator variable, Rank2 h, takes on the value of one, if the fund is operating in the
lowest competitive sector and zero otherwise Rank1 h is an indicator variable which takes on the
value of one, if the fund is operating in the middle competitive sector and zero otherwise. Rank0 h
is an indicator variable which takes on the value of one, if the fund is operating in the highest
competitive sector and zero otherwise. Cash is the percentage of the fund’s total net asset held in
cash. Past Perf is the past six-month holding period return of the fund. Log(Age) is the natural
logarithm of the age of the fund. Log(Fund TNA) is the natural logarithm of total net assets of the
fund. Std Dev(Ret) is the monthly standard deviation of the fund returns calculated over the past
12 months. Flow is the new money flow to the fund and calculated over the previous six month
period as, flowi,t =
(
TNAi,t−TNAi,t−1∗(1+reti,t)
TNAi,t−1
)
. StdDev(Flow) is the monthly standard deviation
of the fund flows calculated over the past 12 months. Turn Over is the annual turnover ratio of the
fund. Log(Family TNA) is the natural logarithm of the total TNA of the fund family. I include
the dummy variables for the years and use panel corrected standard errors. The significance levels
are denoted by *, **, *** and indicate whether the results are statistically different from zero at
the 10-, 5- and 1-percent significance level.
12b1 with Front-End Load Expenses: All the funds
1999-2006 Parameter Estimate
A B C D E F G H
Intercept 0.272** 0.214** 0.504*** 0.483*** -0.232** -0.288** -0.012 -0.033
rank1 h -0.014 -0.015 -0.016 -0.015 -0.021 -0.019 -0.023 -0.024
rank0 h -0.068** -0.067** -0.062** -0.062** -0.08** -0.077** -0.075** -0.076**
Cash 0.005** 0.004** 0.003* 0.003
Past Perf -0.025 -0.018 -0.043* -0.042* -0.119** -0.115** -0.155** -0.141**
Log (Age) 0.032** 0.039** 0.02 0.023* 0.044** 0.051** 0.026 0.031**
Log (Fund TNA) -0.032*** -0.03** 0.01 0.011 -0.04*** -0.039*** 0.007 0.009
StdDev(Ret) 1.836*** 1.868*** 1.752*** 1.666*** 1.729** 1.832** 1.856** 1.464**
Flow 0.055*** 0.032** 0.032** 0.032** 0.035** 0.018 0.015 0.015
StdDev(Flow) -0.723*** -0.597***
Turn Over -0.003 -0.014* -0.01 -0.017* -0.032*** -0.026**
Log (Family TNA) 0.049*** 0.05*** 0.054*** 0.055***
No of Obs 17935 17958 17958 18030 9887 9896 9896 9932
R squared 0.08 0.072 0.028 0.028 0.077 0.071 0.025 0.019
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Table 2.15: Competition and Family Marketing Expenses
This table displays the results of the OLS regression with average 12b1 fees including front-end
load of a fund family across all the funds in a market segment as the dependent variable. The
reference indicator variable, Rank2 h, takes on the value of one, if the fund is operating in the
lowest competitive segment and zero otherwise Rank1 h is an indicator variable which takes on
the value of one, if the fund is operating in the middle competitive segment and zero otherwise.
Rank0 h is an indicator variable which takes on the value of one, if the fund is operating in the
highest competitive segment and zero otherwise. Family Cash is the average percentage of the
fund’s total net asset held in cash across all the funds of a family in a market segment. Similarly
Family Past Perf is the average past six-month holding period return of the funds, Log(Avg Family
Age) is the natural logarithm of the average age of the funds. Log(Family TNA) is the natural
logarithm of total net assets of the funds in the market segment. Avg Family Past Flow is the
average new money flow to the funds in a segment and calculated over the previous six month
period as, flowi,t =
(
TNAi,t−TNAi,t−1∗(1+reti,t)
TNAi,t−1
)
. Avg Family Turn Over is the average annual
turnover ratio of the funds in a segment. I include the dummy variables for the years and use panel
corrected standard errors. The significance levels are denoted by *, **, *** and indicate whether
the results are statistically different from zero at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent significance level.
Mkting Expenses : All the funds
Variable Parameter t Value
Intercept 0.232 6.94
rank1 h -0.018 -1.79
rank0 h -0.051 -4.94
Family Cash 0.004 4.07
Family Past Perf -0.136 -2.67
Log (Avg Family Age) 0.022 3.88
Avg Family Turn Over -0.019 -5.19
Log (Family TNA) 0.034 16.3
Avg Family past Flow 0.007 1.01
No of Obs 8266
R squared 0.0468
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Table 2.16: Competition and Family 12b1 fees
This table displays the results of the OLS regression with average 12b1 fees of a fund family across
all the funds in a market segment as the dependent variable. The reference indicator variable,
Rank2 h, takes on the value of one, if the fund is operating in the lowest competitive segment
and zero otherwise Rank1 h is an indicator variable which takes on the value of one, if the fund is
operating in the middle competitive segment and zero otherwise. Rank0 h is an indicator variable
which takes on the value of one, if the fund is operating in the highest competitive segment and zero
otherwise. Family Cash is the average percentage of the fund’s total net asset held in cash across all
the funds of a family in a market segment. Similarly Family Past Perf is the average past six-month
holding period return of the funds, Log(Avg Family Age) is the natural logarithm of the average
age of the funds. Log(Family TNA) is the natural logarithm of total net assets of the funds in the
market segment. Avg Family Past Flow is the average new money flow to the funds in a segment
and calculated over the previous six month period as, flowi,t =
(
TNAi,t−TNAi,t−1∗(1+reti,t)
TNAi,t−1
)
. Avg
Family Turn Over is the average annual turnover ratio of the funds in a segment. I include the
dummy variables for the years and use panel corrected standard errors. The significance levels are
denoted by *, **, *** and indicate whether the results are statistically different from zero at the
10-, 5- and 1-percent significance level.
12b1 Expenses : All the funds
Variable Parameter t Value
Intercept 0.216 13.03
rank1 h -0.004 -0.84
rank0 h -0.032 -6.08
Family Cash 0.002 4.47
Family Past Perf -0.07 -2.88
Log (Avg Family Age) -0.02 -6.97
Avg Family Turn Over -0.001 -0.46
Log (Family TNA) 0.016 16.27
Avg Family past Flow -0.012 -3.4
No of Obs 10841
R squared 0.0402
106
Chapter 3
Financial Constraints and Strategic
Trading in Illiquid Markets
3.1 Introduction
Often similar trading strategies are pursued by a few large investors in illiquid markets and
their trades have significant price impacts. These sophisticated traders are aware of this and
take into account the price impacts of their trades not only on their own portfolio choice
decisions, but also on the portfolio choice decisions of other traders in the market.
These traders are often exposed to various liquidation constraints, which may depend on
the market price. For example, hedge funds with margin accounts may have to liquidate a
part or whole of their portfolios in response to margin calls. A variety of risk management
practices such as portfolio insurance may trigger liquidation of portfolios. Investors who sale
short may have to close their positions and exit the market, if the prices move adversely.
The effects of these endogenous price driven constraints are twofold. On the one hand, it
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may force the large investors with price impacts to reduce their trading speed in order not
to violate the constraints. On the other hand, it may encourage predatory behavior : strong
traders may manipulate market price to push other traders into distress and force them to
leave the market, so that they can trade at a favorable price next period.
This phenomenon is well documented in the popular press. One recent example is that
of Focus Capital.
“In a letter to investors, the founders of Focus, Tim O’Brien and Philippe Bubb,
said it had been hit by “violent short-selling by other market participants”, which
accelerated when rumors that it was in trouble circulated. Sharp drops in the
value of its investments led its two main banks to force it to sell last Tuesday.”
FT 04/03/08.
Another famous example of predatory trading is Goldman Sachs & Co. and other coun-
terparties’ trading against LTCM in 1998. The proposal of UBS Warburg, to take over
Enron’s traders without taking over its trading positions, was opposed on the same ground,
i.e. it presented predatory risk. There are also evidence of predatory trading during 1987
stock market crash (Brady et al., 1988).1
In this paper we study a multi-period model of strategic trading with large strategic
traders and allow for forced liquidations. These large traders invest in an illiquid risky asset
and a risk free asset and face liquidation constraints: when their portfolio value becomes
negative, they have to unwind their total risky positions immediately and leave the market.
In this set up, we show that traders’ wealth limits the positions they can take in the risky
asset, if they do not want to violate the liquidation constraint. Also, relatively strong
strategic traders, who have lower exposures to the risky asset, may take into account this
1Please see Brunnermeier and Pendersen(2005) for a detailed discussion on predatory trading.
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constraint and trigger insolvency of relatively weak traders.
Our analysis finds that when traders have similar proportions of their wealth invested in
the risky asset, they will behave cooperatively and spread their orders over several trading
periods. This is similar to what they would do in a benchmark model without the constraint.
However, if there is a significant difference in the proportions of the wealth invested in the
risky assets among the traders , the strong traders (with low proportion of wealth invested
in the risky asset) predate on the weak traders (with high proportion of wealth invested in
the risky asset) by manipulating the price and forcing the weak traders to unwind their risky
positions immediately. By doing this, the strong traders benefit from the fire sale resulting
from the forced liquidation of the weak traders.
Our work contributes to the literature on limits to arbitrage. A large part of this liter-
ature, for example works by Shleifer and Vishny(1997), Xiong(2001) , Gromb and Vayanos
(2002) and Liu and Longstaff (2004), focuses on potential losses in convergence trading due
to institutional frictions or capital constraints. These models share a common element: a
mechanism to amplify exogenous shocks. Arbitrageurs have to liquidate part of their po-
sitions after an initial shock to prices which creates further adverse price movements and
liquidations.
In contrast, we have endogenised the amplification mechanism in our model: arbitrageurs,
who are subject to liquidation constraints, are not fully competitive and hence their trades
have price impacts. This type of strategic interaction, which is missing in the previous
models, makes a fundamentally riskless arbitrage opportunity risky. The existence of the
liquidation constraint and presence of other arbitrageurs create a predatory risk, which makes
arbitrageurs reluctant to invest in arbitrage opportunities in the first place.
In a related paper Kondor (2009) develops an equilibrium model of convergence trading
and its impact on asset prices, where arbitrageurs optimally decide how to allocate their
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limited capital over time. He shows that prices of identical assets can diverge even if the
constraints faced by arbitrageurs are not binding, and that in equilibrium arbitrageurs’ activ-
ities endogenously generate losses with positive probability, even if the trading opportunity is
fundamentally riskless. In his model arbitrageurs are competitive and his focus is on the en-
dogenous determination of the price gap, whereas we study trading behaviour of imperfectly
competitive arbitrageurs, who are subject to liquidation constraints.
Our work also adds to the literature on predatory trading (i.e. trading that induces
and/or exploits the need of other investors to reduce their positions) and forced liquidation.
In an important paper Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) show that if one trader needs to
sell, others also sell and subsequently buy back the asset. This leads to price overshooting
and a reduced liquidation value for the distressed trader. Hence, the market is illiquid when
liquidity is needed the most. Carlin, Lobo and Viswanathan (2007) analyze how episodic
illiquidity can can arise from a breakdown in cooperation between market participants. They
consider a repetition of the predatory stage game and show that while most of the time
traders provide apparent liquidity to each other, when the stakes are high, cooperation
breaks down, leading to sudden and short-lived illiquidity. Chu, Lehnert, and Passmore
(2009) explore the effects of cross-price elasticities on predation, liquidity provision, and
the policies in a multi-asset framework. A common element of these papers is again the
exogenous nature of liquidation: some arbitrageurs become distressed due to an adverse
shock and their need to liquidate is exploited by other solvent traders. In contrast, our
model endogenizes the solvency of arbitrageurs as capital requirement is based on observed
prices. This encourages arbitrageurs to induce distress of others by manipulating market
price.
The closest paper to our analysis on financially constrained arbitrage is Attari and Mello
(2006). They analyze trading strategies when arbitrageurs can influence the dynamics of
prices on which capital requirements are based. They show that financial constraints are
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responsible for price volatility and time variation in the correlations of prices across markets.
Unlike in their work, we allow heterogeneity among arbitrageurs, which creates opportunity
for predatory trading.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents the general model, Section 3.3 derives
the equilibrium for a monopolistic strategic trader, Section 3.4 analyzes the case of identical
duopoly, Section 3.5 presents the general model with two strategic traders and Section 3.6
concludes.
3.2 The Model
In this section we describe the setup of the economy, introduce the agents and the financial
constraints.
We have two trading periods (0 and 1). In each period, agents trade with each other by
submitting orders which clear the market in a Walrasian framework.
3.2.1 Assets
There are two assets. The first is a one-period risk-free asset that pays a constant gross
return of R which we normalize to 1. The second is a long-lived risky asset that pays a
dividend of d at the end of period 1, where d is normally distributed with mean d and
variance σ2. Let pt denote the market price of the risky asset at time t = 0 and 1.
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3.2.2 Agents
There are two types of traders: value based long-term traders and strategic traders.
Long-term Traders
We assume a competitive fringe consisting of long-term or ‘value-based’ traders as follows.
Some traders, 0-investors, enter the market at date 0, trade, exit the market and hold their
portfolio until the final payoff of the risky asset. Similarly, 1-investors enter the market at
date 1, trade and hold their portfolio until the payoff of the risky asset at the end of period
1.
The t-investors, t = 0, 1, are competitive, form a continuum of measure 1, and have initial
wealth wt. They choose holdings of the risky asset, yt, to maximize the expected utility of
final wealth. We model long-term traders to be risk-averse with CARA-coefficient α. Their
optimization problem is
max
yt
−E [exp (−αwt1)] ,
subject to the budget constraint wt1 = w
t − ptyt + dyt.
Long-term traders have CARA-utility on their normally distributed final wealth, hence
their optimization problem is equivalent to:
max
yt
CE
(
wt1
)
= wt − ptyt + dyt − α
2
σ2y2t ,
which yields that the optimal demand of t-investors is
yt(pt) =
1
ασ2
(
d− pt
)
=
1
λ
(
d− pt
)
(3.1)
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in periods t = 0 and 1. As our focus will be on the behaviour of strategic traders, we can
introduce the parameter λ ≡ ασ2 ≥ 0, and note that from the viewpoint of strategic traders
λ represents market illiquidity (or 1
λ
is market depth). Equation 3.1 shows that t-investors
will purchase the asset if pt < d, since this means that the asset looks cheap and will sell
the asset if pt > d, since this means that the asset looks dear. Thus value-based traders’
demand is driven by the divergence of the price from the intrinsic value.
We define Xt as the aggregate flow of trades coming from strategic traders in period t.
The equilibrium market price of the asset is determined by the market clearing condition
Xt + yt = 0 and the resulting price is given as
pt = d+ λXt. (3.2)
Equation 3.2 describes how the demand flow from arbitrageurs affects the market price
of the asset. If the arbitrageur is buying the asset (Xt > 0), the price, pt, will be higher than
it would be in the absence of an arbitrageur. The reverse will be true if the arbitrageur is
selling the asset (Xt < 0).
Strategic Traders
Trading by strategic traders affects the market price of the asset. We model strategic traders
to be risk-averse with CARA-coefficient α, who maximize their expected final period utility,
that is
max−E [exp (−αW i1)]
We define the wealth (or capital) of strategic trader i, W i1, at period 1 as
W i1 = M
i
1 + e
i
1d
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where ei1 is her position in the risky asset and M
i
1 is her position in the riskless asset after
trading in period 1. The dynamics of eit and M
i
t are given by the following equations:
eit = e
i
t−1 + x
i
t
where eit−1 is the after-trade position at the end of period (t− 1) and xit is the trade order
in period t; and
M it = M
i
t−1 − ptxit
which means that the strategic trader’s investment in the risk-free asset changes only by the
payments for purchases or receipts from the sales of the risky asset. Negative values of M it
represent amounts borrowed, negative values of eit represent short position in the the risky
asset. For simplicity, we denote their starting positions as M i ≡M i−1 and ei ≡ ei−1.
Traders have CARA-utility on their normally distributed final wealth, hence their opti-
mization problem is equivalent to:
max
xi0,x
i
1
CE
(
W i1
)
= M i −
1∑
t=0
pt
(
xit
)
xit + d
(
ei +
1∑
t=0
xit
)
− α
2
σ2
(
ei +
1∑
t=0
xit
)2
(3.3)
After trading in period 0, determination of the strategic trader’s solvency is made. If
the liquidation constraint is not met, the trader becomes insolvent and is forced to liquidate
all its positions and exit the market. if the constraint is met, she remains solvent and can
continue to trade in period 1.
We discuss the constraints faced by strategic traders in detail in the next section.
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3.2.3 Constraints
Arbitrageurs in financial markets are often required to back their trading positions with some
capital, for example margin requirements in futures contracts. Whenever this collateral or
margin amount falls below a certain threshold, the arbitrageur gets a margin call and she will
be forced either to deposit more money in the account or to sell off some of her assets. We use
a simple constraint to capture this in our analysis. However, our model can accommodate
different types of financial constraints, as long as these are based on market prices.
We define the constraint in terms of the value of the arbitrageurs’ portfolio. Using our
previous notations, we require the portfolio value of a strategic trader prior to trading at
date t (t = 0 or 1) to be nonnegative, i.e.
W it−1 = M
i
t−1 + pt−1e
i
t−1 ≥ 0
where the trader’s portfolio wealth consists of her riskless position and risky position eval-
uated at the current market price. For simplicity, we assume that traders are all solvent
at the beginning of the model, evaluated at the unconditional mean price p−1 ≡ d, i.e.
W i = M i + p−1ei = M i + dei ≥ 0. For the determination of trader i’s solvency prior to the
date 1 trade, the constraint to be met is
W i0 = M
i
0 + p0e
i
0 > 0
Using the dynamics of the risky and the riskless positions this constraint can be written in
the following form:
W i0 = M
i
0 + p0e
i
0 =
(
M i − p0xi0
)
+ p0
(
ei + xi0
)
= M i + p0e
i ≥ 0 (3.4)
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This is useful because M i and ei are known before date 0 and hence it is only the p0 term
that depends on the trading activity of the traders in period 0. From now on we will use
this latest inequality to determine the solvency of strategic traders.
3.3 Trading Strategy of a Constrained Monopoly
In this set up we have just one strategic trader who can trade in both the periods. The
optimization problem of this constrained monopolist arbitrageur can be written as
max
x0,x1
CE (W1) = M −
1∑
t=0
pt (xt)xt + d
(
e+
1∑
t=0
xt
)
− α
2
σ2
(
e+
1∑
t=0
xt
)2
(3.5)
s.t. market clears : pt = d+ λxt;
dynamic budget constraints : Mt = Mt−1 − ptxt
and et = et−1 + xt;
final payoff : W1 = M1 + de1;
insolvency constraint : x1 = −e0 if W0 = M0 + p0e0 ≤ 0.
Proposition 1 There exist thresholds k
m
and km such that we have the following equilib-
rium: if W = M + de ≥ λkme2 (where 0 ≤ km ≤ 1), the first best is feasible and the trader’s
optimal trade order is the same as in the absence of the constraint: xu0 = x
u
1 = −12 ασ
2
λ+ασ2
e
while pu0 = p
u
1 = d− λ2 ασ
2
λ+ασ2
e;
if λk
m
e2 > M +de ≥ λmax {0, km} e2, the trader reduces its date-0 order to stay solvent.
Her trade orders and equilirium prices in both the periods are xc0 = − 1λ M+dee , pc0 = −Me and
xc1 = − ασ
2
2λ+ασ2
ec0, p
c
1 = d− λ ασ
2
2λ+ασ2
ec0 respectively.
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if kme2 > M + de ≥ 0, the trader liquidates; sells half of her endowment in both periods:
xl0 = x
l
1 = −12e at prices pl0 = pl1 = d− λ2e,
where k
m
and km are functions of λ/ασ2 and are given in Appendix 3.A, and km ≤ 0 if
and only if λ/ασ2 ≥ 1/2 - in this case the third situation never happens.
We find that if the proportion of wealth invested in the risky asset is low, i.e. trader is
wealthy enough compared to her risky position, the solvency constraint will not bind. In this
case she will smooth her trade orders across periods in order to minimize her price impact
and hence will trades the same amount in both the periods.
As the proportion of wealth invested in the risky asset becomes higher (i.e. λk
m
e2 >
M + de for some k
m
), the trader faces a trade-off between the optimal risk-sharing and her
price impact. If the market is relatively illiquid or the trader has low risk-aversion parameter
or the asset is not very risky, i.e. λ/ασ2 ≥ 1/2, she does not want to become insolvent and
bear the high cost of the fire-sale, hence she reduces her trading speed. The trader will also
trade less in the first period if the market is relatively liquid (λ/ασ2 < 1/2) and her initial
wealth is high enough (M + de ≥ λkme2).
Finally, if the market is relatively liquid compared to the trader’s risk-bearing capacity
and much of her portfolio wealth is invested in the risky asset, she does not mind violating
the solvency constraint and the liquidation. In this case she smoothes her trade orders across
periods in order to minimize her price impact and hence trades the same amount in both
periods, i.e. half of her initial endowment.
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3.4 Duopoly with same starting positions in both the
assets
In this section we study a model with two identical strategic traders. Both of them start
with same position in risky and riskless assets, that is: M1 = M2 = M and e1 = e2 = e 6= 0.
The optimization problem of strategic trader i in this set up is:
max
xi0,x
i
1
CE
(
W i1
)
= M −
1∑
t=0
pt
(
xit
)
xit + d
(
e+
1∑
t=0
xit
)
− α
2
σ2
(
e+
1∑
t=0
xit
)2
(3.6)
s.t. market clears : pt = d+ λ
(
2∑
i=1
xit
)
;
dynamic budget constraints : M it = M
i
t−1 − ptxit
and eit = e
i
t−1 + x
i
t;
final payoff : W i1 = M
i
1 + de
i
1;
insolvency constraint : xi1 = −ei0 if W i0 = M i0 + p0ei0 < 0;
We ignore the case when e = 0, because a risk-averse trader with no position in the risky
asset, will not trade with the value-traders. This is because she will have to offer a price
pt > d, if she wants to buy, and accept a price pt < d, if she wants to go short.
These restrictions on the starting positions yield: W 10 = M
1
0 + p0e
1
0 = M
1 + p0e
1 =
M2 + p0e
2 = M20 + p0e
2
0 = W
2
0 . This implies that insolvency constraints will bind on both
the traders at the same time. Therefore in equilibrium they need to have same certainty
equivalent and must pursue identical trading strategies. If not, one of them will deviate.
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Proposition 2 There exist thresholds k
d
and kd such that we have the following equilibrium:
if W = M + de ≥ λkde2 (where 0 ≤ kd ≤ 1), the first best is feasible and the traders’
optimal trade orders are the same as in the absence of the constraint: x1u0 = x
2u
0 = −ass0 e
and xs1 = x
w
1 = −ass1 e0 with pu0 = d− 2λass0 e and pu1 = d+ λ (2bss1 − ass1 ) e0;
if λk
d
e2 > M + de ≥ λmax{0, kd} e2, both traders reduce their date-0 sell orders to stay
solvent, that is x1c0 = x
2c
0 = − 12λ M+dee and pc0 = −Me , then proceed with x1c1 = x2c1 = −ass1 ec0
and pc1 = d− 2λass1 ec0;
if λkde2 > M +de ≥ 0, the traders liquidate; sell half of their endowment in both periods:
x1l0 = x
1l
0 = x
1l
1 = x
1l
1 = −12e at prices pl0 = pl1 = d− λe,
where k
d
and kd are functions of λ/ασ2 given in Appendix 3.B and kd ≤ 0 if and only if
λ/ασ2 ≥ ld constant - in this case the third situation never happens.
The intuition is similar to the case of monopolist arbitrageur. We find that as long as traders
have a low proportion of wealth invested in the risky asset, the solvency constraint will not
bind. In this case they will smooth their trade orders across periods in order to minimize
their price impact and hence trade the same amount in both the periods.
As the proportion of wealth invested in the risky asset becomes higher, i.e. λk
d
e2 ≥
M + de, traders face a trade-off between the optimal risk-sharing and the trading speed.
If the market is very illiquid or the traders have low risk-aversion parameters or the asset
is not very risky, that is λ/ασ2 ≥ ld for a given constant ld, they do not want to become
insolvent and hence reduce their trade speed. They will also want to avoid insolvency (and
subsequent fire-sale), and will reduce their trade speed, if the market is relatively liquid or
they are significantly risk-averse (λ/ασ2 is close to zero), and they are relatively not poor,
i.e. M + de ≥ λkde2.
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Finally, if the market is relatively liquid compared to the traders’ risk-bearing capacity
or the payoff risk is high (λ/ασ2 < l
d
) and most of their capital is invested in the risky asset,
they will decide to violate the constraint and hence liquidate. In this case they will smooth
their trade orders across periods in order to minimize their price impact and hence will trade
the same amounts in both periods: half of their initial endowments.
The only changes compared to the monopolistic model are related to the thresholds, and
it is because of the fact that there are two identical traders now. When one decides on a
particular trade order, she has to take into account that altogether they will have a price
impact double of that in the single trader case. Comparing trade orders, prices, and the
wealth thresholds (the ks and the ks) in the monopoly and the duopoly case we find that the
unconstrained trade order is less per se and the equilibrium price is lower; the constrained
price is the same as in the monopolistic case and trades are half of the original; while when
being liquidated, trades are the same in both cases and the market-clearing price in case of
multiple traders is lower.
3.5 Duopoly with different starting positions in risk
free asset but same position in risky asset
In this section we study the optimal trading strategies of two strategic traders who start
with the same positions in the risky asset but with different positions in the riskless asset.
As described in Section 3.2.3, the solvency constraint can be written as
M i + p0e ≥ 0
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for i = 1, 2. Hence by making M1 and M2 different we can ensure that the constraint will
not bind on both the traders at the same time and therefore it is possible to obtain an
equilibrium price p0 under which one trader remains solvent while the other is forced to go
for a fire-sale in the subsequent period. If, for example, M1 > M2, that is, trader one is
wealthier than trader two, the solvency of trader two (W 20 = M
2 + p0e ≥ 0) will also imply
the solvency of trader one, as W 10 = M
1 + p0e > M
2 + p0e = W
2
0 ≥ 0. Therefore, from now
on we will call the two traders strong and weak, where M s > Mw.
The optimization problem of trader i is the following:
max
xi0,x
i
1
CE
(
W i1
)
= M i −
1∑
t=0
pt
(
xit
)
xit + d
(
e+
1∑
t=0
xit
)
− α
2
σ2
(
e+
1∑
t=0
xit
)2
(3.7)
s.t. market clears : pt = d+ λ
(
2∑
i=1
xit
)
;
dynamic budget constraints : M it = M
i
t−1 − ptxit
and eit = e
i
t−1 + x
i
t;
final payoff : W i1 = M
i
1 + de
i
1;
and insolvency constrain : xi1 = −ei0 if W i0 = M i + p0e < 0.
For the definition of the equilibrium we first define the value function.
Definition 3 We define the following conditional value functions for period t:
V jkt
(
M it , e
i
t,M
−i
t , e
−i
t
)
= M it + de
i
t −
1
2
(
eit, e
−i
t
)
Qjkt
(
eit, e
−i
t
)′
for i ∈ {s, w} and t = 0, 1, conditional on state {jk}, where
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j ∈ {s, l} denotes the state of trader i, that is if she is solvent or being liquidated;
k ∈ {s, l} denotes the state of trader −i;
M it and e
i
t are the after-trade portfolio holdings of trader i;
M−it and e
−i
t are the after-trade portfolio holdings of trader −i;
Qjkt is a 2× 2 symmetric matrix.
Definition 4 The value function of trader i at date t is the merger of (up to) four different
conditional value functions in different regions given as
V it
(
M it , e
i
t,M
−i
t , e
−i
t
)
=

V sst
(
M it , e
i
t,M
−i
t , e
−i
t
)
if W it ,W
−i
t ≥ 0,
V slt
(
M it , e
i
t,M
−i
t , e
−i
t
)
if W it ≥ 0 > W−it ,
V lst
(
M it , e
i
t,M
−i
t , e
−i
t
)
if W−it ≥ 0 > W it ,
V llt
(
M it , e
i
t,M
−i
t , e
−i
t
)
if 0 ≥ W it ,W−it .
Definition 5 A Nash-equilibrium of the above trading game is a vector of demands {xit}i=s,w;t=0,1
such that xi1 solves the program
max
x
V i1
(
M i1, e
i
1,M
−i
1 , e
−i
1 |x−i1 ,M i0, ei0,M−i0 , e−i0
)
= max
x
V i1
(
M i0 − P(x)x
(
P(x)
)
, ei0 + x
(
P(x)
)
,M−i0 − P(x)x−i1 , e−i1
)
and xi0 solves the program
max
x
V i0
(
M i0, e
i
0,M
−i
0 , e
−i
0 |x−i0 ,M i,M−i, e
)
= max
x
V i0
(
M i − P(x)x
(
P(x)
)
, e+ x
(
P(x)
)
,M−i − P(x)x−i0 , e−i0
)
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with
V i0 (.) = max
{
V ss0 (.) , V
sl
0 (.) , V
ls
0 (.) , V
ll
0 (.)
}
,
and P(x) is the market-clearing price in period t when trader i submits the demand x, and
trader −i submits her equilibrium demand x−it and pt clears the market at date t.
3.5.1 Equilibrium Trades
In this section we study the date 0 and 1 trades in equilibrium for the above problem. We
solve it backwards. First, we solve for the optimal trades at date 1, given the state the
traders are in (that is whether they are solvent or insolvent), then we obtain value functions
representing the continuation utilities, and solve for the optimal trades of period 0 for a
conjectured state of the world. Finally, we check whether it is optimal for any trader to
deviate in such a way that it would change the state of the world (the change of the state
would imply a change in the value function as well).
Depending on if the solvency constraint is binding or not, we have to distinguish between
three states of the world in the begining of period 1: first, both traders are solvent, that
is W s0 ,W
w
0 ≥ 0; second, the strong trader is solvent while the weak is insolvent, that is
W s0 ≥ 0 > Ww0 ; and third, both traders are insolvent, that is 0 > W s0 ,Ww0 .
Equilibrium of Type 1: Both traders remain solvent
If both traders remain solvent for period 1, their optimal trades are
xi1 = −ass1 ei0 + bss1 e0 = −
ασ2
λ+ ασ2
ei0 +
2ασ2
λ+ ασ2
λ
3λ+ ασ2
e0,
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with the market-clearing price
p1 = d− λ 2ασ
2
3λ+ ασ2
e0,
where e0 =
1
2
(es0 + e
w
0 ). Their value functions become
V ss0
(
M i0,M
−i
0 , e
i
0, e
−i
0
) ≡ max
xi1
M i0 − p1
(
xi1
)
xi1 + d
(
ei0 + x
i
1
)− α
2
σ2
(
ei0 + x
i
1
)2
= M i0 + de
i
0 −
α
2
σ2
(
ei0
)2
+
1
2
(
ei0, e
−i
0
)
Qss0
(
ei0, e
−i
0
)′
where Qss0 is a 2× 2 symmetric, positive definite matrix:
Qss0 =
1
2λ+ ασ2
(
ασ2
λ+ ασ2
)2(
2λ+ ασ2
3λ+ ασ2
)2 (2λ+ ασ2)2 −λ (2λ+ ασ2)
−λ (2λ+ ασ2) λ2

=
1
2λ+ ασ2
a
 (2λ+ ασ2)2 −λ (2λ+ ασ2)
−λ (2λ+ ασ2) λ2
 .
Therefore the optimal first-period trades satisfy the following optimization problems:
max
xi0
V ss0
(
M i0,M
−i
0 , e
i
0, e
−i
0
)
= M i0 + de
i
0 −
α
2
σ2
(
ei0
)2
+
1
2
(
ei0, e
−i
0
)
Qss0
(
ei0, e
−i
0
)′
= M i + de+
(
d− p0
)
xi0 −
α
2
σ2
(
e+ xi0
)2
+
1
2
(e+ xs0, e+ x
w
0 )Q
ss
0 (e+ x
s
0, e+ x
w
0 )
′ .
After solving for the optimal trades, conditional on both traders satisfying the solvency
constraint, we obtain the following result:
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Proposition 6 There exists a linear equilibrium in which both traders remain solvent with
trades and market-clearing prices
xi0 = −ass0 e and xi1 = −ass1 ei0 + bss1 e0 for i = s, w and
p0 = d− 2λass0 e and p1 = d+ λ (2bss1 − ass1 ) e0,
with the necessary and sufficient condition
0 ≤ λmax{kss,sl, 2ass0 } e2 ≤Mw + de ≤M s + de.
The coefficients ass0 , a
ss
1 and b
ss
1 and function k
ss,sl (λ/ασ2) is given in Appendix 3.D.1.
Given the state of the world in which both traders remain solvent, the above trades and
prices must be consistent with satisfying the solvency constraint, that is
M s + p0e ≥Mw + p0e ≥ 0,
which is equivalent to
M s + de ≥Mw + de ≥ 2λass0 e2.
For the existence of a Nash equilibrium, though, we need another constraint on the
starting wealth:
λkss,sle2 ≤Mw + de.
where kss,sl is a function of the relative market depth, λ/ασ2. The reason for this is rather
simple. Being aware of the solvency constraint, traders can engage in the costly manipulation
of date 0 prices if they are able to extract higher payoffs in the next trading round. That is
the strong trader might want to force the weak trader to liquidation and benefit from lower
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purchase price in the next period. The cost of making the weak trader distressed is increasing
in her starting wealth, Mw + de, hence there exists a threshold kss,sl such that the strong
trader will engage in this type of price-manipulation if and only if Mw + de < λkss,sle2.
Equilibrium of Type 2: The strong trader remains solvent, the weak trader is
liquidated
If one trader is liquidated while the other survives with after-trade positions of es0 and e
w
0
the second-period (optimal) trades are
xw1 = −ew0
and
xs1 =
λ
2λ+ ασ2
ew0 −
ασ2
2λ+ ασ2
es0
with market-clearing price
p1 = d− λ λ+ ασ
2
2λ+ ασ2
ew0 − λ
ασ2
2λ+ ασ2
es0
and the continuation value functions are
V sl0
(
M s0 , e
s
0,M
l
0, e
l
0
)
= M s0 + de
s
0 −
α
2
σ2 (es0)
2 +
1
2
(es0, e
w
0 )Q
sl
0 (e
s
0, e
w
0 )
′ ,
where Qsl0 is a 2× 2 positive semidefinite matrix:
Qsl0 =
1
2λ+ ασ2
 (ασ2)2 −λασ2
−λασ2 λ2

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and
V ls0 (M
w
0 , e
w
0 ,M
s
0 , e
s
0) = M
w
0 + de
w
0 −
1
2
(ew0 , e
s
0)Q
ls
0 (e
w
0 , e
s
0)
′ ,
where Qls0 is
Qls0 =
λ
2λ+ ασ2
 2 (λ+ ασ2) ασ2
ασ2 0
 .
Therefore the optimal first-period trades satisfy the following optimization problems:
max
xs0
V sl0
(
M s0 , e
s
0,M
l
0, e
l
0
)
= M s0 + de
s
0 −
α
2
σ2 (es0)
2 +
1
2
(es0, e
w
0 )Q
sl
0 (e
s
0, e
w
0 )
′
= M s + de+
(
d− p0
)
xs0 −
α
2
σ2 (e+ xs0)
2
+
1
2
(e+ xs0, e+ x
w
0 )Q
sl
0 (e+ x
s
0, e+ x
w
0 )
′
for the strong trader, while for the weak trader we have
max
xw0
V ls0 (M
w
0 , e
w
0 ,M
s
0 , e
s
0) = M
w
0 + de
w
0 −
1
2
(ew0 , e
s
0)Q
ls
0 (e
w
0 , e
s
0)
′
= Mw + de+
(
d− p0
)
xw0 −
1
2
(ew0 , e
s
0)Q
ls
0 (e
w
0 , e
s
0)
′ .
After solving for the optimal trades conditional on the strong trader surviving and the
weak trader liquidating, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 7 There exists a linear equilibrium in which the strong trader remains solvent
and the weak trader is liquidated with trades and market-claring prices in the following form:
xs0 = −asl0 e and xw0 = −als0 e and p0 = d− λ
(
asl0 + a
ls
0
)
e and
xs1 =
[
λ
2λ+ ασ2
(
1− als0
)− ασ2
2λ+ ασ2
(
1− asl0
)]
e and xw1 = −
(
1− als0
)
e and
p1 = d− λ
[
λ+ ασ2
2λ+ ασ2
(
1− als0
)
+
ασ2
2λ+ ασ2
(
1− asl0
)]
e
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with the constants asl and als (as functions of λ/ασ2) given in Appendix 3.D.2. A necessary
condition for this type of equilibrium to happen is the existence of function k
ls,ss
(λ/ασ2)
(given in Appendix 3.D.2) such that
0 < Mw + de ≤ λkls,sse2 < λ (asl0 + als0 ) e2 ≤M s + de.
Given the state of the world in which the strong trader remains solvent and the other
is liquidated, the above trades and prices must be consistent with only the weak trader
violating the solvency constraint, that is
M s + p0e ≥ 0 > Mw + p0e,
which is equivalent to
M s + de ≥ λ (asl0 + als0 ) e2 > Mw + de.
For the existence of a Nash equilibrium, though, we need another constraints on the
starting wealth:
λk
ls,ss
e2 > Mw + de,
where k
ls,ss
is a functions of the relative market depth, λ/ασ2. The reason for this is rather
simple. Being aware of the solvency constraint, traders can engage in costly manipulation
of date 0 prices, if they are able to extract higher payoffs in the next trading round. In this
equilibrium the strong trader remains solvent while the weak trader is forced to liquidate.
Therefore there is no possible benefit for the strong trader either to push herself to liquidation
by bearing extra cost in period 0 and then face a reduced action space (the forced fire-sale)
in the next period or to rescue the other trader, again by bearing a cost and face costly
risk-sharing in the next period (the weak trader will trade in the same direction).
128
The weak trader, however, might benefit from price manipulation by rescuing herself.
She can reduce her trade speed in period 0, so that she remains solvent and hence is able
to trade optimally for risk-sharing in the next period. The cost of this price manipulation
is decreasing in her own wealth, Mw + de, hence there exists a threshold k
ls,ss
such that the
weak trader will engage in this type of price-manipulation if Mw + de ≥ λkls,sse2.
The above constraints yield that we have a price constraint for the strong trader; and a
price and a deviation constraint for the weak trader. For the existence of an equilibrium we
need the portfolio wealth of the strong trader to satisfy the following
M s + de ≥ λ (asl0 + als0 ) e2,
and that of weak to statisfy the following
λmin
{
k
ls,ss
, asl0 + a
ls
0
}
e2 > Mw + de ≥ 0.
It is easy to show that λ
(
asl0 + a
ls
0
)
> k
ls,ss
> 0, hence the above constraints can be
summed up as
0 ≤Mw + de ≤ λkls,sse2 < λ (asl0 + als0 ) e2 ≤M s + de.
That is, for the strong trader, the price constraint is always tighter than the deviation
constraint and for the weak trader the opposite is true.
We see that the coefficient of the strong trader’s trade in period 0 is negative, while in
period 1, it is positive, i.e. she first sells and then buys, whereas without the constraint he
would always sell, as he is risk-averse. So, it can be interpreted as the strong trader predating
against the weak trader, i.e. part of his first period strategy is to push the price down.
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Equilibrium of Type 3: Both the traders are liquidated
The date 1 trades when both traders liquidate are
xs1 = −es0 and xw1 = −ew0
hence
p1 = d− λ (es0 + ew0 )
and the optimal first-round trades have to satisfy
max
xi0
V ll0
(
M i0, e
i
0,M
−i
0 , e
−i
0
)
= M i0 + de
i
0 −
1
2
(
ei0, e
−i
0
)
Qll0
(
ei0, e
−i
0
)′
= M i + de+
(
d− p0
)
xi0 −
1
2
(
e+ xi0, e+ x
−i
0
)
Qll0
(
e+ xi0, e+ x
−i
0
)′
.
Proposition 8 The optimal trades and the market-clearing prices when both traders are
liquidated are given by
xs0 = x
w
0 = x
s
1 = x
w
1 = −
1
2
e
and
p0 = p1 = d− λe.
Both the traders get liquidated in equilibrium if and only if
0 ≤ M s + de < λkll,sle2 and
0 ≤ Mw + de < λkll,sse2.
where k
ll,sl
, k
ll,ss
are functions of λ/ασ2 given in Appendix 3.D.3.
The above trades and prices must be consistent with violating the solvency constraint.
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M i + p0e = M
i +
(
d− λe) e < 0,
which is equivalent to
0 ≤M i + de < λe2 for i = s, w,
For the existence of a Nash equilibrium we also need that M s + de ≤ λkll,sle2, and
Mw + de ≤ λkll,sse2, where kll,sl and kll,ss are functions of λ/ασ2. Being aware of the
solvency constraint, traders with price impact can manipulate date 0 prices with a cost, if
they are able to extract higher payoffs in the next trading round. In this scenario these
higher payoffs are obvious. An unconstrained risk-averse trader never sells all her risky
holdings. Hence forced liquidation is clearly suboptimal. Therefore, if it is not too costly to
increase the price in period 0 to secure solvency, the strong trader is willing to bear this cost.
The price-manipulation cost is decreasing in the trader’s initial wealth, hence there exists a
threshold, k
ll,sl
, such that the strong trader will engage in price-manipulation if and only if
M s + de ≥ λkll,sle2.
As both traders have price impacts, the forced liquidation and the resulting selling pres-
sure of the strong trader hurts the weak trader too. Therefore it might be in her interest
to manipulate the date 0 price and rescue the strong trader. As before the cost is again
a decreasing in the wealth of the strong trader and therefore, there exists a threshold,
k
ll,ls
, such that the weak trader prefers to make the strong trader solvent if and only if
M s + de ≥ λkll,lse2. If this price manipulation is not too costly, the weak trader might
also want to increase the date-0 price high enough to secure her solvency (and implicitly
the strong trader’s solvency too). This cost will be a decreasing function of her own wealth
and therefore there exists a threshold, k
ll,ss
, such that the weak trader prefers to make both
traders solvent if and only if Mw + de ≥ λkll,sse2.
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As discussed above, we have a price constraint and two deviation constraints on the
wealth of the strong trader, and a price and a deviation constraint on the wealth of the weak
trader. For the existence of an equilibrium we need the portfolio wealth of the strong trader
to satisfy
0 ≤M s + de < λmin
{
1, k
ll,ls
, k
ll,sl
}
e2,
while for the weak trader we must have
0 ≤Mw + de < λmin
{
1, k
ll,ss
}
e2.
It is easy to show that k
ll,ls
, k
ll,sl
, k
ll,ss ≤ 1, which means that the deviation constraint
is always tighter than the price requirement. In fact, when traders liquidate, they smooth
it through two periods to minimize their price impact and hence sell the same amount, i.e.
half of their endowments in each period. Also, we can show that
k
ll,sl
< k
ll,ls
,
which is equivalent to saying that it is always cheaper for the strong trader to reduce her
trading speed in order to stay solvent than for the weak trader to rescue her. Given these
inequalities we can sum up the above constraints as
0 ≤M s + de < λkll,sle2 and 0 ≤Mw + de < λkll,sse2. (3.8)
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3.5.2 Existence of Equilibria
The k thresholds mentioned in the previous sections are functions of λ/ασ2. However, they
are too complicated to be solved analytically. We solve them numerically instead.
As mentioned in appendix 3.D.4, we fix the relative market depth ratio, i.e λ/ασ2 and
examine the existence of equilibria as a function of the initial portfolio wealths of the strong
and the weak traders. We find three different scenarios with two positive constants l and u.
• If λ/ασ2 ≤ l, there exist all three types of equilibrium.
We plot this case on Figure 3.1. On the x axis we have the initial wealth of the
strong trader, M s + de, on the y axis we have the starting wealth of the weak trader,
Mw + de. As we have assumed Mw + de ≤ M s + de, we only plot the three types of
equilibrium as a function of the initial portfolio wealths in the bottom right triangle.
The area highlighted with medium grey represents equilibrium when both traders re-
main solvent, i.e., M i + de ≥ 2λass0 e2 for i = s, w. The area highlighted by dark grey
stands for equilibrium with the weak trader’s fire-sale, i.e. when M s + de ≥ λkls,lle2 >
λ
(
asl0 + a
ls
0
)
e2 > Mw + de ≥ 0. Finally the light grey area represents equilibria with
double liquidation; this happens when 0 ≤M i + de < λe2 for i = s, w.
• If l < λ/ασ2 ≤ u, there exist only ss and sl equilibria.
We plot this case on Figure 3.2. On the x axis we have the initial wealth of the
strong trader, M s + de, on the y axis we have the starting wealth of the weak trader,
Mw+de. As we assumed Mw+de ≤M s+de, we only plot the three types of equilibria
as a function of the initial portfolio wealths in the bottom right triangle. The area
highlighted medium grey represents equilibria when both traders remain solvent, i.e.,
M i+de ≥ 2λass0 e2 for i = s, w. The area highlighted by dark grey stands for equilibria
with the weak trader’s fire-sale, i.e. when M s + de ≥ λkls,lle2 > λ (asl0 + als0 ) e2 >
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Mw + de ≥ 0.
• If u < λ/ασ2, there exist only the ss equilibria.
We plot this case on Figure 3.3. On the x axis we have the initial wealth of the strong
trader, M s + de, on the y axis we have the starting wealth of the weak trader, Mw + de. As
we assumed Mw + de ≤ M s + de, we only plot the three types of equilibria as a function
of the initial portfolio wealths in the bottom right triangle. The area highlighted with grey
represents the only equilibria, that is when both traders remain solvent, i.e., M i + de ≥
2λass0 e
2 for i = s, w.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper presents an equilibrium model of endogenous predation with strategic traders,
who are subject to liquidation constraints: when the portfolio value of a trader becomes
negative, she has to unwind her total risky position immediately and leave the market. In
this set up we find that relatively strong traders may trigger the liquidation of relatively
weak trader.
The behaviour of traders depends on their relative proportion of wealth invested in the
risky asset. When these proportions are similar across the traders , they behave cooperatively
and spread their orders over several trading periods, as they would do in a setting without the
constraint. However, if there is a significant difference in the proportion of wealth invested
in the risky asset among the traders, the relatively strong trader (with lower proportion
of wealth invested in the risky asset) predates on the relatively weak trader (with higher
proportion of wealth invested in the asset) by manipulating the price in the first period,
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and forcing her to unwind her risky position immediately. By doing this, the strong trader
benefits from the fire sale resulting from the forced liquidation of the weak trader.
One obvious question is whether a strategic trader will be willing to invest in a portfolio of
illiquid assets, if it makes her prone to predation and hence large losses. The answer coming
from our model is in negative. Our rational arbitrageurs won’t be willing to buy an asset if
they will have to liquidate for sure in the subsequent period. This result is due to the fact
that there is no informational asymmetry in our model and prices and positions are always
deterministic. Therefore, the optimal strategy is to refrain from investing in the market if
other potential strategic traders are present. An extension of the framework including some
information asymmetry is left for future work.
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Figure 3.1: The three types of equilibria plotted as a function of initial wealths for λ/ασ2 = 0.5.The
x axis stands for M s + de, the y axis represents Mw + de. The top right area represents equilibria
when both traders remain solvent, the bottom right grey area stands for equilibria with the weak
trader’s fire-sale, and the bottom left area shows equilibria with double liquidation.
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Figure 3.2: The ss and sl equilibria plotted as a function of initial wealths for λ/ασ2 = .7. The x
axis stands for M s + de, the y axis represents Mw + de. The top right area represents equilibria
when both traders remain solvent, the bottom right are stands for equilibria with the weak trader’s
fire-sale.
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Figure 3.3: The ss equilibrium plotted as a function of initial wealths for λ/ασ2 = 3. The x axis
stands for M s + de, the y axis represents Mw + de. The top right area represents equilibria when
both traders remain solvent.
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Appendix 3.A Trading Strategy of a Constrained Monopoly
Proof of Proposition 1. First we have the following proposition:
Proposition 9 In period 1, conditional on being solvent and having endowment e0 in the
risky asset, the first-best trade size and market-clearing price are given by
x1 = − ασ
2
2λ+ ασ2
e0 and p1 = d− λ ασ
2
2λ+ ασ2
e0. (3.9)
Proof. As the market clearing price is determined by Equation 3.2 with Xt = xt, we
have p1 = d + λx1, hence we can rewrite the optimization problem conditional on being
solvent at date 0 with positions M0 and e0 in the risk less and the risky assets, respectively,
as
max
x1
M0 −
(
d+ λx1
)
x1 + d (e0 + x1)− α
2
σ2 (e0 + x1)
2 .
The FOC is
0 = − (d+ 2λx1)+ d− ασ2 (e0 + x1) ,
which yields
x1 = − ασ
2
2λ+ ασ2
e0 and
p1 = d− λ ασ
2
2λ+ ασ2
e0.
It also gives a continuation value function of
V (M0, e0) = M0 −
(
d+ λx1
)
x1 + d (e0 + x1)− α
2
σ2 (e0 + x1)
2 (3.10)
= M0 + de0 − λ ασ
2
2λ+ ασ2
e20. (3.11)
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Proof of Proposition 1. The solution of the constrained case is presented in two steps.
First we solve the optimization problem given that (i) the strategic trader remains solvent
and (ii) she becomes insolvent, and check in which regions of the parameters it can happen.
Then we compare the certainty equivalents of surviving and liquidating in the overlapping
domain of parameters (when multiple equilibria exist) to see what the optimal strategy is
when both are possible.
Conditional on the strategic trader remaining solvent, she proceeds with the uncon-
strained optimal trades given in Proposition 9 and the date-0 optimization problem becomes
equivalent to the following one:
max
x0
V (M0, e0) = M0 + de0 − λ ασ
2
2λ+ ασ2
e20
= M + de+
(
d− p0
)
x0 − λ ασ
2
2λ+ ασ2
(e+ x0)
2
s.t. M + p0 (x0) e ≥ 0.
The Lagrangian is
L = M + de+
(
d− p0
)
x0 − λ ασ
2
2λ+ ασ2
(e+ x0)
2 − µ [M + (d+ λx0) e] ,
where µ denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the constraint; hence the FOC w.r.t. x0 is:
0 = −λx0 −
(
d+ λx0
)
+ d− 2λ ασ
2
2λ+ ασ2
(x0 + e)− µλe
and
− (M + p0 (x0) e)
 ≤ 0 if µ = 0= 0 if µ > 0. w.r.t. µ.
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Now either µ = 0 which gives
xu0 = −
1
2
ασ2
λ+ ασ2
e
and the market clearing price
pu0 = d−
λ
2
ασ2
λ+ ασ2
e,
or µ > 0, thus M + p0e = 0 and we get
pc0 = −
M
e
= d+ λx0 and
xc0 = −
1
λ
M + de
e
= −1
λ
M + de
e2
e,
which also yield a value function of
V c (M, e) = M + de+
(
d− pc0
)
xc0 − λ
ασ2
2λ+ ασ2
(e+ xc0)
2
= M + de− 1
λ
(
M + de
e
)2
− λ ασ
2
2λ+ ασ2
(
e− 1
λ
M + de
e
)2
.
Now turning to the insolvent case, full liquidation means x1 = −e0 = − (x0 + e), hence
the optimization program becomes
max
x0
M − p0 (x0)x0 − p1 (x1)x1 = M + de− λ
[
x20 + (x0 + e)
2]
s.t. M + p0 (x0) e < 0,
hence the FOC gives
0 = −2λx0 − 2λ (x0 + e) , that is
xl0 = x
l
1 = −
1
2
e
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and
pl0 = p
l
1 = d−
λ
2
e,
which also yield a value function of
V l (M, e) = M + de− λ
[(
xl0
)2
+
(
xl0 + e
)2]
= M + de− λ
2
e2
and the insolvency constraint becomes
M + p0e = M +
(
d− λ
2
e
)
e < 0, i.e.
M + de <
λ
2
e2.
Thus we have the following results: if M + de ≥ λkme2 = λ
2
ασ2
λ+ασ2
e2, the first best trade
(that is the optimal trade in absence of the constraint) is feasible and the trade will proceed
with it; if M + de < λk
m
e2 ≤ λ
2
e2, there are multiple equilibria and the trader can choose
between the second-best survival and the optimal liquidation. She is better off by reducing
her trading speed and hence remaining solvent if and only if
V c (M, e) ≥ V l (M, e) ,
that is
M + de− 1
λ
(
M + de
e
)2
− λ ασ
2
2λ+ ασ2
(
e− 1
λ
M + de
e
)2
≥M + de− λ
2
e2,
which is equivalent to
1
2
(
M + de
e
, e
) 2λ + 2λ ασ22λ+ασ2 1λ 1λ −2λ ασ22λ+ασ2 1λ
−2λ ασ2
2λ+ασ2
1
λ
−λ+ 2λ ασ2
2λ+ασ2
(M + de
e
, e
)′
≤ 0,
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12
(
M + de
e
, e
)
Qm
(
M + de
e
, e
)′
≤ 0
with
Qm =
1
λ (2λ+ ασ2)
 4 (λ+ ασ2) −2λασ2
−2λασ2 λ2 (ασ2 − 2λ)

hence, given that 0 ≤M + de < λ
2
ασ2
λ+ασ2
e2, is satisfied if and only if
λkme2 ≤M + de
with
km =
ασ2 −√λ (2λ+ ασ2)
2 (λ+ ασ2)
.
Since km > 0 if λ/ασ2 < 1
2
, the proof of Proposition 1 is complete.
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Appendix 3.B Trading Strategy of the Duopoly with
same starting positions in both the as-
sets
Proof of Proposition 2. As the general model is solved in Appendices 3.C and 3.D, we
apply those results to the special case and extend it where needed. As noted in Section 3.4,
the identical starting positions imply that either both traders remain solvent or both of the
violate the constraint and get liquidated. Therefore we need to consider two continuation
value functions only.
From Appendix 3.C.1 we know that the optimal trades at date 1 given that both traders
remain solvent are
xi1 = −
ασ2
λ+ ασ2
ei0 +
ασ2
λ+ ασ2
λ
3λ+ ασ2
e0,
with the value function
V ss0
(
M i0,M
−i
0 , e
i
0, e
−i
0
)
= M i0 + de
i
0 −
α
2
σ2
(
ei0
)2
+
1
2
(
ei0, e
−i
0
)
Qss0
(
ei0, e
−i
0
)′
,
where Qss0 is a 2× 2 symmetric, positive definite matrix:
Qss0 =
1
2λ+ ασ2
(
ασ2
λ+ ασ2
)2(
2λ+ ασ2
3λ+ ασ2
)2 (2λ+ ασ2)2 −λ (2λ+ ασ2)
−λ (2λ+ ασ2) λ2
 .
Therefore going back to date 0 trader i has the following optimization problem:
max
xi0
CE
(
W i1
)
= M+de+
(
d− p0
(
xi0
))
xi0−
α
2
σ2
(
e+ xi0
)2
+
1
2
(
e+ xi0, e
−i
0
)
Qss0
(
e+ xi0, e
−i
0
)′
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s.t. market clears : pt = d+ λ
(
2∑
i=1
xit
)
;
dynamic budget constraints : M it = M
i
t−1 − p1xi1
and eit = e
i
t−1 + x
i
t;
final payoff : W i1 = M
i
1 + de
i
1;
insolvency constraint : xi1 = −ei0 if W i0 = M + p0e < 0.
The Lagrangian becomes
L = M + de+
(
d− p0
)
xi0 −
α
2
σ2
(
e+ xi0
)2
+
1
2
(
e+ xi0, e
−i
0
)
Qss0
(
e+ xi0, e
−i
0
)′
−µi (M + p0e) ,
where µi denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the constraint for trader i; hence the FOC w.r.t.
xi0 is
0 =
(
d− p0
)− λxi0 − ασ2 (e+ xi0)
+ (1, 0)Qss0
(
e+ xi0, e
−i
0
)′ − µiλe,
and
− (M + p0 (x0) e)
 ≤ 0 if µ
i = 0
= 0 if µi > 0.
w.r.t. µi.
Given that the two traders get distressed at the same time they must have identical
Lagrange multipliers as well, µ1 = µ2 = µ. If µ = 0, we get the unconstrained solution of
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Appendix 3.D.1, hence
x1u0 = x
2u
0 = −
ασ2
3λ+ 2ασ2
e with
pu0 = d− 2λ
ασ2
3λ+ 2ασ2
e;
thus, as long as the unconstrained strategies are feasible:
M + pu0e ≥ 0, i.e. M + de ≥ λk
d
e2 = 2λ
ασ2
3λ+ 2ασ2
e2,
the two identical traders will proceed with these optimal trades.
If µ > 0, the constraints must bind and hence
pc0 = −
M
e
= d+ λ
(
x10 + x
2
0
)
.
If x10 6= x20, the two identical traders will end up with different positions for period 1 and
after the second round as well, in which case one is better off than the other, which cannot
happen in equilibrium, and hence we must have
x1c0 = x
2c
0 = −
1
2λ
M + de
e
.
It also implies that the value functions become
V c (M, e) = M + de− 1
2λ
(
M + de
e
)2
− λ
2
ασ2 (9λ+ 4ασ2)
(3λ+ ασ2)2
(
e− 1
2λ
M + de
e
)2
.
From Appendices 3.C.3 and 3.D.3 we know that the optimal trading trades given that
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both traders become insolvent are
x10 = x
2
0 = x
1
1 = x
2
1 = −
1
2
e
which yields
p0 = p1 = d− λe,
and the value of this strategy for trader i is
V l (M, e) = M + de− λe2.
Therefore, as long as the unconstrained strategies are not feasible, i.e.
0 ≤M + de < 2λ ασ
2
3λ+ 2ασ2
e2,
the two identical traders either reduce their trading speed or liquidate. Remaining solvent
is preferred if and only if
V c (M, e) ≥ V l (M, e) ,
that is
M + de− 1
2λ
(
M + de
e
)2
− λ
2
ασ2 (9λ+ 4ασ2)
(3λ+ ασ2)2
(
e− 1
2λ
M + de
e
)2
≥ M + de− λe2,
which is equivalent to
0 ≥ 1
2
(
M + de
e
, e
)
Qd
(
M + de
e
, e
)
,
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where
Qd =

1
λ
(
1 +
ασ2(9λ+4ασ2)
4(3λ+ασ2)2
)
−1
2
ασ2(9λ+4ασ2)
(3λ+ασ2)2
−1
2
ασ2(9λ+4ασ2)
(3λ+ασ2)2
λ
[
−2 + ασ
2(9λ+4ασ2)
(3λ+ασ2)2
]
 ,
hence, given that 0 ≤M + de < 2λ ασ2
3λ+2ασ2
e2, is satisfied if and only if
λkde2 ≤M + de
with
kd =
−Qd12 −
√(
Qd12
)2 −Qd11Qd22
Qd11
.
Since kd < 0 if and only if λ/ασ2 is low enough, i.e. there exists an l
d
> 0 such that
λ/ασ2 < l
d
, the proof of Proposition 2 is complete.
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Appendix 3.C Trading Strategy of the Duopoly with
different starting positions in risk free
asset but same position in risky asset -
date 1
3.C.1 Date 1 trades when both traders are solvent
The optimization problem of the strategic trader in period 1 is
V ss0
(
M i0,M
−i
0 , e
i
0, e
−i
0
) ≡ max
xi1
M i0 − p1
(
xi1
)
xi1 + d
(
ei0 + x
i
1
)− α
2
σ2
(
ei0 + x
i
1
)2
,
hence the FOC becomes
0 = −2λxi1 − λx−i1 − ασ2
(
ei0 + x
i
1
)
.
Assuming the symmetric form xi1 = −ass1 ei0 + bss1 e0 where ass1 and bss1 are constants and
e0 =
1
2
(es0 + e
w
0 ) we have
x−i1 = −ass1 e−i0 + bss1 e0 = ass1 ei0 + (bss1 − 2ass1 ) e0,
which yields that
xi1 = −
(λass1 + ασ
2)
(2λ+ ασ2)
ei0 +
λ (2ass1 − bss1 )
(2λ+ ασ2)
e0,
therefore
ass1 =
(λass1 + ασ
2)
(2λ+ ασ2)
and bss1 =
λ (2ass1 − bss1 )
(2λ+ ασ2)
,
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which implies
ass1 =
ασ2
λ+ ασ2
and bss1 =
2λ
3λ+ ασ2
ασ2
λ+ ασ2
.
Hence the optimal period 1 trades when both traders remain solvent are
xi1 = −ass1 ei0 + bss1 e0
= − ασ
2
λ+ ασ2
ei0 +
ασ2
λ+ ασ2
2λ
3λ+ ασ2
e0,
and the market-clearing price is
p1 = d− 2λ ασ
2
3λ+ ασ2
e0.
It also gives that
V ss0
(
M i0,M
−i
0 , e
i
0, e
−i
0
) ≡ max
xi1
M i0 − p1
(
xi1
)
xi1 + d
(
ei0 + x
i
1
)− α
2
σ2
(
ei0 + x
i
1
)2
= M i0 + de
i
0 −
α
2
σ2
(
ei0
)2
+
1
2
(
ei0, e
−i
0
)
Qss0
(
ei0, e
−i
0
)′
where Qss0 is a 2× 2 positive semidefinite matrix:
Qss0 =
1
2λ+ ασ2
a
 (2λ+ ασ2)2 −λ (2λ+ ασ2)
−λ (2λ+ ασ2) λ2
 .
with
a =
(
ασ2
λ+ ασ2
)2(
2λ+ ασ2
3λ+ ασ2
)2
150
3.C.2 Date 1 Trades when one trader is liquidated
Suppose trader w is forced to fire-sell, hence
xw1 = −ew0 .
At the same time trader i is solvent thus her optimization problem is
V sl0 (M
s
0 ,M
w
0 , e
s
0, e
w
0 ) ≡ max
xs1
M s0 − p1 (xs1)xs1 + d (es0 + xs1)−
α
2
σ2 (es0 + x
s
1)
2 ,
therefore her FOC is
0 = −p1 − dp1
dxs1
xs1 + d− ασ2 (es0 + xs1) ,
which yields
xs1 = −
ασ2
2λ+ ασ2
es0 −
λ
2λ+ ασ2
xw1 = −
ασ2
2λ+ ασ2
es0 +
λ
2λ+ ασ2
ew0
and hence the market-clearing price is
p1 = d− λ ασ
2
2λ+ ασ2
es0 − λ
λ+ ασ2
2λ+ ασ2
ew0 .
The continuation values become
V sl0 (M
s
0 ,M
w
0 , e
s
0, e
w
0 ) ≡ max
xs1
M s0 − p1 (xs1)xs1 + d (es0 + xs1)−
α
2
σ2 (es0 + x
s
1)
2
= M s0 + de
s
0 −
α
2
σ2 (es0)
2 +
1
2
(es0, e
w
0 )Q
sl
0 (e
s
0, e
w
0 )
′ ,
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where Qsl0 is a 2× 2 positive semidefinite matrix:
Qsl0 =
1
2λ+ ασ2
 (ασ2)2 −λασ2
−λασ2 λ2
 ;
and
V ls0 (M
w
0 , e
w
0 ,M
s
0 , e
s
0) = M
w
0 − p1xw1
= Mw0 + de
w
0 −
1
2
(ew0 , e
s
0)Q
ls
0 (e
w
0 , e
s
0)
′ ,
where Qls0 is a 2× 2 matrix:
Qls0 =
λ
2λ+ ασ2
 2 (λ+ ασ2) ασ2
ασ2 0
 .
3.C.3 Date 1 Trades when both traders liquidate
The constraint yields that there is not much strategic activity going on here, as
xs1 = −es0 and xw1 = −ew0 ,
which implies
p1 = d− λ (es0 + ew0 ) .
Also, the continuation value functions are
V ll0
(
M i0, e
i
0,M
−i
0 , e
−i
0
)
= M i0 − p1xi1 = M i0 + dei0 −
1
2
(
ei0, e
−i
0
)
Qll0
(
ei0, e
−i
0
)′
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where
Qll0 =
 2λ λ
λ 0
 .
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Appendix 3.D Trading Strategy of the Duopoly with
different starting positions in risk free
asset but same position in risky asset -
date 0
For date 0, we solve for the optimal trades given ( after period 0 trading) both traders remain
solvent; one remains solvent, the other liquidates; both liquidate. Then we consider possible
deviations that may change the state of the world, for example the stronger trader deviates
from an ss (both solvent after period 0 trading) equilibrium and pushes the other trader
into distress. There can be an equilibrium only if there is no potential profitable deviations.
But, since the value functions are quadratic, it will always give us intervals as conditions on
M s + de or Mw + de, so that the equilibrium exists.
3.D.1 Equilibrium of Type 1: Both traders remain solvent
When both traders remain solvent they both satisfy the solvency constraints
M i + p0e ≥ 0 for i = s, w.
Let us analyze the case when the constraints are not binding. We will show later that
in equilibrium the constraint cannot bind for any traders as it would be optimal for at least
one of them to deviate.
From Appendix 3.C.1 we know that the optimal date 1 trades in case both traders stay
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solvent are
xi1 = −ass1 ei0 + bss1 e0 = −
ασ2
λ+ ασ2
ei0 +
ασ2
λ+ ασ2
2λ
3λ+ ασ2
e0 for i = s, w, (3.12)
and the market-clearing price is
p1 = d− 2λ ασ
2
3λ+ ασ2
e0
where e0 =
1
2
(es0 + e
w
0 ), and the value functions are
V ss0
(
M i0, e
i
0,M
−i
0 , e
−i
0
)
= M i0 + de
i
0 −
α
2
σ2
(
ei0
)2
+
1
2
(
ei0, e
−i
0
)
Qss0
(
ei0, e
−i
0
)′
.
where Qss0 is a 2× 2 symmetric, positive definite matrix:
Qss0 =
1
2λ+ ασ2
a
 (2λ+ ασ2)2 −λ (2λ+ ασ2)
−λ (2λ+ ασ2) λ2
 .
where
a =
(
ασ2
λ+ ασ2
)2(
2λ+ ασ2
3λ+ ασ2
)2
.
Going back to date 0 trader i has the following optimization problem
max
xi0
V ss0
(
M i0, e
i
0,M
−i
0 , e
−i
0
)
= M i0 + de
i
0 −
α
2
σ2
(
ei0
)2
+
1
2
(
ei0, e
−i
0
)
Qss0
(
ei0, e
−i
0
)′
= M i + de+
(
d− p0
)
xi0 −
α
2
σ2
(
e+ xi0
)2
+
1
2
(
e+ xi0, e+ x
−i
0
)
Qss0
(
e+ xi0, e+ x
−i
0
)′
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which gives the FOC
0 = −2λxi0 − λx−i0 − ασ2
(
e+ xi0
)
+
(
2λ+ ασ2
)
a
(
e+ xi0
)− λa (e+ x−i0 ) ,
hence
xi0 = −
a (λ+ ασ2)− ασ2
a (λ+ ασ2)− (ασ2 + 3λ)e
= −ass0 e
which implies that the equilibrium price takes the form
p0 = d− 2λass0 e
and the expected utility of trader i is
V ss
(
M i,M−i, e
)
= M i + de+
(
d− p0
)
xi0 −
α
2
σ2
(
e+ xi0
)2
+
1
2
(
e+ xi0, e+ x
−i
0
)
Qss0
(
e+ xi0, e+ x
−i
0
)′
and imply that a necessary condition for the existence of an equilibrium with two solvent
traders is
M i + p0e = M
i +
[
d− 2λass0 e
]
e ≥ 0, that is
M i + de ≥ 2λass0 e2
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In case Mw + de ≤ 2λass0 e2, the first-best trades are not feasible, hence in order to stay
solvent the FOC of the weak trader is replaced by
Mw + p0e = 0,
that is
p0 = −M
w
e
or
xw0 = −
1
λ
Mw + de
e
− xs0,
and therefore the equilibrium trades are given by
xs0 =
λ (1 + a)
[(2λ+ ασ2) (1− a)− λ (1 + a)]
1
λ
Mw + dew
ew
− ασ
2 − (3λ+ ασ2) a
[(2λ+ ασ2) (1− a)− λ (1 + a)]e
= −assC0 e+ bssC0
1
λ
Mw + dew
ew
,
and
xw0 = −
1
λ
Mw + de
e
− xs0 = assC0 e−
(
1 + bssC0
) 1
λ
Mw + dew
ew
,
We can compute the optimal value function by pluging in these optimal trades in V ss0 .
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Deviations
Strong Trader attacks the Weak Trader For the weak trader to be liquidated we need
that
M s + p0e ≥ 0 > Mw + p0e
while the weak trader does not change her optimal trade of period 0:
xw0 = −ass0 e
The strong trader is therefore better off by forcing the weak trader to liquidation if and
only if
V sl
(
M s,M l, e, xs0
) ≥ V ss (M s,M l, e)
Weak Trader decides to liquidate instead of reducing trading speed The strong
trader has trade order
xs0 = −assC0 e+ bssC0
1
λ
Mw + dew
ew
hence for the weak to be liquidated she needs Mw + p0e < 0 ≤M s + p0e
She prefers being liquidated iff
V ls (Mw,M s, e, xw0 ) ≥ V ssC (Mw,M s, e)
We solve the above two inequalities in value functions, which are quadratic in nature.
After several steps of tedious algebra, we find the following constraint on Mw + de, which
ensures that there are no profitable deviations from the equilibrium.
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λkss,sle2 ≤Mw + de.
However, the threshold kss,sl is a functions of λ/ασ2 and it is too complicated to be solved
analytically, so we find existence of equilibriums numerically in Section 3.5.2.
3.D.2 Equilibrium of Type 2: The Strong Trader remains solvent,
the Weak Trader is liquidated
If one trader is liquidated while the other survives with after-trade positions of es0 and e
w
0 ,
the second-period optimal trades are
xw1 = −ew0
and
xs1 =
λ
2λ+ ασ2
ew0 −
ασ2
2λ+ ασ2
es0
while
p1 = d− λ λ+ ασ
2
2λ+ ασ2
ew0 − λ
ασ2
2λ+ ασ2
es0
and the continuation value functions are
V sl0
(
M s0 , e
s
0,M
l
0, e
l
0
)
= M s0 + de
s
0 −
α
2
σ2 (es0)
2 +
1
2
(es0, e
w
0 )Q
sl
0 (e
s
0, e
w
0 )
′ ,
where Qsl0 is a 2× 2 positive semidefinite matrix:
Qsl0 =
1
2λ+ ασ2
 (ασ2)2 −λασ2
−λασ2 λ2

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and
V ls0 (M
w
0 , e
w
0 ,M
s
0 , e
s
0) = M
w
0 + de
w
0 −
1
2
(ew0 , e
s
0)Q
ls
0 (e
w
0 , e
s
0)
′ ,
where Qls0 is
Qls0 =
λ
2λ+ ασ2
 2 (λ+ ασ2) ασ2
ασ2 0
 .
The optimal first-period trades are obtained from the first-order conditions of the two
traders, that is
max
xs0
V sl0
(
M s0 , e
s
0,M
l
0, e
l
0
)
= M s0 + de
s
0 −
α
2
σ2 (es0)
2 +
1
2
(es0, e
w
0 )Q
sl
0 (e
s
0, e
w
0 )
′
= M s + de+
(
d− p0
)
xs0 −
α
2
σ2 (e+ xs0)
2 +
1
2
(e+ xs0, e+ x
w
0 )Q
sl
0 (e+ x
s
0, e+ x
w
0 )
′
hence the FOC is
0 = −4λ λ+ ασ
2
2λ+ ασ2
xs0 − 2λ
λ+ ασ2
2λ+ ασ2
xw0 −
3λ
2λ+ ασ2
ασ2e
while for the weak trader we have
max
xw0
V ls0 (M
w
0 , e
w
0 ,M
s
0 , e
s
0) = M
w + de+
(
d− p0
)
xw0 −
1
2
(ew0 , e
s
0)Q
ls
0 (e
w
0 , e
s
0)
′
hence the FOC is
0 = −2λ3λ+ 2ασ
2
2λ+ ασ2
xw0 − 2λ
λ+ ασ2
2λ+ ασ2
xs0 − λ
2λ+ 3ασ2
2λ+ ασ2
e
that is
xw0 = −
λ+ ασ2
3λ+ 2ασ2
xs0 −
1
2
2λ+ 3ασ2
3λ+ 2ασ2
e
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combining the FOCs gives
xs0 =
1
2
[
λ
λ+ ασ2
2λ+ ασ2
5λ+ 3ασ2
− ασ
2
λ+ ασ2
]
e = −asl0 e
and
xw0 = −
1
2
4λ+ 3ασ2
5λ+ 3ασ2
e = −als0 e > −
1
2
e
and
xs1 =
[
−1
2
ασ2
λ+ ασ2
+
1
2
λ
λ+ ασ2
3λ+ 2ασ2
5λ+ 3ασ2
]
e > xs0
and xw1 = −
[
1
2
6λ+3ασ2
5λ+3ασ2
+ 3λ+3ασ
2
5λ+3ασ2
]
e < −1
2
e
which yields a market-clearing price of
p0 = d− λ
[
asl0 + a
ls
0
]
e
p0 = d+ λ
[
−1
2
ασ2
λ+ ασ2
e+
1
2
(
λ
λ+ ασ2
2λ+ ασ2
5λ+ 3ασ2
− 4λ+ 3ασ
2
5λ+ 3ασ2
)
e
]
and
p1 = d+ λ
[
−1
2
ασ2
λ+ ασ2
e+
1
2
(
λ
λ+ ασ2
2λ+ ασ2
5λ+ 3ασ2
− 5λ+ 3ασ
2
5λ+ 3ασ2
)
e
]
< p0
We can plug in the values of trade and price the value functions V sl
(
M s,M l, e
)
and
V ls (Mw,M s, e)
For the existence of an equilibrium of this type we also need
M s + p0e ≥ 0 > Mw + p0e
In case this does not hold, the constraint will bind for the strong trader and hence instead
161
of her FOC we have
−M
s
e
= p0 = d+ λ [x
s
0 + x
w
0 ]
that is
−1
λ
M s + de
e
= xs0 + x
w
0 ,
which together with the weak trader’s FOC yields
xw0 = −
1
2
2λ+ 3ασ2
2λ+ ασ2
e+
λ+ ασ2
2λ+ ασ2
1
λ
M s + de
e
= −aC0 e+ bC0
1
λ
M s + de
e
and
xs0 = a
C
0 e−
(
1 + bC0
) 1
λ
M s + des
es
,
which satisfies
M s + p0e = 0 > M
w + p0e
Again we can plug in the values in the expected utilities V sl
(
M s,M l, e
)
and V ls (Mw,M s, e)
Deviations
There are three realistic deviations from this setup. In two of them it is the weak trader who
might want to change the state of the world. In the other case, the strong trader might not
want to reduce her trading speed in the constrained case in order to stay alive and decides
to liquidate instead.
Weak Trader forces the Strong to liquidate She can decrease the first period price
by excessive selling hence forcing the strong trader to liquidate.
However this strategy is probably suboptimal: the weak trader has to bear an extra cost
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for selling with the price drop and in the second period too she liquidates at a lower price
as now the strong trader is not able to drive the price up by buying part of the weak’s
endowment. Let us check this.
The weak trader needs to make sure
0 > M s + p0e
and she will do it iff
V ll (Mw,M s, e, xw0 ) ≥ V ls (Mw,M s, e) ,
Weak Trader rescues itself The other possible deviation is when the weak trader is
willing to bear some cost in the first period by buying and hence increasing the price in
order to meet solvency and be unconstrained in the next trading round.
While the strong trader sticks to her original trade, she needs to make sure
Mw + p0e ≥ 0,
ans she will do it iff
V ss (Mw,M s, e, xw0 ) ≥ V ls (Mw,M s, e) ,
Strong Trader decides to liquidate In case the strong trader just barely survives, which
includes reducing her trade speed at date 0 and thus bearing a cost coming from insufficient
price-impact reduction, she may want to violate the constraint and hence liquidate everything
in period 1.
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While the date 0 trade of the weak trader does not change, she needs to make
0 > M s + p0e
s > Mw + p0e
w
and she will do it iff
V ll (M s, es,Mw, ew, xs0) ≥ V sl (M s, es,Mw, ew) ,
We solve the above three inequalities in value functions, which are quadratic in nature.
After several steps of tedious algebra, we find the following constraint, which ensures that
there are no profitable deviations from the equilibrium.
λk
ls,ss
e2 > Mw + de,
However, the threshold k
ls,ss
is a function of λ/ασ2 and is too complicated to be solved
analytically, so we find existence of equilibriums numerically in Section 3.5.2.
3.D.3 Equilibrium of Type 3: Both Traders liquidate
As derieved in appendix 3.C.3, the date 1 trades when both traders liquidate are
xs1 = −es0 and xw1 = −ew0
hence
p1 = d− λ (es0 + ew0 )
164
and therefore
V ll0
(
M i0, e
i
0,M
−i
0 , e
−i
0
)
= = M i + dei +
(
d− p0
)
xi0
−λ (ei + xi0)2 − λ (ei + xi0) (e−i + x−i0 )
the optimal first-period trades hence satisfy
max
xi0
V ll0
(
M i0, e
i
0,M
−i
0 , e
−i
0
)
= M i+de+
(
d− p0
)
xi0−
1
2
(
e+ xi0, e+ x
−i
0
)
Qll0
(
e+ xi0, e+ x
−i
0
)′
which gives the FOC of
0 = −4λxi0 − 2λx−i0 − 3λe
for i = s, w, therefore
xi0 = −
1
2
e
which yields
xi1 = x
i
0 = −
1
2
e
and
p0 = p1 = d− λe
The value of this strategy for trader i is
V ll
(
M i,M−i, e
)
== M i + de− λe2
It also has to satisfy that both trader violate the constraint, that is
M i + p0e = M
i +
(
d− λe) e < 0
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which is equivalent to
0 ≤M i + de < λe2 for i = s, w,
Deviations
Strong Trader rescues itself It means that she wants to increase the price to make sure
M s + p0e ≥ 0 > Mw + p0e
while
xw0 = −
1
2
e
The strong trader is better off by rescuing itself iff
V sl (M s,Mw, e, xs0) ≥ V ll (M s,Mw, e)
Weak Trader rescues Strong Trader It might be optimal to rescue the strong trader
(even if she would not rescue itself) as the second period price might be higher in case
the strong trader remains solvent and therefore the liquidation payoff of the weak trader is
higher.
In this scenario the strong trader proceeds with
xs0 = −
1
2
e
while the weak trader wants to increase the price to make sure
M s + p0e ≥ 0 > Mw + p0e
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The weak trader is better off rescuing the strong iff
V ls (Mw,M s, e, xw0 ) ≥ V ll (M s,Mw, e)
Weak Trader rescues both: itself and the strong trader It might be optimal to
rescue itself (and at the same time the strong trader as well) since she could perform the
first-best trade in period 1.
In this scenario the strong trader proceeds with
xs0 = −
1
2
e
while the weak trader wants to increase the price to make sure
M s + p0e ≥Mw + p0e ≥ 0
The weak trader is better off rescuing both of them iff
V ss (Mw,M s, e, xw0 ) ≥ V ll (M s,Mw, e)
We solve the above three inequalities in value functions, which are quadratic in nature. After
several steps of tedious algebra, we find the following constraints, which ensures that there
are no profitable deviations from the equilibrium.
0 ≤ M s + de < λkll,sle2 and
0 ≤ Mw + de < λkll,sse2.
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However, the threshold k
ll,sl
, k
ll,ss
are functions of λ/ασ2 is too complicated to be solved
analytically, so we find existence of equilibriums numerically in Section 3.5.2.
3.D.4 Existence of Equilibria
As mentioned before, it is easy to see that the k thresholds are functions of λ/ασ2, however, it
is too difficult to solve for them analytically. We have instead tried to solve them numerically.
We fix α and σ2 and vary λ. Given these values, we compute the optimal trades for each of
the equilibriums. Then we check for the deviations. We find the following. When the relative
market depth ratio, λ/ασ2, is lower than a threshold l, which is approximately equal to 0.65,
there exists all three types of equilibriums; when λ/ασ2 is between the lower and a upper
threshold, u, which is approximately equal to 0.71, i.e. when 0.65 = l < λ/ασ2 ≤ u = 0.71,
there exists only the ss and sl equilibria; when relative market depth ratio, λ/ασ2, is higher
than the upper threshold i.e. λ/ασ2 > 0.71, there exists only the ss equilibrium.
168
Bibliography
[1] Acharya, Viral, Peter DeMarzo and Ilan Kremer (2010). Endogenous Information Flows
and the Clustering of Announcements. Working Paper, NYU and Stanford University.
[2] Aragon, George O., Hertzel, Michael, Shi, Zhen , 2010. Why do Hedge Funds Avoid
Disclosures? Evidence from Confidential 13F Filings.
[3] Attari, M., Mello, A. S., 2006. Financially constrained arbitrage in illiquid markets.
Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, 30, 2793-2822.
[4] Brady, N. F., Cotting, J. C., Kirby, R. G., Opel, J. R., and Stein, H. M., 1988. Report
of the presidential task force on market mechanisms. U.S. Government Printing Office.
[5] Brown, Keith C., W. V. Harlow, and Laura T. Starks (1996). Of Tournaments and
Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry. The
Journal of Finance 51, 85-110.
[6] Brown, Stephen and Schwarz, Christopher, 2010. The Impact of Mandatory Hedge Fund
Portfolio Disclosure.
[7] Brunnermeier, M. K., Pedersen, L. H., 2005. Predatory Trading. Journal of Finance, 60,
1825–1863.
[8] Cai, Fang, 2003, Was there front running during the LTCM crisis?, FRB International
Finance Discussion Paper.
169
[9] Capon, Noel, Gavin J. Fitzsimons, and Russ Alan Prince (1996). An individual level
analysis of the mutual fund investment decision. Journal of Financial Services Research
10, 59-82.
[10] Carhart, Mark M., 1997. On persistence in mutual fund performance, Journal of Finance
52, 57-82.
[11] Carlin, B. I., Lobo, M. S., and Viswanathan, S., 2007. Episodic liquidity crises: coop-
erative and predatory trading. Journal of Finance, 62, 2235–74.
[12] Carlin, Davies and Iannaccone,2010. Competition and Transparency in Financial Mar-
kets, Working Paper.
[13] Chen, Joseph, Samuel Hanson, Harrison Hong and Jeremy C. Stein, 2008. Do hedge
funds profit from mutual-fund distress? Working Paper.
[14] Chen Qi, Goldstein Itay and Jiang Wei, 2010, Payoff Complementarities and Financial
Fragility: Evidence from Mutual Fund Outflows, Journal of Financial Economics 97, 239-
262.
[15] Chu, C. S., Lehnert, A., and Passmore, W., 2009. Strategic trading in multiple assets
and the effects on market volatility. International Journal of Central Banking, 5, 143–172.
[16] Cohen, Randolph B., Joshua Coval and Lubos Pastor, 2005. Judging fund managers by
the company that they keep, Journal of Finance 60, 1057-1096.
[17] Coval, Joshua D., and Erik Stafford, 2007, Asset Fire Sales (and Purchases) in Equity
Markets, Journal of Financial Economics 86, 479512.
[18] Deegan, Craig and Gary Carroll (1993). An Analysis of Incentives for Australian Firms
to Apply for Reporting Excellence Awards. Accounting and Business Research 23, 219-227.
170
[19] Deegan, Craig and Anthony Hallam (1991). The Voluntary Presentation of Value Added
Statements in Australia: A Political Cost Perspective. Accounting and Finance 31, 1-21.
[20] Dye, Ronald A. (1985). Disclosure of Nonproprietary Information. Journal of Accounting
Research 23, 123-145.
[21] Fishman, Michael J., and Kathleen M. Hagerty (1990). The Optimal Amount of Dis-
cretion to Allow in Disclosure. Quarterly Journal of Economics 105, 427-444.
[22] Fishman, Michael J., and Kathleen M. Hagerty (2003). Mandatory Versus Voluntary
Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers. Journal of Law, Eco-
nomics and Organiza-tion 19, 45-63.
[23] Frank, Mary M., James M. Poterba, Douglas A. Shackelford, and John B. Shoven, 2004,
Copycat funds: Information disclosure regulation and the returns to active management
in the mutual fund industry, Journal of Law and Economics 47, 515-541
[24] Gallaher, Steven, Ron Kaniel, and Laura Starks (2005). Madison Avenue Meets Wall
Street: Mutual Fund Families, Competition and Advertising. Working Paper, University
of Texas and Duke University.
[25] Gallego-Alvarez, Isabel, Isabel Maria Garcia Sanchez and Luis Rodriguez Dominguez
(2008). Voluntary and Compulsory Information Disclosed Online. Online Information Re-
view 32, 596-622.
[26] Ge, Weili; Zheng, Lu (2005). The Frequency of Mutual Fund Portfolio Disclosure. Work-
ing Paper, Ross School of Business, the University of Michigan.
[27] Grossman, Sanford J. (1981). The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Dis-
closure about Product Quality. Journal of Law and Economics 24, 461-483.
[28] Grossman, S. J. and Hart, O. D. (1980). Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids. Journal
of Finance 35, 323-334.
171
[29] Gualtieri, Paolo and Giovanni Petrella (2005). Does Visibility Affect Mutual Fund
Flows?. Working Paper, Catholic University, Milan, Italy.
[30] Hasbrouck, Joel, Trading costs and returns for US equities: Evidence from daily data,
2005.
[31] Gromb, D., Vayanos, D., 2002. Equilibrium and welfare in markets with financially
constrained arbitrageurs. Journal of Financial Economics, 66, 361-407.
[32] Jung,Woon-Oh and Kwon, Young K. (1988). Disclosure When the Market Is Unsure of
Information Endowment of Managers. Journal of Accounting Research 26, 146-153.
[33] Leland Rex Robinson, Investment Trust Organization and Management. New York:
The Ronald Press Company, 1926: 87-89.
[34] Kacperczyk, Marcin, Clemens Sialm and Lu Zheng, 2008, Unobserved actions of mutual
funds, Review of Financial Studies 21, 2379-2416.
[35] Kondor, P., 2009. Risk in dynamic arbitrage: the price effects of convergence trading.
Journal of Finance, 64, 631-655.
[36] Korkeamaki,T, Puttonen,V, Smythe, T, 2007, Advertising and mutual fund asset flows,
International Journal of Bank Marketing Vol. 25 No.7, 2007 pp. 434-451
[37] Liu, J., Longstaff, F., 2004. Losing money on arbitrage: optimal dynamic portfolio
choice in markets with arbitrage opportunities. Review of Financial Studies, 17, 611-641.
[38] Loewenstein, R., When Genius Failed: The Rise and Fall of Long-Term Capital Man-
agement, Random House, New York.
[39] Lou, Dong, 2010, A Flow-Based Explanation for Return Predictability.
[40] Martin, Gerald S. and John Puthenpurackal, 2008, Imitation is the sincerest form of
flattery: Warren Buffet and Berkshire Hathaway, working paper.
172
[41] Milgrom, Paul R. (1981). Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and
Applications. The Bell Journal of Economics 12, 380-391.
[42] Shin, Hyun Song (2003). Disclosures and Asset Returns. Econometrica 71, 105-133.
[43] Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1997. The limits of arbitrage. Journal of Finance, 52, 35-55.
[44] Sirri, Erik, and Peter Tufano, 1998, Costly search and mutual fund flows, Journal of
Finance 53, 1589-1622.
[45] Verrecchia, Robert E. (1983). Discretionary Disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Eco-
nomics 5, 179-194.
[46] Wang, Yu, and Marno Verbeek, 2010. Better than the original? The relative success of
copycat funds. Working paper. Rotterdam School of Management Erasmus University.
[47] Wermers, Russ (2001). The Potential Effects of More Frequent Portfolio Disclosure on
Mutual Fund Performance.Investment Company Institute Perspective, pp. 1-12.
[48] Wermers, Russ, Tong Yao and Jane Zhao, 2007. The investment value of mutual fund
portfolio disclosure, Working paper.
[49] Wong, Jilnaught. (1988). Economic Incentives for the Voluntary Disclosure of Current
Cost Financial Statements. Journal of Accounting and Economics 10, 151-167.
[50] Xiong, W., 2001. Convergence trading with wealth effects. Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics, 62, 247-292
173
